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I. INTRODUCTION

"[Setoff] is grounded on the absurdity of making A pay B when B owes
A."

Studley v. Boylston National Bank, 229 U.S. 523,528 (1913)
Traditional bankruptcy has honored2 setoff 3 even though this has the effect
of conferring a priority on holders of setoff rights. Yet courts and commentators
2

See Barkley Clark, Bank Exercise of Setoff. Avoiding the Pitfalls, 98 BANKING L.J. 196
(1981); Carmelita Hammon, Note, Setoff In Bankruptcy: Is the CreditorPreferredor Secured,
50 COLO. L.REV. 511, 517 (1979); Harold A. Justman, Comments on the Bank's Right of
Setoff Under the ProposedBankruptcy Act of 1973, 31 Bus. LAw. 1607 (1976); Philip T. Lacy,
Setoff and the Principle of Creditor Equality, 43 S.C. L. REV. 951 (1992); Ephraim K.
Leibowitz, Banks' Right to Setoff in Bankruptcy: "From Erosion To Extinction," 94 BANKING
L.J. 796 (1977); John C. McCoid II, Setoff. Why Bankruptcy Priority?, 75 VA. L. REV. 15
(1989); John Teshelle, Banker's Right of Setoff-Banker Beware, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 40, 66
(1981).
311 U.S.C. § 553 (1988):
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections 362 and
363 of this title, this title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a
mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose before commencement of the case under this title against a claim of such creditor
against the debtor that arose before commencement of the case, except to
the extent that(1) the claim of such creditor.., is disallowed other than under section
502(b)(3) of this title
(2) such claim was transferred, by an entity other than the debtor, to
such creditor(A) after the commencement of the case; or
(B)(i) after 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and
(ii) while the debtor was insolvent; or
(3) the debt owed to the debtor by such creditor was incurred by such creditor(A) after 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;
(B) while the debtor was insolvent; and
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have for many years worried about the policy of giving priority to setoff
holders in bankruptcy.4 The text of the Bankruptcy Code has presented priority
for qualifying setoffs.
One qualification for priority of setoffs has received little attention because
of a focus on the limitations on setoff expressed in § 553.5 The focus on these
§ 553 limitations on setoff has perpetuated the traditional precode canon that
setoffs enjoy priority in bankruptcy. Setoff rights come from nonbankruptcy
law, usually state law but also federal nonbankruptcy law. But nonbankruptcy
law no more obviously grants priority rights to setoff than it generally grants
any creditor rights of priority.6 Indeed, it is much easier to suppose what
nonbankruptcy law does than to state plausibly what nonbankruptcy law does.

(C)for the purpose of obtaining a right of setoff against the debtor.
(b)(1) Except with respect to a setoff of a kind described in section
362(b)(6), 362(b)(7), 365(h)(2), or 365(i)(2) of this title, if a creditor offsets

a mutual debt owing to the debtor against a claim against the debtor on
or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition, the trustee
may recover from such creditor the amount so offset to the extent that
any insufficiency on the date of such setoff is less than the insufficiency
on the later of(A) 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and
(B)the first date during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of
the filing of the petition on which there is an insufficiency.
(2) In this subsection, "insufficiency" means amount, if any, by which a
claim against the debtor exceeds a mutual debt owing to the debtor by the
holder of such claim.
(c) For the purposes of this section, the debtor is presumed to have been
insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of
the filing of the petition.
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1988) [hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated,
footnote citations to a section refer to Bankruptcy Code sections].
Bankruptcy Act § 68 (Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as amended, 11 U.S.C § 108(a)-(b)
(repealed 1979):
a. In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the estate of a
bankrupt and a creditor the account shall be stated and one debt shall be
set off against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid.
b. A setoff or counterclaim shall not be allowed in favor of any debtor
of the bankrupt which (1) is not provable against the estate and allowable
under section 93 of this title; or (2) was purchased by or transferred to him
after the filing of the petition, or within four months before such filing, with
a view to such use and with knowledge or notice that such bankrupt was
insolvent or had committed an act of bankruptcy.
4

See infra notes 28-30.

5

See infra note 75.
One theory of bankruptcy holds that state law should provide the norms of

6

bankruptcy distributions. THOMAS JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITSOF BANKRUPTCY LAW

(1986). One might object to this view on the grounds that state law is too indeterminate
on distributive issues created by insolvent debtors to provide distributive norms. For
example, in applying state law to constructive trusts, analysis of Jackson's theory reveals
that it is neither constructive nor trustworthy as Dean Philip T. Lacy has similarly
applied the same theory to support priority for setoffs in bankruptcy. Dean Lacy's recent
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993
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Bankruptcy has adopted nonbankruptcy law as generally conclusive on the
validity of a setoff as well as almost all other questions of whether a claim of a
creditor is valid. 7 Bankruptcy need not also adopt any particular treatment
which nonbankruptcy law might give to setoffs or any other valid
nonbankruptcy claim. For example, bankruptcy generally recognizes the
contract rights of a debtor's promisees 8 and the tort claims of a debtor's victims.
Yet bankruptcy does not guarantee promisees or victims that they will receive
treatment in a bankruptcy proceeding in the face amount of their claims. The
face amount of a creditor's claim represents the same thing in bankruptcy as it

rejoinder counters Professor John C. McCoid's conclusions by showing that some setoff
rights, for example, those acquired while the debtor was solvent, do not offend the
principle of equality among creditors as framed under preference law. Lacy, supra note
2; McCoid, supra note 2.
These examples suggest what may be true generally about the usefulness of a state
law theory. State law may require an elaborate interpretive dance to determine what
priorities it commends. Jackson seems to assume that a constructive trust claimant
would win the race to a debtor's assets under state law and so deserves bankruptcy
protection. Lacy assumes a holder of setoff rights would win the same race.
Each may believe that these parties have a significantly higher likelihood of
collecting their claims against an insolvent debtor than average creditors of tile same
debtor. But state law presents no obvious or uniform schedule of probable debt
collectibility for any setoff or other claim.
Of course, if probable debt collectibility were the measure for bankruptcy priority,
as it sometimes is, (see infra note 14) bankruptcy could conveniently choose to impose
priority to all claims of a certain kind while recognizing that only the mean or median
of such claims trulyholds a higher than average collectibility rate. In this article I suggest
that the code requires a case-by-case assessment of a setoff claim for priority based on
a sufficiently high likelihood of collectibility under state law to merit priority in
bankruptcy. But, the very different text of the former Bankruptcy Act presumed a high
likelihood of collectibility, although the courts completely honored that text only in
liquidations (which ironically had the least of any other policy basis). See infra Part IV.
Currently, bankruptcy does not even indulge liens with any greater presumption of
greater collectibility.
The controversy noted on constructive trusts has curiously generated more
caselaw and commentary than yet pertains to setoff. Alone, this bibliography provides
a readily available case study of current philosophies of bankruptcy law: Compare
Thomas Jackson, Statutory Liens And Constructive Trusts In Bankruptcy: Undoing The
Confusion, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287 (1987) and Mario Cuevas, Bankruptcy Code Section 544(a)
and Constructive Trusts: The Trustee's Strong Arm Powers Should Prevail, 21 SETON HALL
L. REV. 678 (1991) with Emily Sherwin, Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy, 1989 ILL. L. REV.
297 and David G. Carlson, Tlie Trustee's Strong Arm Power Under tHe Bankruptcy Code, 43
S.C. L. REV. 841, 921-34 (1992). See also Jeffrey Davis, Equitable Liens and Constructive
Trusts in Bankruptcy: Judicial Values and the Limits of Bankruptcy, 41 U. FLA. L. REV. 1
(1989); Andrew Gold, Note, The Strong A rmi ClauseOutniuscles the Constructive Trust-In
re General Coffee Corp.: City National Bank of Miami v. General Coffee Corp., 39 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 757 (1985).
7§ 502(b)(1).
8

Major exceptions to this rule are the limitations on recoverable damages in
bankruptcy of lessors and employees (§ 502(b)(6)-(7)) who receive perhaps
compensating alternative abstract bankruptcy rights under other bankruptcy sections.
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does under state law: An abstract right to a judgment establishing the validity
of a claim.
From one significant point of view, every creditor deserves to receive 100
cents on each dollar it is owed. We often talk as though state law provides for
the collection of debt of 100 cents on a dollar. This cannot be the view of state
law when the debtor is insolvent. State law has never guaranteed that the debt
it makes enforceable will be collectible in its face amount. Rather, state law has
provided creditors with the abstract legal rights to enforce and collect debts. In
view of this legal machinery, one might illogically equate the proposition of
what is a valid claim to what is a collectible claim. But state law generally does
not, and of course generally cannot, actually enforce the precept that debts
should be paid in full. That every creditor deserves full payment is thus a
proposition states might adopt for solvent debtors. 9 State law permits the legal
enforcement of this proposition when the debtor is solvent.
Bankruptcy law, on the other hand, deals with the problem of insolvency in
which alternative moral imperatives might support widely different
bankruptcy approaches. A number of alternative moral imperatives could
direct the essential task of converting prebankruptcy abstract legal rights of
creditors into concrete bankruptcy rights, 10 or in determining who gets the
debtor's assets.
9
This statement must exclude the class of debtors who are insolvent only by the
exclusion of exempt property. Unlike other debtors (for example, corporations),
individual debtors (oxygen-breathers) for certain purposes are insolvent even though
they have assets of a value greater than their liabilities or revenues sufficient to meet
current debt obligations under the law of exempt property. For example, excluding
exempt property, pursuant to fraudulent transfer law, debt obligations may leave an
individual debtor with liabilities exceeding assets or current obligations exceeding
revenues. See Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act §§ 1-2. Bankruptcy is quite unsettled
about the proper treatment of individual debtors solvent when exempt property is
included in the calculation and insolvent when exempt property is excluded.
Prebankruptcy planning presents the individual debtor the opportunity to exempt
property. Some prebankruptcy planning is permissible and some not. So far a so-called
"pig rule" provides an ad hoc bankruptcy limitation on prebankruptcy planning. E.g.,
NCNB Nat'l Bank v. Bowyer (In re Bowyer), 916 F.2d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir. 1990);
Northwest Bank v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988); see also Fla. Stat. § 222.30
(1993)(invalidating exemptions created by conversion of nonexempt into exempt
property with intent to hinder creditors).
10

For example, bankruptcy law might distinguish among the claims of creditors by
validating certain claims and invalidating others. Bankruptcy could strive to pay as
much as possible to all those claims which are more deserving than others.
Or, bankruptcy could create a comprehensive hierarchical ladder of creditor
claims. If payment in full of the most deserving creditor claims was the guiding norm,
bankruptcy could pay only the top rung(s) to the extent of the value of the bankruptcy
estate. In this scheme no claims valid under state law would need de jure invalidation,
although most would receive de facto invalidation.
Though the latter bankruptcy scheme seems more like traditional and present
bankruptcy law, elements of the former also manifest themselves in our bankruptcy
law. Bankruptcy law has a rather short hierarchical list of the priority claims which often
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The present Bankruptcy Code adopts an imperative with respect to claims
in bankruptcy which rests on applicable nonbankruptcy law. The code leaves
to nonbankruptcy law the largely unfettered 11 function of identifying the
validity and the amount of the claims of creditors. 12 Bankruptcy uses these
abstract prebankruptcy legal rights to determine the validity and the amount
of the claims of creditors. This determination results in a conversion of
13
prebankruptcy rights into abstract bankruptcy rights.
Creditors who achieve the best or better positions in debt-collection in
bankruptcy proceedings are typically those who had priority over less
well-positioned creditors before bankruptcy proceedings. As a result, the
prebankruptcy calculus of the collectibility of any particular claim against a
debtor comes to light in bankruptcy. For example, when a bank has a valid lien
against an asset of an insolvent debtor, state law informs bankruptcy law about
the relative collectibility of the bank's claim as against the other claims against
14
debtor.

de facto invalidates unsecured claims excluded from the list. The list begins with secured
claims and continues with the unsecured claims expressly granted priority in § 507.
11Identifying claims valid in bankruptcy is the function of the bankruptcy concept
of allowable claims, which generally proceeds under § 502. However, an allowable
claim in a bankruptcy assures a creditor only an abstract bankruptcy right to
compensation from the assets of the bankruptcy estate. Like state law, bankruptcy
makes no guarantees of the present monetary value of allowable claims. Instead, such
claims are rights to participate either in the asset distribution of a liquidation or in the
bargaining (including voting) of a reorganization.
12§ 502.
13

This may lead to the idea that state law may play an informative role, with respect
to the different legal questions ofhow to convert abstract bankruptcy rights into concrete
rights. For example, because state law has norms which identify the validity and
amounts of claims, one might expect it to have norms regarding how to rank such claims.
However, state law does not obviously rank the priority of claims, despite longstanding
suppositions to the contrary. One priority principle from state law stands out: First in
time is first in right. Although this "race" idea often appears in state law, it applies to
priority disputes among lien or ownership claimants and it typically ranks lien or new
owners above the claims of former owners' unsecured creditors. Among unsecured
claims, state law has no priority rule. Generally, state law presents unsecured creditors
a ratability rule under which last counts as much as first. This ratability rule combines
with the priority rule of "first in time" to offer creditors an opportunity: claimants who
first acquire payment or a lien securing payment typically have the better rights to the
property with which the debtor made or secured payment.
Perhaps the soundest characterization of state law is opportunity. Every creditor
has the opporttity to take a lien and acquire a higher priority than unsecured creditors.
For the conversion of abstract legal rights to concrete legal rights, state law provides
every creditor an equal opportunity to vindicate its abstract right. Thus, among abstract
rights, state law presents a normative message of equal creditor opportunity.
Nevertheless, by the time a debtor files bankruptcy, creditors will have begun to avail
themselves of the state law debt-collection opportunities.
14 Bankruptcy might find this information interesting or irrelevant. Whatever
normative force comes from the relative collectibility of the various claims against a
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Bankruptcy thus uses relative collectibility to determine distributional
priorities as in the case of liens. 15 Bankruptcy also uses considerations apart
from collectibility to determine bankruptcy priority. Employees receive
priority for certain claims even though they may not have been well-positioned
in any race for a debtor's assets outside of a bankruptcy proceeding. 16
Unsecured claims enjoying no specific code priority share proportionately, or
ratably, according to the amounts of their allowed claims in whatever remains
in the bankruptcy estate. 17 The nature of the treatment of the different kinds of
claim is sometimes not easily comprehended. Some claims seem to enjoy
priority rather than mere ratability, although neither relative collectibility nor
distinct bankruptcy aims seem to support their priority. Setoffs are an example
of the latter.
Setoffs appear to enjoy priority in the code. However, no present bankruptcy
aim justifies a general priority for setoffs. 18 Relative collectibility also does not
support a general priority for setoffs. 19 Arguably, a different bankruptcy code
might need to give general priority to setoffs. 20 The Bankruptcy Code has no

debtor depends on the forcefulness of relative collectibility as a criterion for distributive
bankruptcy issues.
Bankruptcy should never accept an apriori normative force of relative collectibility
unless it wishes to reward those who were equally favored under state law but who
more vigorously engaged in debt-collection. One mistaken reason for rewarding the
more vigorous debt-collectors would be the assumption that "rewarding" follows state
priority law. This reasoning, however, transforms a state principle of equal opportunity
into a state priority policy. A state might adopt a pure opportunity priority system
because it wishes to avoid making these distributive decisions. If this were true,
bankruptcy would have more reason to give normative force to state neutrality than to
the priorities which happened to arise from neutrality. Honoring what is no more than
the probability of debt-collectibility as a priority would require a different justification.
On the other hand, bankruptcy could make a commitment to relative collectibility
for a number of reasons. Bankruptcy might wish to: 1) damage prebankruptcy creditor
expectations as little as possible and honor vigorous debt-collectors as holding higher
expectations; 2) minimize manipulative forum-shopping which may injure legitimate
claims; and 3) have no independent reason to favor any creditor over others. In addition,
bankruptcy might choose relative collectibility because it is an inexpensive priority
scheme or one so expensive or uncertain that it forces creditors to bargain among
themselves regarding how a bankruptcy estate shall be distributed. Bankruptcy might
shirk relative collectibility and prefer pure ratability, or it might shirk collectibility for
other priority schemes which serve other purposes.
15§§ 506(a), 724(b)(1), 1129(b)(2)(a).
16§ 507(a)(3)-(4).
17§ 726(a)(1).
18

McCoid has laid the foundation for this assertion on which Part Ill builds. See
McCoid, supra note 2.
19d.
20Granting priority to setoff in bankruptcy may have the effect of encouraging
holders of setoff rights to refrain from exercising those rights before a bankruptcy case
commences. If true, this may provide a debtor in bankruptcy the opportunity to use
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need to provide such priority to setoffs. Relative collectibility does favor certain
setoffs, but it does not confer a general priority to setoffs inasmuch as the
collectibility probability of setoffs seems no more than average.
Thus, it is not surprising that a careful examination of the code shows that
setoffs may receive priority in bankruptcy. Setoffs, however, do not, and should
not, obtain bankruptcy priority simply because they are valid under state law.
This article explains why any priority for setoff in bankruptcy is more
complicated than usually assumed. The validity of an abstract legal right prior
to bankruptcy is only the first step in the process of obtaining priority in
bankruptcy. When the code validates setoff, it merely accepts the abstract legal
right of the setoff. In order to have priority, a setoff must pass a relative
21
collectibility test, commonly known as valuation under § 506(a).
Bankruptcy traditionally treats the rights of a setoff holder against an
insolvent bankruptcy estate as though the estate were solvent. The tradition of
fully recognizing setoff in these insolvency proceedings has continued
primarily due to a policy favoring the reorganization of distressed businesses.
The policy of protecting setoff for the purpose of providing reorganizing
businesses with needed operating funds became anachronistic with the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.2 2
Setoff holders are given secured claims under the code.23 The secured claim
is a feat of legal imagination because claims are abstract rights against someone
and secured claims are abstract rights against something. A setoff holder has a
claim against the debtor in bankruptcy and is also subject to liability on a claim
of a debtor in bankruptcy. As compared to other creditors holding in personam

funds in a bank account during a bankruptcy proceeding. A policy favoring
reorganization would permit this use, as does the code. See infra Part I. But that
reorganization policy need not be implemented by a setoff priority.
Section 68 of the Bankruptcy Act granted priority to setoff rights which survived
despite criticism perhaps because, absent these rights, the reorganizing debtor would
lack the funds to operate the business while restructuring its finances and operations.
The Bankruptcy Code has no such reason to grant setoff priority because it directly
creates the opportunity to use funds subject to setoff. Nor does the code obviously grant
setoff priority independent of relative collectibility.
21
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
shows that the legislature recognized that setoffs might be subject to valuation under
§ 506(a): "The subsection [506(a)] also provides for the valuation of claims which involve
setoffs under section 553." S.R. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5854. (note that the comparable provision of the House Committee Report,
95-595, lacks this precise statement. See infra note 23).
22

See infra Part 11I.

23§ 506(a). The legislative history shows appreciation for the similarity of liens and
setoffs which led to merging the two as code secured claims.
"[Tihe analogy between a deposit or debt that may be offset and a
security interest is not complete. Nevertheless, it is adequate to justify
giving an offsetting creditor the same protection as the bill gives secured
creditors generally."
H.R. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 184 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6146.
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claims against a bankrupt debtor, a setoff holder is indistinguishable from the
other creditors. Yet a setoff holder effectively manages to enjoy a priority over
other creditors in bankruptcy by effectively receiving payment on its claim by
a setoff rate rather than a pro rata figure. In other words, a setoff holder is
distinguished from other creditors on the grounds that the setoff holder owes
money to the estate. An unsecured creditor may become a secured claimant
because it owes as much to the estate as the estate owes it.
A mistake supports the imagination behind this idea of setoff. The mistake
is found in the assumption that equal face-amount debts owed to a bankruptcy
estate and by a bankruptcy estate are balanced. Bankruptcy takes the
Wonderland view by concluding that these mutual claims have equivalent
value. The purpose of this counterfactual assumption (how can a claim against
an insolvent have the same value as a claim in same amount against a solvent?)
eventually became an incentive to banks from setting off, so that a
reorganizable debtor might have the use of its bank account to continue
business operations. No longer necessary for that blunt purpose, the setoff
24
seems to live on.
When parties simultaneously owe each other money, which is presently
payable, they agree 25 to net-out the claims or debts out and the net debtor will
24

See infra Part mI.

25

Like other agreements under the objective theory of contract law, neither party
need actually or subjectively assent to the netting out of the claims. Parties with frequent
common dealings as debtor and as creditor often do provide for setoff in their express
agreements or through their course of dealings. Even without such overt behavior, the
law accords each the right of setoff to the extent it is a creditor. Some setoff rights may
thus arise without either party's manifesting assent at all. In these contexts
quasi-contract may more accurately ground the right of setoff. "Setoff is a creature of
equity, and arises without the aid of a special contract between the bank and depositor."
See Clark, supra note 2, at 233. Seen as a cure for unjust enrichment outside of bankruptcy
as between two parties each of whom is debtor and creditor, setoff in bankruptcy affects
other parties and may conversely unjustly enrich a setoff holder.
The right of setoff as a sta te law creation may aim only at the two-party relationship
as opposed to the exercise of setoff under which state law may recognize the exercise of
a right of setoff as a priority. E.g., U.C.C. § 4-303 (1990). A right of setoff at bankruptcy
resembles an unadjudicated claim of a constructive trust. Bankruptcy law has struggled
with claims of the latter. See supra note 6.
The leading cases tend to involve an ownership claim to property of the estate
frequently deriving from state constructive trust law. This has become the most
controversial setting for determining whether a claimant owns the property or whether
the claimant is just another unsecured creditor of the estate. Cases supportive of the
nonbankrupt party's claim of ownership include: Sanyo Elec., Inc. v. Howard's
Appliance Corp. (In re Howard's Appliance Corp.), 874 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1989); City Nat'l
Bank of Miami v. General Coffee Corp. (In re General Coffee Corp.), 828 F.2d 699 (11th
Cir. 1987), cert.denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988); Vineyard v. McKenzie (In reQuality Holstein
Leasing), 752 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1985) (approving in theory and not on the facts
presented). Cases rejecting the nonbankrupt party's claim of ownership include: First
Capital Mortg. Loan Corp. v. Research-Planing, Inc., (In re First Capital Mortg. Loan
Corp.), 917 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1990); Belisle v. Plukett, 877 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1989);
Torres v. Eastlick (In re North Am. Coin & Currency, Ltd.), 767 F.2d 1573 (9th Cir. 1985)
(refusing to apply constructive trust ownership theory absent fra ud).
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pay the other the balance owing. This simple process is the origin of setoff and
remains the legal basis for setoff. Although untroubling when it occurs between
solvent parties, setoff may become troubling when one party is insolvent. In a
bankruptcy proceeding, the domicile of the insolvent, setoff raises positive and
normative questions.
Bankruptcy law never fully respected setoffs and setoff rights. 26 Setoffs have
remained controversial under the Bankruptcy Code27 as they had been under
28
the repealed Bankruptcy Act.

Bankruptcy may have conflicts to resolve which state law does not address. That
appears to be true for constructive trust claims in bankruptcy, which move a simple
two-party constructive trust issue into a multi-party context. Likewise, a claim of a setoff
right in bankruptcy may ask for a priority over other creditors based on state law
authority which addresses only two-party disputes-the setoff holder and its
depositor/debtor. In multi-party contexts, such as distributional disputes among
creditors, the state law validating setoff may rest primarily on the premise thata debtor's
creditors may have to bear the cost of finding further assets of a debtor, which will have
satisfaction from a ready asset such as a bank account. State debtor-creditor law, a body
of law which is almost entirely ancient, may have been formed without any view that
the debtor is insolvent.
26

See supra note 3, for text of § 553. The bankruptcy code creates the distinction
between setoffs exercised prior to bankruptcy and those that are not. The few rules
provided by the code distinguish setoff rights held at the time a bankruptcy case begins
(§ 553(a)) from setoffs exercised prior to bankruptcy (§ 553(b)). The magic of legal
imagination permits such fantastic distinctions. One legally clear occurrence of the
exercise of a setoff right seems to be the moment a court orders one debt to offset another.
Yet, so many setoffs are held by banks or other depository institutions that, by the
customs of such institutions, setoff occurs when some customary procedure is followed
by which a deposit account is "seized." This has led to a second perhaps clear legal
instance of setoff: setoff occurs when such setoff rights holders say so.
As with the first example, whether the setoff was valid often depends on whether
a court eventually will agree with the setoff holder's action. But, the time at which a
court rules that a setoff right is valid may no more be the time at which a party offsets
than would a contract occur when a court rules a contract to be valid. Surely there are
contract rights and setoff rights antedating judicial rulings. The model of bank setoff
suggests that setoff occurs when one debtor, such as a bank, refuses the demand for
payment by another debtor, its depositor. In nonbank contexts it is the apparent
insignificance of a rejected demand for payment, the absence of a customary materiality,
that leads to the belief that at bankruptcy the code might separate exercised or actual
setoffs from setoff rights which have not been acted on. Thus, § 553 breaks into two
different categories the question of setoffs in bankruptcy as though the real world
supported the idea that some setoffs have not occurred before bankruptcy and others
have. This reasoning rests on the groundless belief that prior to bankruptcy demands
and refusals to pay have not occurred between the eventual debtor in bankruptcy and
its debtors and creditors.
27

Title 11 of the United States Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).

28

Hitherto, the controversy about setoff has rested on principle: does the code
priority for setoff violate a fundamental bankruptcy principle, such as a principle of
creditor equality? This question was recently asked and answered affirmatively by
Professor John C. McCoid. McCoid, supranote 2. Dean Philip T. Lacy's recent rejoinder
counters McCoid's conclusions by showing that some setoff rights, those acquired while
thedebtorwas solvent, do notoffend the principle of equality among creditors as framed
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Cases 29 and commentary 30 have questioned the normative wisdom of the
code's validation 31 of setoff rights. In addition, the code provisions regarding
setoff are less plain than practice books suggest.

under preference law. Lacy, supra note 2. This article takes a different view than their
template of preference law to assess the proper scope of setoff rights in bankruptcy. See
infra note 39. This paper questions the conventional code reading adopted or assumed
by McCoid and Lacy, and apparently, by everyone else.
The significant interpretive difficulty on setoff has concerned the dispute about
theeffectof the automatic stay on setoff rights including whether a bank's administrative
freeze of an account violates the stay. Compare Daniel Keating, Offensive Uses of the
Automatic Stay, 45 VAND. L. REV. 71 (1992) (automatic stay enables bankruptcy court
review of setoff validity) and B.F. Goodrich Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Patterson
(In re Patterson), 967 F.2d 505 (11th Cir. 1992) (a credit union's freeze of deposit without
relief from stay violates automatic stay) with Jack F. Williams, Application of the Cash
CollateralParadigmto the Preservationof the Right Setoff in Bankruptcy, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 27
(1990)(freeze should not violate stay provision because cash collateral under § 363(c)(2)
requires adequate protection of setoff holder's rights).
In addition, setoff under the Bankruptcy Act was often questioned. Indeed, the
Supreme Court ruled that setoffs needn't be recognized in railroad reorganization under
former § 77 because of the policy favoring railroad reorganization. Lowden v.
Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 298 U.S. 160 (1936); Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors,
Inc., 417 U.S. 467 (1974). Other bankruptcy courts had likewise suggested under the Act
that setoff is merely permissive and is a notion which has recurred under the code. See
infra Part Il.
29
E.g., Elcona Homes Corp. v. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. (In re Elcona Homes
Corp.), 863 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1988) (presenting objections to bankruptcy's apparent
favoring of setoff holders); McCoid, supra note 2 (setoff conflicts with the principle of
creditor equality); Lacy, supra note 2 (challenging McCoid's analysis as to setoff rights
inter alia obtained while the debtor was solvent as no violation of the equality principle).
Lacy's defense against the claim that setoff is a misguided preference uses the law of
preference to show some setoffs are not preferences. In this he assumes that the
immunization of transfers prior to a preference period or while a debtor was solvent, is
sound bankruptcy law. That is questionable. Second, the timing of the right to setoff
may not be the appropriate focal point for comparative analysis with preference law.
Thus, if a setoff right accrued while the debtor was solvent, but setoff was exercised only
after the debtor became insolvent, the latter event seems the better analogue of a
preferential transfer.
The creditor who has not setoff by the date of bankruptcy, as with the creditor who
has done so on the eve of bankruptcy, might have the setoff avoided or affected in
bankruptcy under a principle of creditor equality. Similarly, Lacy suggests that his
quarrel with McCoid is principally that the latter fails to evaluate his anti-setoff views
with the bankruptcy theory of Baird and Jackson. Lacy, supra note 2, at 953 n.13.
Baird and Jackson's theories largely advocate bankruptcy's recognition of creditor's

nonbankruptcy entitlements. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY (1992);
THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAw (1986). Lacy argues

that creditor's nonbankruptcy entitlements recognized in bankruptcy include setoff
rights.
But this overstates the issues between the "state's rights" and the 'bankruptcy
policy" groups. Jackson has emphasized that a major task of bankruptcy law is the
proper translation of substantive nonbankruptcy rights in the bankruptcy context rather
than resting bankruptcy analysis on whatever label a state might formally use. The setoff
question is a preeminent example of the problem about which people might disagree
as to the correct bankruptcy translation. No one seems to maintain a strong view of
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Setoffs may offend a notion of equality among creditors because the setoff
holder, when conceived as an unsecured creditor, receives better treatment than
other unsecured creditors.32 Honoring setoff in bankruptcy may pay a setoff
holder more than that paid to other unsecured creditors. On the other hand,
some setoff holders, along with other creditors (such as lienors), may deserve
priority in bankruptcy as "secured claims".3 3 The Bankruptcy Code has
seemingly taken the latter view in providing a "secured claim" to setoff
holders. 34 Like liens, setoffs may enjoy better treatment in bankruptcy than
claims of unsecured creditors. 35 Legitimate doubts about the analogy of setoffs
to liens remain, as does traditional bankruptcy hostility to liens and other
priority treatments of any creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding.
either state rights in bankruptcy or of bankruptcy policy. For example, the bankruptcy
policy view does not suggest that nonbankruptcy entitlements should be ignored in
developing bankruptcy law; nor has the pro-entitlements view taken the opposite
position. The conflict remains relatively mild and theoretically undefined with
abundant examples of disagreement but no broad view by which to comprehend why
it isn't all ad hoc. See also David G. Carlson, Banknptcy Philosophy,85 MICH. L. REV. 1341
(1987).
30Commentary supporting setoff in bankruptcy: Hammon, supra note 2; Lacy, supra
note 2; Leibowitz, supra note 2. Contra McCoid, supra note 2; D.E. Murray, Bank Versus
Creditors of Their Customers: Set-offs Against Customers' Accounts, 82 COM. L.J. 449 (1977).
31Because the parties to a setoff relationship are both creditors and both debtors, I
use debtor when referring to the debtor in bankruptcy and setoff holder or setoff
claimant in referring to the nonbankrupt party. Two reported cases posed a setoff
relationship while each was a debtor in bankruptcy. There I resort to proper names. See
infra at notes 212-36.
Under § 553 a right of setoff is recognized with the following limits: (1) the body
of § 553(a) does not create a right of setoff which was not valid prior to the bankruptcy
of the debtor against whom a setoff right is asserted; (2) § 553(a)(1) bars setoff based on
a disallowed claim against a debtor, and this is very significant as the text will explain;
(3) § 553(a)(2) bars setoff based on a claim against a debtor transferred by an entity other
than the debtor either after commencement of the bankruptcy case, or within 90 days
before the date of the filing of the petition; (4) § 553(a)(3) bars setoff through a claim
against the debtor acquired for the purpose of obtaining a setoff right within 90 days of
the filing of the petition and while debtor was insolvent; (5) § 553(b) recaptures a setoff
right exercised prior to the date of the filing of the petition to the extent creditor has
reduced the insufficiency between its claim and the debtor's claim between either 90
days before the filing or the first date there is an insufficiency and the date of the exercise
of the setoff right. In addition the code bars the exercise of a setoff right by a claim that
arose against the debtor before the commencement of the case under § 362(a)(7) though
relief from this stay may be granted. § 362(d).
Other than these limitations on setoff rights in bankruptcy, one further unnoticed
limitation is the thesis of this article: under § 506(a) the court may value the setoff right
at less than its face value. See infra Part I.
32

See McCoid, supra note 2.

33

See Lacy, supra note 2.

34§ 506(a).
35§ 553.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss4/3

12

19931

SETOFF AND BANKRUPTCY

Full recognition of liens in bankruptcy only follows from bankruptcy tests
to which setoffs are generally immune. 36 Although setoffs must pass their own
tests under the code, 3 7 setoffs share another basic test with liens for their

qualification as a secured claim under § 506(a). This test, valuation, limits the
priority of liens and setoffs in bankruptcy. While the valuation of liens as
secured claims in bankruptcy is as common and notorious as debt in
bankruptcy, valuation of setoff rights in bankruptcy is unknown. The thesis

presented here holds that valuation of setoff rights is no less appropriate than
lien valuation,38 and further, that the text of the code readily accepts such an
unconventional reading.
Setoff overcompensates 39 the holder of a claim against the debtor whenever
its face value exceeds the real value of that claim. 40 Setoff in bankruptcy has

36

The preface to § 553(a) provides the setoff immunity from the trustee's strong arm
power under § 544(a), which avoids liens (and other transfers of the debtor) unperfected
at bankruptcy.
37

Section 553 imposes five tests for recognizing setoffs in bankruptcy. See supra note
31. The first requires that the setoff be valid under nonbankruptcy law. The other four
are independent bankruptcy tests: §§ 553(a)(1)-(3), 553(b).
381 presume here the normative probity of lien valuation and traditional lien priority
in bankruptcy. My thesis merely follows from acceptance of that premise, the code text
and sundry comparisons of similarity and difference between bankruptcy treatments
of creditors. Until I find time to repair my broken normativity machine, I shall have to
endure drawing normative conclusions based on the general lines of treatment that
bankruptcy gives to various creditors. I leave to others their own broken normativity
machines and invite them to limit the normative appeal of their speculations in this way.
Even though one may derive no final 'ought' from swinging at the often dizzying 'is' of
the Bankruptcy Code, it does cut down strikeouts and may yield an attainable hit for
justice by treating equals the same.
39

Permitting a creditor to offset its debt to a bankruptcy estate in the full face amount
of the debt owed by the debtor offends the norm of fraudulent transfer law. Face amoutt
valuation of setoff preserves a principle of reciprocity between a setoff holder and its
debtor. As between these two parties alone, their contractually-based rights demand
full setoff valuation. On the other hand, bankruptcy places the reciprocal rights of
creditors against the bankruptcy estate and imposes fraudulent transfer and preference
law to limit any individual entity's rights in or against property of a bankruptcy estate
or property which ought to be in an estate. Fraudulent transfer law cuts deeper than
preference law which is, in principle, simply an aspect of the overcompensation aspect
of fraudulent transfer law.
The highly technical preference law (§ 547(b)) forces the sharing with other
creditors of certain prebankruptcy transfers of a debtor's property, when made: 1) on
account of an antecedent debt; and 2) within the preference period; and 3) while debtor
was insolvent. This yields the creditor more than she would have received in a
liquidation. § 547(b)(1)-(5). Preference law is taken to implement a policy of equality
among creditors. It is perhaps disputable that the preference law should be taken to
ground a principle of equality. Another justification for preference law is the chilling of
premature collection activity by creditors which may preclude a debtor's business
turnaround. Perhaps another argument in support of preference law is the maintenance
of the debtor's assets as a business unit which may produce a greater yield for creditors
in bankruptcy.
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None of these reasons should persuade anyone that bankruptcy needs present
preference law. All these preference law justifications are apologies for an embarrassing
tradition since preference recoveries cannot produce ratable equality in a code which
itself has less equality than inequality in its favoring so many different claimants (e.g.,
§§ 506-507) who frequently take much if not most of every bankruptcy estate. No more
than the society at large in which equality is more a dream than a reality, may
bankruptcy implement a principle of equality among creditors. Chilling premature
collections through preference law, or maintaining the business as a more valuable unit
through preference law is hardly the feat of preference law in a bankruptcy code which
permits creditors and debtors to file bankruptcy and obtain an automatic stay without
so much as a judicial fare-thee-well. The power to file and invoke the automatic stay
protects against premature collections and preserves the "common pool." Preference
law deters no one from prebankruptcy collection.
Fraudulent transfer is the normative basis by which bankruptcy should measure
setoff. The thesis here is that the positive basis for setoff-the code-doesn't require the
traditional or conventional priority for setoff. Reading the code as suggested in this
article would permit bankruptcy treatment of setoff consistent with the principles of
fraudulent transfer by compensating setoff with its real value.
40

The real value of a general claim against an insolvent is the face amount of a claim
discounted by the odds and time of its collection. This approach theoretically differs
from previous suggestions. See McCoid, supra note 2, at 1-6. McCoid's proof of the
violation of the principle of equality rests on contrasting setoff protection with
preference law and suffers under Dean Lacy's criticism. See Lacy, supra note 2. Yet, the
many histories, purposes and immunities within preference law leave little case for it.
The vicious preference clock, telling either Creditor Savings Time or Creditor
Immunity Time, cannot itself be explained by any sound principle of equality among
creditors when the problematical aspect of preference law remains proximity to
bankruptcy rather than just insolvency. But this needs a few words of explanation: a
transfer which otherwise qualifies for preference avoidance under § 547(b) is not
voidable as a preference if effectively made prior to the preference period. Yet a debtor
might have been insolvent, or as insolvent, prior to the preference period when the
transfer was made. That creditor may be overcompensated for its claim if bankruptcy
law permits its retention. Preference law tolerates the retention. Fraudulent transfer law
should not tolerate the retention, but the issue there of "reasonably equivalent value" is
problematical. "Value" includes satisfaction of antecedent debt. § 548(d)(2)(A). If the real
value of the debt or claim for which payment is made prior to the preference period is
less than the payment, then the creditor may have received more than the reasonably
equivalent value of its claim. To that extent it is theoretically a fraudulent transfer.
§ 548(a)(2)(A)-(B). Fraudulent transfer law articulates the overcompensation principle,
if never perfectly, and is the proper theoretical basis for understanding setoff in
bankruptcy.
Some might still insist that the principle of equality grounds the overcompensation
test as implemented in fraudulent transfer law. But that is wrong because the
overcompensation principle may benefit third parties or debtors independent of their
creditors. For example, the rights to avoid transfers on exempt property (§§ 522(d)-(i))
benefit debtors, not creditors. I don't think § 522(f), for example, is necessarily wise to
the extent the courts have applied it to cases in which a debtor has chosen or been
restricted to the state exemptions, because the overcompensation principle is there
infringed by overcompensa ting debtors who may thereby gain greater exemption rights
than outside bankruptcy. See Owen v. Owen, 111 S. Ct. 1833 (1991); Lawrence Kalevitch,
Lien Avoidance on Exemptions Property: The False ControversyAbout Opt-out, 44 OKLA. L.
REV. 443 (1991); C. Robert Morris, Bankruptcy Fantasy: The Site of Missing Words and The
Order of Illusory Events, 45 ARK. L. REV. 265 (1992).
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traditionally provided the setoff holder with a right to cancel its liability to the
bankrupt estate by the face amount of the setoff holder's claim against the
41
estate. Although the code defines setoff as a secured claim, the implication of
including setoffs within the concept of secured claims has not been addressed.
The code treats liens and setoffs as secured claims. A lienor under § 506
receives a secured claim in the face amount of the debt secured only if the
collateral has at least that value. 42 Section 506(a) requires collateral valuation
to determine the amount of the secured claim.43 Setoff in the face amount of a
creditor's claim likewise requires valuation. Part I144 discusses § 506(a) and
§ 553 and how they may limit, in appropriate cases, the setoff right to less than
the face amount of a creditor's claim. Part II shows that this reading of the
Bankruptcy Code is not only consistent with § 553, but also readily accepted
under § 553. Part II continues with a more detailed examination and analysis
of § 553. Part III compares the different kinds of setoffs with liens and other
creditors' rights and shows that certain setoffs compare well with creditors who
enjoy no special bankruptcy treatment, even though these creditors were
well-positioned until bankruptcy.45 Part IV continues the theme of the positive
analysis of Part II, and the comparative analysis of Part III, to set forth an

41 E.g., Lacy, supra note 2, at 959; McCoid, supra note 2, at 15-16, 27-39 ; BAIRD, supra
note 29, at 206; Frank Kennedy, Secured Creditors Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 15
IND. L. REV. 477, 487 (1982).
Professor Kennedy also explained the purpose of § 553(b)'s limitation on setoff as
perhaps different from the principle of equality among creditors: "The application of
this [§ 553(b)] test only to pre-petition setoffs is intended to deter them in the interest of
enhancing the chances that debtors in distress may survive financial crises as a result of
the exercise of restraint by their bank creditors." Kennedy, supra, at 491 n.89. Yet,
Professor Kennedy might have thought the equality principle so implicit that he might
assume no one would think his identification of a policy of deterrence behind § 553(b)
as exclusive. See also supra note 20.
A policy of deterring prebankruptcy setoffs by bank creditors has some
effectiveness under § 553(b) because a bank creditor can setoff almost instantly. So its
collections by setoff are different from the typical unsecured creditor whom only the
mythology of preference law could deter. Bank setoff may be the only effective creditor
collection which can disempower the general timing power bankruptcy gives debtors
(or groups of creditors). Professor Kennedy's statement of the purpose of § 553(b)
provides an incentive to creditors, including banks, against offsetting during the 90 days
before bankruptcy, presumably by protecting the right of setoff for those creditors who
don't setoff until after bankruptcy (and by leave of court-§ 362(a)(7)). Part Ill addresses
this "reward" justification of setoff, and the theses of Part I and II may diminish the
bankruptcy value of a setoff right even for those who wait.
42

Other requirements for this conclusion include that the debt be allowable under

§ 502.
43§ 506(a).
44

Infra note 49.

45Infra note 92.
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explanation of why the intuitions regarding the preferential aspect of setoffs
were curbed by a policy goal which has become anachronistic. 46
Part V discusses valuation of setoff rights in bankruptcy. This discussion may
disappoint anyone predisposed to thinking that valuation of setoff rights might
be simple or quick. However, no one familiar with the valuation process of
collateral in bankruptcy should be surprised. Still, this may discourage
appreciation of the theses presented, and may strengthen the tradition of
valuing setoffs in the face amount of the creditor's claim. Consistency and
integrity would require performing the same valuation for secured claims
which are liens. 47 Part VI addresses postbankruptcy setoff rights and inquires
as to the effects of exempt property, debt discharge and confirmation on setoff
48
rights.
Some setoffs deserve validation in full in bankruptcy proceedings, even after
bankruptcy proceedings have come to discharge or confirmation. Others
deserve treatment no different than gifts by insolvents. The remaining setoff
claims require careful handling.
II. SETOFF AND THE

CODE TExT

The voluntary exchange of something relatively worthless for something
relatively valuable may be permissible between the immediate parties as a
valid contract but it is a voidable fraudulent transfer when the party who
received something relatively worthless was or thereby became insolvent. 49
Such exchanges impair the rights of third-parties, the creditors of the insolvent.
The general principle supporting bankruptcy's compensation of creditors
derives from fraudulent transfer law. No one should take from a a debtor more
than its fair share. Some transferees, including creditors, will take more than
others because their rights were relatively more valuable before bankruptcy. 50
Some creditors will take more because specific federal bankruptcy policies
define their fair share, regardless of their relative prebankruptcy value. 51 No
federal bankruptcy policy supports an indiscriminate priority in bankruptcy
for a holder of a setoff claim. 52 Thus, any priority for setoff in bankruptcy must
derive from the relative value of a setoff before bankruptcy. Some setoff claims
have no more relative value than some creditors have sufficient collateral to
back their claims. Under such circumstances, bankruptcy's recognition of setoff

46

Infta note 158.

47

1nfra note 195.

48

Infra note 205.

49

E.g., Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act § 5(a).

50§ 502.

51E.g., § 507.
52

Section 553(a) rather neutrally permits recognition of setoffs in bankruptcy to the
extent setoffs are recognized outside of bankruptcy.
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in the face amount of a creditor's claim confers a gift on the setoff holder and
violates the fraudulent transfer principle.
A. Section 506(a)
The code treats a setoff just like a secured claim. Under § 506(a), the code
may determine that a setoff right is a secured claim. When a traditional lienor
under real or personal property law has a secured claim under § 506(a), the
amount of the secured claim is the value of the collateral. 53 Section 506(a) grants
a valid 54 setoff holder "a secured claim.., to the extent of the amount subject
to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to the extent.., the
55
amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim."
Conventional analysis reads the "amount subject to setoff, as the case may
be" as the face amount of the creditor's claim against the estate. 56 Under this
analysis, the amount of the secured claim a setoff holder receives under § 506(a)
follows from the allowed claim of the creditor under § 502. 57 This reading of
the code permits overcompensation and relative favoring of setoff holders in
bankruptcy and begs the question of whether the code does give setoff holders
priority. The previously quoted code text and § 553 suggest a different analysis,
which, although more complicated, is responsive to the distributive fairness

53§ 506(a).
54
Section 553 must recognize that a setoff is valid before § 506(a) applies. The latter
incorporates the former. Interestingly, this is also true conversely. § 553(a)(1).
55

Id.

56

See supra note 39.

57E.g., GEORGE M. TRELSTER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRuPTcY LAW 169 (1986),

which refers only to disallowed under § 502. Another commentator attributes the
inclusion of setoff as a secured claim under § 506(a) as necessary to § 553(b): "Without
section 506(b)'s [506(a)] inclusion of a right of setoff in its definition of secured claim,
every pre-bankruptcy setoff would result in an improvement in position. With section
506(b) [506(a)], it is necessary to look to section 553(b) to determine which setoffs result
in an impermissible pre-bankruptcy improvement in position." DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL.,
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 945-46 (3d ed. 1987).

But, § 553(b) alone suffices for the calculation of any improvement in position due
to a setoff taken within 90 days before bankruptcy. Under that provision the critical term
is "insufficiency" which is defined therein as the "amount, if any, by which a claim
against the debtor exceeds a mutual debt owing to the debtor by the holder of such
claim." § 553(b)(2). A court compares the insufficiencies at two specified dates and
thereby determines any recoverable improvement-in-position. No recourse to § 506
enters this separate § 553(b) analysis. However, the amount by which the setoff did not
improve the holder's position may remain for valuation as a secured claim under
§ 506(a) if the trustee or debtor obtains the use of such funds under § 363(c)(2). See infra
notes 171, 194. Otherwise, no issue of any "secured claim" may arise from the setoff.
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issues which trouble judges like Richard Posner 58 and scholars like John
McCoid. 59
The quoted text of the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly provide the
computation of the "amount subject to setoff, as the case may be".60 What the
section teaches is that the amount subject to setoff is the allowed secured claim
of the setoff holder.61 For the case-by-case determination ("as the case may be")
of the "amount subject to setoff," setoff claimants may undergo valuation, as
do lien claimants, to determine the allowed secured claims. 62 In lien cases,
bankruptcy determines the value of the collateral in order to determine the
allowed secured claim. 63 Likewise, bankruptcy determines the value of the
amount subject to setoff. When the setoff right has a lesser value than the
face-amount of the creditor's claim against the debtor, § 506(a) may limit the
setoff in bankruptcy, just as it limits a lien to the extent that the debt exceeds
the determined value of the collateral.
Section 506(a) permits real valuation of setoff rights in bankruptcy. "An
allowed claim"64, begins § 506(a), is "a secured claim to the extent of the amount
subject to setoff... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that.., the amount
so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim."
Determination of "the amount subject to setoff' is critical to this definition of
the "secured claim" that the section bestows upon any setoff claimant. What is
the "the amount subject to setoff'? Readers of this sparse language need to
know the meaning of this critical expression in order to determine what is the
secured claim of a setoff holder.
In the traditional setoff formula, DC 65 - CC66 or CC - DC, the amount subject
to setoff is either DC or CC. The setoff amount which any creditor has is the
amount of its claim reduced to the extent to which its own claim exceeds the
claim against which setoff may be taken. From the point of view of the creditor
who has not filed bankruptcy, its setoff right is CC - DC. CC may be taken to
58

Elcona Homes Corp. v. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. (In re Elcona Homes Corp.),

863 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1988).
59

See supra notes 28-30.
60§ 506(a).
61

Determination of a secured claim is the purpose of § 506.

62

"Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the
proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on
such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest." § 506(a). See supra
note 37.
63
United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd. (In re Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.), 484 U.S. 365, 372 (1988).
64

"An allowed claim," the phrase with which § 506(a) begins, means a claim which
§ 502 deems valid against a bankruptcy estate.
65DC equals the bankruptcy debtor's claim.
66

CC equals the creditor's claim.
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equal the allowed unsecured claim of the setoff claimant, or the latter
discounted to true value. The former interpretation supports the conventional
face-value treatment of setoff; the latter supports the real value interpretation
suggested here. Under the statutory text CC may equal either; thus, § 506(a)
permits bankruptcy courts to determine the amount subject to setoff to be the
real value of the creditor's claim, CC. This is the consequence of the drafters'
use of the expression "the amount subject to setoff" without defining or further
explaining that expression. This consequence does not necessarily reflect the
intention of the drafters.
Using face-value figures in the setoff formula assumes that the critical
expression, "the amount subject to setoff," may be derived directly from the
amounts of the prebankruptcy claims of each party. Arguably, this derivation
is consistent with the drafters' expectations, that the traditional netting out of
mutual claims followed setoff analysis. The net result is an amount subject to
setoff, at face-valuation of the setoff claimant's setoff right, which may well be
appropriate when the unsecured claim is able to be satisfied in full. When, in
a bankruptcy proceeding, that cannot be accomplished, devaluing setoff rights
may be more appropriate under the code text.
Section 506(a) refers to § 553, which is conventionally read as the critical code
provision on setoff. In general, § 553 does not conclude its work until § 506(a)
has allowed or disallowed the setoff right.6 7 This follows not from the fact that
§ 506 precedes § 553 in the code, but rather because § 553 incorporates § 506
and requires setoff determination under § 506(a). If the latter permits setoff
valuation as here suggested, § 553 does as well.
B. Section 553
Prefatorily, § 553 teaches that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section
and in sections 362 and 363 of this title, this title does not affect any right of a
creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor ... against
a claim of such creditor against the debtor . . ."68 Setoff is a "right of a creditor
to offset a mutual debt." Whatever right to offset that a creditor may have to
offset in bankruptcy cannot exceed its nonbankruptcy right. Whether a creditor
has any such nonbankruptcy right is far more complex than typically
addressed in bankruptcy discussions. To the bankruptcy writer, the right may
be assumed. If a creditor would be denied setoff outside of bankruptcy, in

67

Section 553(a)(1) specifically makes this point, although it does not expressly relate
its use of the term "disallowed" to § 506(a). Section 553(a)(1) does present the idea that
a setoff right might be disallowed for its purposes, such as limiting setoff rights in
bankruptcy, for any disallowing reason other than § 502(b)(3). See infra text
accompanying note 55.
68§ 553(a).
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whole or part, then to that extent there is no bankruptcy right protected by
§ 553.69

Those debts which are mutual are the subject of a long and frequently
troubling history in bankuptcy and debtor-creditor law. The doctrine of
mutuality of debts requires that, on some scale of parallel planes, each debt
must have arisen more or less on the same plane for setoff to be permitted. 70
Thus, where the bank holds a loan claim for money against D and D has a
deposit account with that bank, the debts are mutual; and where the bank has
the monetary claim but holds money in trust for D, the debts are not mutual,
as the bank is a trustee, not a debtor. Preoccupation with the mutuality doctrine
has obscured the question of the amount of the setoff. The reference to the
nonbankruptcy right of setoff in § 553(a) may suggest that the code is
incorporating nonbankruptcy law to provide the amount of the setoff right.
However, the reference to nonbankruptcy law may only determine the abstract
question of whether a setoff claimant has any setoff right and may leave for
bankruptcy determination the amount of the setoff right under §§ 553 or 506. 71

69

Section 553(a)(1) requires that the setoff right asserted must not be disallowed. It
may be disallowed under § 502(b)(1), like any other claim, to the extent it is
unenforceable outside of bankruptcy. See Murray, supra note 30.
70
1t is often said that the debts must arise in the same capacities, as debtors and
creditors. Tradex, Inc. v. United States (In re IML Freight, Inc.), 65 B.R. 788, 793 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1986). See Clark, supranote 2, at 214-222; Murray, supranote 30. An interesting
recent case barred setoff and permitted a preference action against a prebankruptcy
purported setoff of a claim of the Small Business Administration with debtor's tax
refund. Jarboe v. United States Small Business Admin. (In re Hancock), 137 B.R. 835, 846
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1992) (stating that "The question is whether, for bankruptcy
purposes, this Court should treat Federal Agencies such as IRS and SBA as separate
entities." Yes.); accord In re Merhoff, 88 B.R. 922 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1988); In re Butz, 86
B.R. 595 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1988); In re Rinehart, 76 B.R. 746 (Bankr. S. D. 1987), affd in
part,rev'd in part, Small Business Admin. v. Rinehart, 887 F.2d 165 (8th Cir. 1989). Contra
United States ex rel. Small Business Admin. v. Rinehart, 88 B.R. 1014 (D. S. D. 1988) affd
in part,rev'd in part, Small Business Admin. v. Rinehart, 887 F.2d 165 (8th Cir. 1989); In
re Hazelton, 85 B.R. 400 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988); In re Thomas 84 B.R. 438 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1988); In re Britton, 83 B.R. 914 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1988); Waldron v. Farmers Home
Admin., 75 B.R. 213 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987); In re Pinkert, 75 B.R. 218 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1987); In re Buske, 75 B.R. 213 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987); In re Schons, 54 BR. 665 (Bankr.
W.D. Wash. 1985).
The recent rash of insolvencies of bank institutions, generally outside of Title 11
bankruptcy proceedings, has produced interesting setoff decisions on the mutuality of
debt issue. See, e.g., Grady Properties Co. v. FDIC, 927 F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1991)(holding
that setoff is barred where bank's debtor acquired claim against bank from third party
arising from a separate and unrelated commercial transaction).

71Recognition of abstract nonbankruptcy rights without automatic recognition of
their nonbankruptcy values is the rule, not the exception, in bankruptcy. The
determination of a secured claim in bankruptcy may determine the final distributional
value of a secured claim in a bankruptcy proceeding. However, bankruptcy takes a
two-step process for unsecured claims: (1) nonbankruptcy law determines (for the most
part) the allowance of unsecured claims; (2) bankruptcy law determines how much of
the estate each unsecured claim will receive. E.g., §§ 502, 726, 1129. Because lien
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Setoff between solvent parties is a common law and common sense
expedient. There it would be "absurd" to make each party pay the other.72 Setoff
operates between solvent parties by the cancellation of X's and Y's debts when
they are equivalent or to the extent they are equivalent. What the right result
is when X or Y is insolvent is a question that rarely arises outside of bankruptcy
or other proceedings. 73 The nonbankruptcy idea of setoff assumes that the face
amounts of each debt are determinative because the real value of such mutual
claims is the face amount when both debtors are solvent. The thesis that § 506(a)
permits courts to limit setoff, whenever the setoff would overcompensate the
holder's secured claim rectifies the distributional inequity some setoffs may
effect.
Under § 553(a) creditors do retain the abstract right of setoff under Title 11
that they have outside of bankruptcy. The conventional reading of this text
assumes that bankruptcy must value that abstract right just as it would have
outside of Title 11 if the debtor were solvent at every material moment. That is
compensatorily inconsistent 74 with bankruptcy's general approach to creditors

valuation under § 506(a) is the analogy to this second distributional step, it is easy to
miss the first step: no lien may be a secured claim unless a claim secured by a lien is
allowed under § 502. Bankruptcy may recognize the abstract claim secured by a lien
without automatically granting secured claim status. The distributional rule based on
collateral valuation specifies the bankruptcy value of the lien. The decision of Johnson
v. Home State Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991) does not upset this analysis. Thata lienor may
have a claim in a bankruptcy though it has only a lien and no in personam claim against
the debtor still requires a bankruptcy determination of that lien as a secured claim.
Fixing the amount of the secured claim requires analysis of the amount of the claim and
valuation of the collateral, regardless of whether a nonrecourse lien arose because of a
prior bankruptcy proceeding discharging what had previously been a recourse lien or
a nonrecourse lien had been theparties' original agreement. In the latter case, one must
look to that agreement; and in the former case, one must regard the discharged debt. In
either event outside of chapter 11 and the notorious § 1111 (b) election, the secured claim
cannot exceed the value of the collateral.
72

Studley v. Boylston Nat'l Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913).

73

A related question may arise in the context of an assignment of rights in which an
account debtor is also a creditor of the assignor and the assignor is insolvent. Here, as
elsewhere, under state law, the Uniform Commercial Code imposes the risk of a party's
insolvency (the assignor here) on the account debtor or the assignee, on the principle of
notice or knowledge. U.C.C. § 9-318(1) provides that "the rights of an assignee are subject
to ... (b) [any] claim of the account debtor against the assignor which accrues before the
account debtor receives notification of the assignment." Cf. Artoc Bank & Trust, Ltd. v.
Apex Oil Co. (In re Apex Oil Co.), 975 F.2d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1992)(standing for the
proposition that an account debtor holding setoff rights may have sufficient notification
as diligent inquiry would disclose on knowledge of debtor's creating security interest
in accounts "[alt least where millions of dollars are at stake.")
74
Overcompensa ting a creditor's right of setoff, however, might be justified on other
grounds. If the sole purpose of§ 553(b) were to deter the exercise of prebankruptcy setoff
rights, protecting a setoff in the full face amount of a creditor's claim may be a reward
for preserving the bankruptcy estate analogous to a postpetition administrative
expense. § 503(b)(1)(A). Were this true, it would leave perhaps inconsistent any
differential treatment of liens which had not been foreclosed before bankruptcy.
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which must because of the insolvency appropriately convert all the abstract
prebankruptcy rights of creditors into concrete bankruptcy rights. Granting
any creditor a concrete bankruptcy right identical to its abstract prebankruptcy
right requires either that a prebankruptcy right was immune from the problem
of insolvency or that considerations extrinsic to the problem of insolvency
merited the extraordinary treatment of a creditor. For either of these reasons,
the conventional reading of the code supposes that setoff holders receive this
extraordinary treatment. However, under § 553(a)(1), 75 which limits setoff
claims by normal bankruptcy rules of claims allowance, a setoff claim receives
no more bankruptcy recognition under § 502 than any other claim. The body
of § 553(a) requires bankruptcy to protect the setoff right subject to the
exceptions which follow, such as § 553(a)(1).
Section 553(a)(1) does not indicate expressly what might disallow a setoff
claim. The reference to the exclusion of § 502(b)(3) from this exception to the
body of § 553(a)'s recognition of setoff indicates that the drafters expected
readers to understand "disallowed" as at least a reference to § 502, the code's
most general provision on allowance of claims. The reference of disallowed is
not confined to § 502 and may include any section which might provide for the
disallowance of a setoff, such as § 506(a). Section 553(a)(1) may limit the setoff
right granted under the body of § 553(a) through § 506(a), which limits the
secured claim as recognized in various code provisions to the value of the
collateral.
The overcompensation problem requires the same setoff determination as a
secured claim for purposes of § 553 as is ordinarily undertaken to determine
what lienors hold as secured claims in bankruptcy. It is not merely good or
parallel policy to do so. The code does not grant priority to the setoff
automatically in the face amount of the creditor's claim. Sections 553 and 506
are compatible and require case-by-case valuation of the creditor's claim to a
setoff right. Using the face amount of the creditor's claim against the estate may
be correct, but only if that is the real value of the setoff right. As in the matter

Whether liens would thereby be differentially treated depends on a number of complex
issues and perhaps ultimately on whether liens or setoffs meaningfully survive
bankruptcy. For example, a lien on collateral may be valued for one or another purpose.
("Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the
proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with a hearing on such
disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest." § 506(a).) This seems
to mean collateral may be valued more than once, perhaps even again after bankruptcy
was apparently over. See generally David G. Carlson, Undersecured Claims Under
Bankniptcy Code Sections 506(a) and 111 (b): Second Looks at Judicial Valuations ofCollateral,
6 BANK. DEv. J. 253 (1989). For example, perhaps a setoff claim that is lost early in a
bankruptcy proceeding under § 553(b) (because the setoff holder improved its position
during the 90 days before bankruptcy by offsetting mutual debts) may receive
recognition at a later stage in a complex proceeding, such as a reorganization, if the point
of the deterrence aim has abated.
75
"TIhis title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset ... except to the extent
that - (1) the claim of such creditor against the debtor is disallowed other than under
section 502(b)(3) of this title;" § 553(a)(1).
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of liens, any difference between the face amount of the creditor's claim and its
value as an offset constitutes an unsecured claim against the estate, that is, a
deficiency claim in the vocabulary of liens.
C. Section 553 Setoff Limitations
As previously noted, § 553 states five limitations on setoff in bankruptcy.
Those limitations have been widely understood to validate setoff outside the
scope of that section. To proclaim any further limitation on setoff, as by the
previously suggested interpretation of § 506(a), may appear to contradict the
validation of setoff accomplished by the general principle of § 553. Were
§ 506(a) to limit further the setoff beyond the proscriptions of § 553, some
76
indication of that limitation should appear in the code. As previously noted,
§ 553(a)(1) does precisely that.
Nevertheless, the purely 77 bankruptcy limitations on setoff in § 553 may be
thought to conflict with the reading taken here under the valuation principle
of § 506(a). To appreciate this objection, recall that § 553 invalidates any
nonbankruptcy setoff taken or obtained within 90 days before bankruptcy in
either of three events: (1) where the setoff right was acquired from another
entity while the debtor was insolvent; 78 (2) where the debt, against which a
setoff right was exercised, was incurred by the setoff holder while the debtor
was insolvent; 79 (3) where the setoff improved the holder's position because
there had been an insufficiency between the holder's claim and debt prior to
80
setoff and during the 90 days before bankruptcy.
A setoff claimant may not fall under any of the outlined substantive § 553
limitations and, yet, may have a claim of setoff rejected. A putative setoff right
may be invalid for a number of reasons. For example, the claim against the
debtor in bankruptcy may be entirely invalid outside of bankruptcy, as where
the latter's promise lacked consideration. When this is true, § 553(a)(1)
incorporates § 502(b)(1) and disallows such a setoff claim in bankruptcy.
Any objection to the reading of setoff under the code as taken here cannot
rest on a bald premise that only § 553 limits setoff. Other provisions of the code
arrive in § 553 by its express invitation including, as previously discussed, § 502
and § 506(a).
The objection to the thesis that § 506(a) affects setoffs might arguably rely on
a softer criticism, namely that the other limitations on setoff in § 553 conflict
with setoff valuation under § 506(a). That objection would suppose that the
purposes or effects of the other rules in § 553 conflict with setoff valuation

76

See supra text accompanying note 67.
Sections 553(a)(2)-(3) and 553(b) apply only in bankruptcy but § 553(a)(1) operates
in bankruptcy the same as any invalid setoff claim would operate outside of bankruptcy.
78§ 553(a)(2).
77

79§ 553(a)(3).
80§ 553(b).
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under § 506(a). These setoff-invalidating rules, however, fit with setoff
valuation. Each will be discussed in turn.
1. Setoffs Based on Claims Obtained From Another Creditor: § 553(a)(2)
A claim against a debtor obtained from another entity while a debtor was
insolvent and within 90 days before bankruptcy is invalid in bankruptcy for
the purpose of offsetting a claim of the debtor against the creditor. 81 This kind
of invalid setoff has an aim similar to the setoff analysis presented here. A setoff
so obtained under the analysis taken here has a real value almost certainly
below face value because of the element that the debtor has been insolvent at
the time. If the code invalidates such a setoff in whole, the objection would
argue against the reading taken here which would validate the setoff to the
extent of its real value. Thus, § 553(a)(2) and this thesis conflict. But the former
directs its aim only at setoff rights obtained from another entity. These are
illegitimate in that respect under the code even though they might be less
objectionable when reduced to their likely lesser real value. Yet one might wish
to discourage prebankruptcy trading in claims against a troubled debtor as a
problem which § 506(a) valuation might not sufficiently deter.82 As well, one
might wish to avoid the costliness and uncertainties of valuation hearings in
bankruptcy for any interests so generally unlikely to bear any significant real
value. Claims bought from another creditor shortly before bankruptcy while a
debtor is insolvent may come very cheaply. The objection to the thesis taken
here essentially rests on the idea that setoffs outside the proscription of
§ 553(a)(2), those obtained from another entity prior to 90 days before
bankruptcy, are automatically valid in bankruptcy and also immunized from
any valuation; they are per se valid in face amounts in bankruptcy. But
immunizing liens from per se avoidance under comparable lien avoiding
provisions is distinct from the valuation of liens. 83 So too are setoffs.
81
Note that § 553(a)(2) addresses only claims obtained from others during the stated
time period. It is inapplicable to the transfer of setoff rights. Omitted in the text is the
further limitation on setoffs-that setoffs obtained postpetition from another entity are
invalid. § 553(a)(2)(A). Postpetition trading in claims, for setoffs or for investment, may
present distinctproblems which valuation cannot resolve. Postpetition trading in claims
may disrupt the bankruptcy process by creating costly delay or conflict. Similarly, as
the following text explains, valuation of setoffs is consistent with an independent policy
barring setoffs obtained from other entities which may incite avoidable bankruptcies.
82
A stronger objection would form to the present thesis if a setoff obtained while the
debtor was insolvent was invalidated by the code. However, that is not true. Even were
it true, one might regard the valuation of setoff as consistent with such a provision as a
hedge against finding the debtor was solvent at the time the setoff was obtained and the
almost certain finding that debtor was insolvent at bankruptcy.
83
For example, a lien may be avoided under the bankruptcy avoidance powers.
§§ 544-549. Yet the unavoidability of any lien thereunder does not also have the effect
of guaranteeing that a lien will receive valuation exceeding the value of the collateral.
The bankruptcy limitations on setoffs free setoffs from the generally applicable bank-
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2. Debts Incurred to Debtor for the Purpose of Obtaining Setoff: § 553(a)(3)
Another setoff which is per se invalid under the code is the setoff created
when a creditor of the debtor incurs a debt to the debtor during the 90 days
before bankruptcy and while debtor was insolvent, and the debt was incurred
for the purpose of obtaining a setoff. Finding a debtor extending credit to
anyone during its prebankruptcy days of despair is suspicious. When this
suspicious circumstance combines with its suspiciously benefitting a
preexisting or soon-to-be creditor,84 outlawing such a setoff enforces a larger
fraudulent transfer policy. That is the element of purpose required for the
voidability of such a setoff. As with fraudulent transfer principles under which
85
transferees who lack good faith get no credit for what they gave the debtor,
the provision voids the setoff in full. Again, limiting the setoff to real value may
not sufficiently enforce the fraudulent transfer of the setoff right except in cases
in which a § 506(a) valuation found the setoff worthless.
3. Prebankruptcy Setoff (Improving Setoff Rights): § 553(b)
The complicated limitation on setoff imposed by § 553(b) likewise fits with
the valuation of setoff. Mechanically, § 553(b) limits the prebankruptcy
87
exercise8 6 of a setoff right to a certain amount, the extent to which the first
insufficiency 88 is reduced by the time the setoff was taken if it were taken within
90 days before the bankruptcy.89 To that extent the setoff is per se void in
bankruptcy. The rule invalidates certain buildups of bank accounts which
enable a setoff holder to improve its position during the presumptively
troubled 90 days before bankruptcy. The target is the improvement of the setoff
holder's position-that improvement in the setoff value during the 90 days

ruptcy avoidance powers. But valuation becomes necessary to honor liens and setoffs
in bankruptcy only if they are not avoided in the bankruptcy.
84

Section 553(a)(3) literally applies regardless of the timing of the order in which the
mutual debts are incurred. Itdoes not say that the setoff holder must have been a creditor
before it also became a debtor. Arguably, one cannothave a purpose of obtaining a setoff
unless one is already a creditor at the time one becomes indebted. One might have the
purpose of obtaining a setoff right by incurring a debt, even if the setoff right does not
accrue until the later time when one acquires a claim against its creditor. Nevertheless,
the circumstances are too suspicious no matter how the parties order the debts.

85§ 548(c).
86

Cf. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Exxon Co., 814 F.2d 1030, 1040 n.l (5th Cir. 1987)
(stating that "The fact that a setoffnever actually took place does not affect the analysis.

The issue is whether Exxon hypothetically had the right to a setoff, and because of this
right it was secured and therefore the payment received from Braniff was not a voidable
preference.") (emphasis added).
87§ 553(b)(1)(B).
88

"Insufficiency" is the "amount, if any, by which a claim against the debtor exceeds
a mutual debt owing to the debtor by the holder of such claim." § 553(b)(2).
89§ 553(b)(1).
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before bankruptcy which is fully recaptured by § 553(b). As above, the
improvement of a bank's setoff rights during this troubled period invokes the
avoidance policy of fraudulent transfer law. Correctly or not, building up funds
in a bank account, for example, during the 90 days before bankruptcy is taken
as behavior too suspicious to treat more softly than by invalidation. Valuation
may consistently target what the aim and text of § 553(b) leave unaffected. 90
In sum, the thesis that setoffs are subject to valuation under §506(a) does not
conflict with the texts or policies of the substantive limits on setoff under § 553.
The conventional assumption that only § 553 should limit setoff backs the
objection which has been considered. That assumption does not find support
in the text of the setoff limitations which all follow concordant policies which
have the effect of invalidating certain setoffs even if these setoffs would have
survived valuation to any extent. Those setoffs which survive these setoff
avoiding rules still require valuation to accomplish the separate purpose of
fairly compensating (avoiding overcompensation of) secured claims. That the
invalidation also cures overcompensation is true, but it is only true of those
especially troublesome and particular setoffs to which § 553 directly speaks.
Given the error of the bald argument that § 553 validates the face amount of
setoffs which are not particularly invalidated under § 553,91 one may conclude
that the objection to setoff valuation rests on the no less bald a proposition than
that legislation which invalidates some, validates the rest. But, were
invalidation the purpose of valuation, the objection would not so widely miss
its target.
III. LIENS, WELL-POSITIONED UNSECURED CREDITORS AND SETOFFS

The analysis thus far finds that setoffs in bankruptcy may receive similar
treatment to liens under § 506(a). Nevertheless, examining the important

differences between liens and setoffs may help to explain why bankruptcy has
struggled with setoffs. 92 First, setoffs have traditionally received face amount
valuation in bankruptcy because of the claims allowance rules in bankruptcy.
90

A contentious view of § 553(b) holds that a prebankruptcy exercise of setoff under
§ 553(b) may trigger a recovery by the trustee of an "otherwise unavoidable right. The
provision is clearly at odds with the notion that the enforcement of a nonpreferential
security interest does not constitute a preference... A creditor who receives a preference
that a trustee avoids under section 547, is, with the exception of litigation expenses, in
no worse shape than it would have been had it not received the preferential transfer. In
contrast, under section 553(b) a creditor who exercises a a right of setoff... may well be
in worse shape than if it had refrained from exercising its right." Lacy, supra note 2, at
975. If true, this statement assumes that setoff holders have secured claims in bankruptcy
in the face amount of their claims. In the rare instance when § 506(a) valuation will
produce such values, § 553(b) operates to disgorge the improvement in the bank's
position effected by the setoff. Arguably, only theleast real value of the setoff will receive
recognition under § 553(a). The excess which the bank also took by setoff will expose
the offsetting creditor to the trustee's avoiding powers such as a preferential transfer.
91
92

See supra text accompanying notes 55, 67.
Bankruptcy has struggled with liens as well for different reasons.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss4/3

26

19931

SETOFF AND BANKRUPTCY

Secondly, and derivatively, setoffs have been provided a "legal preference"
because of an illusory analogy to liens. The difference between a lien and a
setoff is the apparent ease of valuation of a setoff as a bankruptcy secured claim.
"How much did debtor owe this creditor" swiftly sets the figure by which
creditor may offset the claim of the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy. But a lien is
a secured claim to the extent of the value of the property in the bankruptcy
estate which prior to bankruptcy had been subjected to the lien. So long as prior
to bankruptcy or in bankruptcy the lien is valid 93 and not subject to a superior
interest, the lien is a secured claim in the value of the collateral. What the value
of the collateral is presents a hard question 94 unlike the illusory clarity of setoff.
A. Allowance and DistributiveRights: Abstract and Concrete Rights in Bankruptcy
A setoff right arises from a claim against another party and not from the claim
of that other party. Even though bankers and lawyers customarily look to the
amount on deposit to determine the amount of a bank setoff,9 5 this is elliptical
from the point of view of a bank as a creditor and appropriate rather when
asking about setoff from the bank's status as debtor. As a defendant debtor, a
bank can determine the amount by which it may offset its creditor's claim by
the amount on deposit. As a plaintiff creditor, a bank has no setoff rights but
may be subject to its debtor defendant's right of setoff in the amount bank owes
its debtor/depositor. If a bank's claim against a debtor is invalid or otherwise
unenforceable, as a defendant against a debtor's claim it has no setoff right. In
bankruptcy such a bank should have no greater right because § 553 merely
recognizes the nonbankruptcy setoff right. If such a right does not exist outside
96
bankruptcy, bankruptcy disallows the claim.
Disallowance also concerns valid claims and extravagant claims. The
validity of a claim and the monetary value of a claim may be distinguished. In
matters of setoff, by tradition there has been no devaluation of a face amount
of a claim against a bankruptcy by the factor of its real value, as Part I! suggests.
The reason for that treatment is the similarity of treatment of setoff creditors
with general unsecured creditors. Generally, unsecured creditors have their
claims against a bankrupt estate determined as if the estate were solvent. The
claims allowance process differs from the asset distribution process in this
93 Bankruptcy

does not validate all liens. The bankruptcy avoiding powers limit the

effect of vulnerable prebankruptcy liens in bankruptcy. §§ 544-550.
94
0ne commentator has called value a moral concept. David G. Carlson, Bankruptcy
Theory and the Creditors' Bargain, 61 U. CINN. L. REV. 453, 498 n.141 (1993); David G.
Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely Character of Valuations in Bankruptcy, 41 AM. U. L.
REV. 63, 70-75 (1991).
95
So long as a bank is owed more than it owes, setting off against what it owes may
not be troublesome.
96
An important exception concerns the postpetition period in a bankruptcy
proceeding during which mutual claims may arise from postpetition dealings. In said
instance, the applicable law would appear to be federal bankruptcy law, which would
govern rising postpetition setoffs.
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993

27

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:599

respect, although the bankruptcy process could perform this task under
distribution provisions or allowance provisions. Bankruptcy creates an illusion
in "allowing" claims at full face value since insolvent estates cannot compensate
at such values in the eventual distribution of assets. Yet the traditional
separation of allowance and distribution is very practical in permitting the
administration of claims prior to the final determination of the value of the
estate available for distribution. Practical and harmless generally, the
separation of claim allowance and distribution perpetuates the illusion that the
value of a setoff is the face value of the holder's claim against the estate.
Comparing the setoff right holder with the lien holder clarifies this obscurity.
Granting the full face value to the claim against the debtor is the equivalent of
granting the full face value of the debt to the lien holder. Traditional treatment
pretends that the setoff right which a bank has against a claim held by the
bankruptcy estate of its depositor is the face value of bank's claim against the
estate. When a bank's claim is allowable in bankruptcy at its face value as an
unsecured claim,97 that figure has traditionally determined the value of bank's
setoff right in bankruptcy. Allowability is not the equivalent of value as the
distinction in bankruptcy between the face amount or allowable claim and the
distributional value of such a claim marks.
To illustrate, suppose that if an unsecured claim of a lien holder were valued
at distributional rates, then one might want to limit a lien holder's interest in
collateral to this measure of true value. Thus, if the collateral and debt are worth
$100 at face value, but the bankruptcy distribution on an unsecured claim
would amount to 50%, then on this view the lien might have in bankruptcy a
value only of 50%. This would result in a lien for 50% of the value of the
collateral, amounting here to $50. Yet, the lien creditor would here also receive
$50 on distribution as well as payment of $50 from the sale of the collateral or
a continuing $50 lien on the collateral. Either the traditional recognition of a
secured claim of $100 or this analytical expression of the same distributional
return, $50 in cash from the estate and $50 of lien generally leads to the same
98
distributional value of the total rights of the lien creditor.
In contrast, using this analytical expression of rights for setoff, if bank owes
$100 to debtor who also owes bank $100, the bank's claim has a distributional
value of $50 on the same 50% dividend. The debtor's claim against the bank,
assuming bank's solvency, has a value of $100. The amount of the bank's
secured claim in bankruptcy is $50. Thus far, then, the bank is in exactly the

97

Section 502 determines whether a claim is "allowable" in bankruptcy and, with a

few exceptions, treats the amount of a claim as it would be determined under
nonbankruptcy law. Bankruptcy payment of claims in money or rights will follow from
further determinations so that claims determined to be allowable set the maximum
which may be paid on bankruptcy claims. As most bankruptcy estates cannot pay claims
in full, the figure set by the allowance process of § 502 necessarily sets the stage for the
pro rata determinations of a creditor's share in an insolvent estate.
98

Omitted here is a discussion regarding the treatment of secured claims in
reorganizations.
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same position as the lien creditor of the previous paragraph. Each has a $50
secured claim in debtor's bankruptcy. However, a lien creditor received its
distribution of $50 from the estate and retained a lien on the collateral in the
amount of $50 which matches the conventional bankruptcy expression of lien
rights; a setoff holder's rights do not so correspond to conventional analysis.
Bank cashed in its setoff right of $50 in exchange for its secured claim. That
setoff right arose from the distributional value of its unsecured claim against
the estate. Its allowable $100 unsecured claim would receive a 50% distribution.
In lieu of the distribution, bank chose to retain the real value of its right not to
have to pay the estate the $100 it held which belonged to the debtor. The real
value of that right was the distributional value of the right: $50. The bank has
nothing left and must fork over the balance of its $100 debt to the estate, or $50.
Again, a lien holder would not similarly exhaust its claim of $100 against the
estate when it exchanged its unsecured claim for $100 for distribution payment
of $50. Along with a setoff holder in conventional analysis, alienor would retain
its lien even after accepting the $50 distribution. That payment does not
discharge the lien, but reduces the amount secured by the lien. To be sure, lien
and setoff rights in bankruptcy may differ in an important (if logically
unnecessary) manner on the question of debt discharge. A discharge of a $100
debt may occur regardless of the amount an estate distributes to creditors. 99
But a discharge of debts may not affect a lien. 100
B. Setoff Holders as Well-Positioned PrebanknrptcyCreditors
The treatment bankruptcy traditionally gives holders of setoff rights
presumes that setoff holders are, like careful lienors, particularly
well-positioned prebankruptcy creditors or other risk-free transferees of the
debtor. One inspiration for traditionally protecting careful lienors and certain
other parties with whom the debtor had dealt before bankruptcy comes from
the distribution of rights among the parties existing at the time, more or less,
of filing bankruptcy. At that time there will usually be other particularly
well-positioned creditors. These creditors share a stronger expectation of
successful debt-collection than other creditors. At least this is often true until a
bankruptcy case begins. Whether or not bankruptcy should always or usually
follow the relative positioning of creditors, it often has. Yet in so doing, the law
of bankruptcy may mistake for a creditor who is particularly well-positioned,
a creditor whose odds of debt-collection are no more than average. Were there
no other policy beyond recognizing the real value of entitlements existing
before bankruptcy for awarding priorities in the bankruptcy estate, as of course
there are, 10 1 a mistaken and even longstanding special treatment by

99
A debt may be discharged by payment or under §§ 727(b), 1141(d), 1228, and 1328,
which discharge debt bankruptcy for selected debtors. Some prebankruptcy debts are
excepted from bankruptcy discharge under the cited sections. E.g., § 523(a).
10

OSee infra Part VI.
101 E.g., § 507.
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bankruptcy might change. In the matter of setoff in bankruptcy other policies
do inspire the present limitations borne by § 553. These limitations may set the
proper balance between the prebankruptcy rights of a setoff holder and what
other goals bankruptcy law may have. Yet this may be soundly doubted.
Instead of a sound analysis of the prebankruptcy positioning of setoff holders,
the present code may have arisen from an assumption, perhaps mistaken, of
what that position is. The heavy scales of tradition make rather than measure
such assumptions. It is more than likely that the present bankruptcy law
receives assumptions about setoff's proper bankruptcy status from a past less
affected by reason than politics.
Whether bankruptcy is mistaken about setoff when it uses the face value of
a setoff holder's claim initially depends on an evaluation of a setoff holder's
rights prior to the bankruptcy proceeding. What setoff holders have done
before bankruptcy or might otherwise have done to protect themselves, and
what they have not done prior to bankruptcy, sets the framework for the
evaluation. How "well-positioned 102 are creditors with setoff rights? Are all
setoff holders so well-positioned that they deserve face valuation of the setoff
rights?
One may compare setoff holders with other creditors who are generally
accorded or denied special protection in bankruptcy. The latter include contract
promisees accorded no priority in bankruptcy. A comparison of setoffs to liens
and other well-positioned prebankruptcy creditors may furnish the
appropriate basis for evaluating whether holders of setoffs or setoff rights merit
special bankruptcy treatment. Yet comparing setoffs to liens also requires an
account of the differentiation among liens made by both nonbankruptcy and
bankruptcy law. Lien creditors do not automatically obtain special treatment
in bankruptcy. Done rightly, liens do, however, generally receive better
treatment than other creditor claims. Where liens are not rightly done, they are
inchoate or, more contemporarily, unperfected. The several kinds of liens
include statutory, judicial and consensual liens. Examples of unperfected or
inchoate liens of each kind abound. A shared quality making these liens
unperfected or inchoate is an element of incompleteness. Mechanics liens, for
example, may be unperfected because some public notice or judicial action has
not occurred. Judgment creditors, for example, may have liens merely inchoate
before levy is made. Consensual liens most typically are or become unperfected
because of a failure to file public notice or because of an expiration of such a
notice.
102Well-positioned prebankruptcy creditors include lien creditors and unsecured
creditors who, but for the filing of bankruptcy, had a higher probability of successfully
collecting on their claims against the debtor. The chief strength in the argument for
treating setoff holders with bankruptcy priority is that setoff holders would have
successfully collected their claim by offsetting it against the debtor's claim. This
proposition is false. But, even if it is true under certain circumstances, setoffs are
protectible in bankruptcy without protecting every setoff. The valuation interpretation
for setoffs presented in Part I, supra, would discriminate between priority setoffs and
others.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss4/3
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Bankruptcy ignores such inchoate or unperfected mechanics lienors, 103
judgment creditors 104 or consensual lien creditors, 105 even though each of these
parties has a typically stronger prebankruptcy position than do unsecured
creditors. Often, each is only a small step or slip away from perfecting its
superior rights and its far better position than that of unsecured creditors. Such
parties acquire the special priority bankruptcy traditionally bestows on liens
when they have achieved a choate or perfected lien at a time sufficiently prior
to bankruptcy. 10 6 These broad notions, and the details they demand or assume,
provide a basis for comparison with setoffs. Perhaps not surprisingly, some but
not all setoffs fare well in the comparison. Some setoff holders are particularly
well-positioned and others are doubtful.
Preliminarily, it goes (almost) without saying that setoff holders may take
advantage of the protection bankruptcy gives to perfected liens. 1 07 If one were
to conclude that holders of setoff rights which have not been exercised at the
time of bankruptcy filing are no more well-positioned than a judgment creditor
about to levy or a mortgagee about to record, both of whom receive no special
protection in bankruptcy, then holders of setoff rights may still achieve lien
rights in a bankruptcy by appropriate behavior. Were such a course necessary
but uninviting because of inconvenience and expense, it may be sufficient to
note that bankruptcy generally puts lien holders to such inconvenience and
expense. That such costs may fall on debtors is perhaps only to note that
borrowers generally may be thought to bear these costs. After posing a simple
example of how banks, the most common setoff holders, might achieve a lien,
or lien-like right, some contrasts between such an arrangement and generally
recognized setoff rights are set forth below.
Assume that long before bankruptcy the setoff holder has required the
eventual bankrupt to deposit a sum of money, which the borrower may not use
for any purpose, into the bank or another bank.1 08 Assume that this was done
in a manner which was fair to both the bank and its borrower: in the event of

103§ 545.
10 4
Because a judgment does not usually create any lien until some further recording
or docketing, a judgment creditor is an unsecured creditor in bankruptcy unless it has
obtained a judicial lien prior to the commencement of bankruptcy. Judicial liens
obtained shortly before bankruptcy may be avoidable as preferential transfers. § 547(b).

105§ 544(a).
106The applicable preference period is 90 days for non-insider creditors and one year
for insider creditors. § 547(b)(4).
107
Alan M. Ahart, Bank Setoff Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 53 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 205, 210-11 (1979).
108
Under the derivative title rule governing rights of judgment creditors, a judgment
creditor may seize from another party only what the judgment debtor may seize. Thus,
an arrangement disabling a borrower from enjoying property also limits its creditors.
A creditor who receives special advantage from such an arrangement is by definition a
well-positioned creditor.
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insolvency of either party, the other would by their contract be likely to have
priority to the deposit over other creditors. A bank and its borrower/depositor
could enter into this agreement so that the bank did not hold the funds in a
general deposit account. Suppose the funds were placed in a special account,
some kind of trust or escrow account pursuant to the parties' contract that upon
the borrower's insolvency or bankruptcy,109 the bank would have the right to
the funds to pay the balance of the debt. If the bank might validly be both
trustee and beneficiary, such an arrangement would closely resemble a
perfected security interest. 110 The bank would there have done enough to
assure both that the creditors of its debtor and its own creditors would have no
claim to the funds on deposit. If valid, such an arrangement would have
effectively put the funds on deposit out of the use or control of either party as
if the bank and its borrower had hired an escrow to hold the funds until the
escrow terms had been satisfied. By such devices the parties would transform
themselves relatively more clearly from being each other's unsecured creditor
to secured creditor status.
But doubts about bank setoff arise because the claim against the bankruptcy
estate may be conceived to be an unsecured claim. Were, as suggested above,
a valid trust created from the borrower's funds in the hands of an independent
trustee or escrowee per a bank and borrower contract, the estate would have
no claim to the funds except as there may be excess over the balance owed the
lender. The debtor's interest in the trust funds would have previously been
transformed into whatever the parties had previously agreed. An escrow or
trust alters the legal relationship of lender and borrower under an unsecured
or undersecured loan accompanied by a general deposit account. The general
deposit account leaves open the possibility that the debtor might obtain the use
of the funds prior to bankruptcy. If the bank were to hold a valid setoff right,
certain problems would arise. If the bank were to permit the debtor the use of
such funds prior to bankruptcy, the setoff right would be lost. The bank might
claim both that the funds were on general deposit but that the depositor had
no access to that account. Whether this is a hypocritical assertion or whether
debating this assertion is hypercritical may lie at the heart of setoff's place in
bankruptcy.
But an escrow or trust relationship makes the deposited funds unavailable
for the general use of either party until the trust conditions are met. Under a
general deposit account relationship of debtor and creditor, a depositor is
legally free to use whatever funds are in the account so long as the bank as
creditor does not freeze the account. It may be that a bank has designated in its

10 9

See Teshelle supra, note 2, at 46-49.

110

Such a creditor bank holds a perfected security interest. However, under UCC
§ 9-104(1), terming the bank's interest as a "security interest" may be misleading. Older
terminology suggests that the transfer of an interest in a deposit account is an
assignment for security. The validity of such assignments depends on whether they
defraud other creditors in the creation and designation of special accounts which take
a debtor's funds out of its control.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss4/3
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computer system that the account may not be debited below a certain balance
amount but is otherwise freely available to the debtor or its payees. Or the bank
may at some temporal point freeze the account. General state law generously
permits banks to make these decisions after payment orders are received from
debtors or their would-be transferees.111 Nevertheless, the volume of litigation
concerning whether such depositary banks effectively made these kinds of
after-the-fact decisions raises questions about such internal and clandestine
processes. Watchfulness, holds or freezes of accounts have remained de facto
pre-setoff practices under the state law governing the relative priority of
account transferees or garnishors because nonbankruptcy law allows setoff
against such parties after notice of such claims comes to the bank. Whether
there is any legal effect to an account under watch, hold or freeze under this
priority law is immaterial. What matters is whether the bank has set off within
the time frame for such action. Yet determining how well-positioned a bank
which had not exercised a setoff right at bankruptcy should take into account
the difference between a bank with a right of setoff which had done nothing at
all and a bank which had administratively limited the debtor's opportunity to
withdraw funds. A high account balance at bankruptcy may reflect only some
apparent good fortune for the bank. Such a bank might insist that had
bankruptcy not occurred, it was so much better positioned than an average
unsecured creditor, that its odds are too high to deny it special treatment in
bankruptcy. Yet that is also the case with inchoate or unperfected lien creditors.
Properly or not, bankruptcy generally accords treatment to lien creditors who
have completed the actions necessary for their special treatment rather than
accord priority on the basis of which creditors would have won the collection
race if there had been no bankruptcy.
Even if a bank could show that 95% of the time a depositor situated as the
debtor in bankruptcy could not have successfully removed the funds in the
account, bankruptcy has not generally accepted such rationales in particular
cases. A comparable holder of a security interest might try to show that it would
have perfected its security interest 95% of the time before lien creditors or
transferees would have taken the collateral. But one expects that comes to
naught in a bankruptcy proceeding. To suggest that in a bankruptcy case the
secured party should receive a discounted secured claim when it had before
bankruptcy perfected might stir excitement among trustees faced with
perfected security interests. Or, suppose that a pawn shop or securities holding
bank or brokerage could be shown to erroneously release possessory collateral
5% of the time: that would not affect those instances in which such lenders had
not made such errors just because they happened to be bankruptcy cases.
1. Probabilities
What bankruptcy should do to a setoff right or a lien should depend upon
what did happen in a particular case and not what might have happened in

lllU.C.C. § 4-303.
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such cases. A lienor may have released its lien and permitted its debtor to sell
the collateral free of the lien. When it does so, it should suffer the consequences,
but not when it has not done so.
Lien analogies help to understand the doubts surrounding the setoff. They
show that the law of secured transactions and mortgages provides rights
effective in bankruptcy upon compliance with prescribed acts and the presence
of collateral in the bankruptcy. The lienor's right to foreclose is respected in the
bankruptcy. Comparably, a bank with a setoff right might continue its right of
112
setoff in bankruptcy so long as funds remain on deposit at bankruptcy.
Nevertheless, taking the setoff right at face value clearly provides the holder
who refrained from exercising that right in any manner with an opportunity
surpassing lien protection. A lienor who could have foreclosed and recovered
any deficiency from other assets of a debtor while the debtor was solvent does
not have that lost opportunity revitalized at bankruptcy when debtor is
insolvent. Nor will a lienor whose collateral once had a sufficient value, as
when debtor was solvent, receive priority in bankruptcy above the remaining
collateral or its value. To permit the equivalent treatment of the unexercised
setoff right as well as such treatment for a creditor who never held a setoff right
while its debtor was solvent rests on probabilities which bankruptcy otherwise
eschews for the facts of particular cases.
112

Even after bankruptcy, it is provided that a bank may pay items until the bank

receives actual notice or knowledge. § 542(c). Nevertheless, the payee orother transferee
maybe subject to liability for receipt of a postpetition transfer under §§ 549-550. Whether
such a payee, or its collecting bank (if the latter was an "initial transferee" under
§ 550(a)(1)), against whom a depository bank may have recourse, is free of a trustee's
postpetition claim is an issue that has not arisen. The question is prompted by the
difference between a depository with setoff desires and a depository without setoff
desires. In the latter, the revocation restores the asset to the estate. In the former, the
asset is affected by the depositary's setoff.
Suppose the depository bank has a right to revoke against the payee or its agent,
such as a collecting bank. Assume that the depository does revoke. Also assume that a
bankruptcy trustee brings action to recover the transfer from either the depository or
the collecting bank or the payee. In order to make this hypothetical truly interesting
with respect to setoff issues, assume further that the depository bank claims setoff
against the trustee based on the transfer it properly revoked as against the collecting
bank and the payee. If the revocation is immaterial to the postpetition transfer liability
of the collecting bank and its principal (the payee), success by the trustee against such
parties will presumably double their claim against the estate and enrich other creditors.

The very broad code definition of transfer does not expressly include a revoked transfer.
Intuitively, a revoked transfer of the property of the estate should generally not be
recapturable by the estate inasmuch as the revocation would have already restored the
transfer to the estate.

In the instant hypothetical, the revoking depository bank has a claim against the
estate. As the depository of estate funds, the bank is motivated to setoff against any
liability it has to the estate. On revocation, this bank does defend against the trustee's
claim to the funds with its offsetting claim. The depository may have done after
bankruptcy what would not have been permissible prior to bankruptcy: it acquired a
debt to the debtor while the debtor was insolvent for the purpose of obtaining a right
of setoff. § 553(a)(3). Or the revocation means the transfer never happened and the setoff
is otherwise permissible.
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Providing all setoffs in bankruptcy full face value recognition would justify
recognizing priorities among unsecured creditors depending on the
probabilities of their having won the race to a debtor's assets had there been
no bankruptcy. Not even the well-positioned unsecured creditor, ready to levy
on assets of the debtor pursuant to judgment, who perhaps deserves priority
for its nonbankruptcy opportunities, has a reasonably certain claim at the filing
of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is typically filed by a distressed debtor to avoid
seizure by a well-positioned judgment creditor. The effect of that filing is the
automatic stay.113 Bankruptcy recognizes no monetary claim for the stoppage
of the creditor's judgment enforcement. 114 Whether the well-positioned
unsecured creditor should receive compensation for its having been stopped
from enforcing its state law rights beciuse of the automatic stay is another
question. But if bankruptcy has correcdy viewed these state law rights or
opportunities as unprotectible, more similarity than difference comes to
comparison of the well-positioned unsecured creditor as judgment creditor
and the setoff holder who has yet to exercise setoff at bankruptcy.
The appropriate focus of this comparison lies in what happens to each of
these differently but well-positioned creditors in a liquidation, typically under
chapter 7. There (as well as in chapter 11) the filing of the petition invokes the
automatic stay. Though one cannot say that every insolvent business enterprise
will take chapter 7 (or 11), experience shows that if an effective
extra-bankruptcy liquidation (as through assignment for the benefit of
creditors) 115 cannot be accomplished, then bankruptcy liquidation will likely
be chosen. The corporate debtor typically takes no benefit from the chapter 7
other than perhaps some good feeling from the less well-positioned unsecured
creditors who likely urged the step to protect themselves against the
well-positioned unsecured creditor. Chapter 7 does thus serve some creditors
of an enterprise by stifling the opportunity the well-positioned unsecured
116
creditors had under the typical state law rule of first in time, first in right.

113§ 362.
114

United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd. (In re Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.), 484 U.S. 365, 372 (1988), confirms this principle in the
context of an undersecured creditor's claim of loss caused by the stay.
115Assignments for the benefit of creditors are codified in some states and judicially
sanctioned in others. The assignment is usually thought more efficient than bankruptcy
liquidation when the number of creditors is relatively small and thus manageable.
Typically, the assignment law will provide for a termination of individual creditor
actions replaced by claims recognition and estate administration provisions in the
assignee. Unfortunately, few of the assignment processes among the states have
received modem attention. This lack of modem attention is largely due to the fact that
bankruptcy law has filled gaps that the assignment statutes or decisional law have left
open. Nevertheless, there would be little controversy among creditors charged with
drafting a new state assignment law that some form of stay of individual creditor rights
should terminate at or shortly after the creation of the assignment.
116

The point of an organized liquidation of a business corporation may be
preservation of the common pool of assets so that all creditors of the same class (the
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The well-positioned unsecured creditor has no right to more than other
creditors under state law. State law does not need to provide this because
bankruptcy law already addresses it. As a result the well-positioned unsecured
creditor is not disappointed in any legitimate expectation which can amount
to a loss cognizable in a bankruptcy case. Its claim that but for the filing and
the effect of the automatic stay halting it6 levy or sale, it would have collected
the debt is an assertion based solely on the higher probabilities its position
opportuned. Yet the effect and perhaps purpose of the automatic stay of chapter
7 precluding its levy nullifies any appeal to probabilities.
This seems true also of the holder of a setoff right who has yet to exercise
that right prior to the bankruptcy filing. Setoff holders who have taken their
setoff prior to the bankruptcy filing are in this respect remarkably
distinguishable from setoff holders whose rights remain unexercised. The
holder of an unexercised setoff right resembles the well-positioned unsecured
creditor qua judgment creditor; those who have offset the mutual debts before
bankruptcy resemble the judgment creditor qua lien creditor. 117
If a judgment creditor cannot appeal to the higher probabilities that it would
have won the race to the debtor's assets had bankruptcy not interrupted its
leading position, then treating holders of setoff rights and completed setoffs
the same upon bankruptcy risks treating differently positioned creditors
similarly. Were this the appropriate comparison, it becomes evident that setoff
holders as a class receive the protection of a probability denied to others. 118 In
this analysis setoffs taken before bankruptcy, especially before insolvency, 119
are differentiated from setoffs which were available but not taken.

unsecured) will take only their fair pro rata share. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND
LIrrs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW, ch. 1 (1986). But, what any creditor's fair share is, is
problematical. One need not adopt Jackson's theory that state rights should determine
what is a fair share. Bankruptcy often eschews that view, as in the case of a
well-positioned (yet unsecured) creditor.
117 Although those who offset before bankruptcy are analogous to judgment creditors
who levied before bankruptcy, that should not conclusively establish that the setoff
should be recognized in its face value. Because bankruptcy routinely recaptures judicial
liens as preferences when the elements of § 547(b) are met, a prebankruptcy setoff taken
during the 90 days before bankruptcy, or the longer insider preference period, would
not ordinarily have occurred while the debtor was solvent. Thus, valuation even of
prebankruptcy setoffs may lead to substantial discounting.
1 18

0nce more, note that bankruptcy policy might be justified in generally approving
setoffs without differentiation between setoffs exercised and those not before
bankruptcy. The textual observations simply point out that some comparisons between
similarly positioned prebankruptcy creditors suggest similarity of treatment, all other
factors being equal. Excluded from that analysis are perhaps sound policy factors
encouraging undifferentiated bankruptcy protection of setoffs on the ground that
stimulating prebankruptcy setoffs would effect more bankruptcies and lesserprotection
of poorly positioned creditors. As to that, see supra note 115.
119

See supra note 117.
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2. Foreclosure Rights

Another inter-creditor comparison may seem to support an undifferentiated
protection of setoff in bankruptcy. A bank with a right to setoff resembles a
secured creditor with a right to foreclose its collateral. Bankruptcy does not
devalue the latter's right to special bankruptcy treatment because it had not
foreclosed before bankruptcy. If unexercised setoff rights are merely foreclosure
rights, then bankruptcy has no more reason to treat the two setoff positions any
differently than it treats the two secured creditor positions differently. Yet,
examples of how bankruptcy may treat the secured creditor differently may be
suggestive of overprotection of the unexercised setoff right.
A secured creditor who foreclosed before bankruptcy may not incur the risks
of valuation and delay that bankruptcy imposes on secured creditors who have
not foreclosed before bankruptcy.120 Its foreclosure sale will have realized its
12 1
The foreclosing secured
opportunity to maximize the value of the collateral.
creditor controls the sale of the collateral, and that control permits it to receive
in a more favorable time-frame the best available price. The fact that
pre-foreclosure secured creditors resent bankruptcy also suggests the greater
costs of bankruptcy to the unforeclosed lien.
Thus, in terms of value there is likely to be more difference than similarity
between a setoff and a foreclosed lien than between a setoff and an unforeclosed
lien. If bankruptcy effectively differentiates lienors in this way, comparing
setoff rights as merely akin to foreclosure rights may point to a different
conclusion. Yet from the point of view of delay alone, setoff rights and lien
foreclosure rights may be more similar in bankruptcy. Each suffers from the
122
automatic stay and each appears subject to the same tests for relief from stay.
Whichever, value or delay, should be the focus of the comparison therefore may
lead to different conclusions about how unexercised setoff rights emerge from
the analogy to lien foreclosure rights.
3. Transferability and Setoff
An independent difficulty with always accepting setoff rights at face value
in bankruptcy concerns the previously mentioned and apparent opportunity
a debtor has to liquidate a general deposit account prior to bankruptcy. If
certain probabilities may be taken to favor the setoff rights' holder, the
probabilities or opportunities that debtors may have to reduce the bank
account before bankruptcy should receive some due in providing similar
treatment of similar prebankruptcy rights in bankruptcy. This will be addressed
in two ways: (1) I shall assume that the debtor has free access to a bank account
120The text assumes completion of the foreclosure through sale of the collateral.
121

Note that a foreclosing creditor may realize this opportunity without actually
obtaining on foreclosure the maximum value available. Cf. Durett v. Washington Nat'l.
Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding that foreclosures may be fraudulent
transfers when too little foreclosure value is obtained).
122§ 362(d).
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up to the moment before bankruptcy. When this is true, if ever, protecting any
mere right of setoff is spurious. (2) 1 later drop this dubious assumption to
observe a more refined idea about setoffs which are exercised before
bankruptcy.
A setoff right in a deposit account to which a debtor enjoys the ability to
withdraw in full disturbs fundamental fraudulent transfer principles. Like
Twyne's sheep 123 or Ratner's accounts receivables, 124 the bank account seems
to be the debtor's to do with as it pleases. Should debtor do so, its transferees
will suffer no claim of the setoff holding bank once ithonors the debtor's orders.
For that reason, others may feel safe in extending credit to the debtor based on
its representation of sufficient funds in the account to cover the debt. Whether
creditors should be so comforted is another question which may depend on
evaluation of particular facts of particular cases, including the extent to which
a bank misled an inquiring creditor as to the susceptibility of a deposit account
to its or others' claims. 125
The paradox of a debtor's enjoying full access to its bank account
simultaneously with bank's setoff right betrays fundamental bankruptcy
premises beyond the principles of fraudulent transfer.126 Property to which a
debtor may enjoy an unrestricted right prior to bankruptcy will pass to the
bankruptcy estate free of any claims. 127 Yet a right to setoff under
nonbankruptcy law has traditionally meant that a debtor lacks the power to
transfer its bank account subject to setoff to its bankruptcy estate free of the
setoff right. Yet a debtor would seem to pass to the estate any funds which it
has withrawn prior to bankruptcy free of the setoff claim. Nor may a setoff
holder succeed in regaining funds transferred to a third party though some
such transferees may suffer recapture by the estate as a preference or fraudulent
transfer.
As a result, a debtor with the actual freedom to withdraw from the account
may have prebankruptcy creditors who may not be likely to wrest the account
from the bank. 128 A garnishment summons will be likely to have two effects:
12 3Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601).
12 4Benedict
v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
12 5The
priorities on garnishment of a bank account, which typically permit a

garnishee bank to offset and take priority over the garnishing creditor, rest on a different
analysis: That rule applies to cases in which the garnishing creditor makes no claim that
it was misled by the general deposit account or another act of the garnishee into
extending credit to one who is insolvent.
12 6Perhaps both ironically and suggestively, however, the same is not true for a
debtor's creditors who are unlikely to succeed in garnishing a distressed debtor's bank
account. Garnishment will almost certainly be met by a successful exercise of setoff by
the creditor if it holds a sufficient claim which will generally take priority over the lien
by garnishment.
127§ 541.
128 See Clark, supra note 2, at 206-13(stating that 'It is fundamental law that a bank
may not exercise setoff against a customer's account unless the customer's debt to the
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss4/3
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First, the bank as creditor will exercise whatever rights of setoff it holds unless
its depositor-debtor provides it protection for its debt or an adequate
explanation of the garnishment. A garnishment will signal the bank of its
debtor's financial difficulties. Even if the bank had not taken any previous
action, it could setoff after receiving the garnishment order and subordinate
the garnishor's claim to its own. 12 9 Second, the garnishment is likely to lead to
a new understanding between the parties. 130
The depositary's favorable priority against a garnishing judgment creditor
may have contributed to bankruptcy's illusions about setoffs because of the
powerful imagery this priority evokes in bankruptcy sensibilities. If setoffs take
before garnishing creditors before bankruptcy, afortiorithey take priority over
such creditors in bankruptcy. This imagery flows from older ideas about what
is property of the bankruptcy estate and the modem perpetuation of that
meta-notion in the trustee in bankruptcy's strong-arm power. Under the
Bankruptcy Act, two ideas chiefly bounded what property came into the
estate. 131 The first idea was property which a debtor at the moment it filed
bankruptcy might transfer. The second idea, providing a powerful and
obscuring image about setoffs, held that property owned by a debtor at the
moment of filing bankruptcy came into the estate if a judgment creditor could
levy on that property.
The priority rule favoring setoff holders over garnishing creditors suggested
but did not support the conclusion that a debtor's bank account did not come
into the bankruptcy estate. For, the alternate test of transferability by the debtor
would bring the account into bankruptcy if setoff had not occurred prior to the
filing of bankruptcy. Yet another powerful bankruptcy image is the trustee's
power to bring into the estate property formerly belonging to the debtor when
its transferee would be subordinate to a judicial lien creditor on the date of
13 2
bankruptcy.
The state priority rule which generally favors offsetting creditors conflicting
with garnishors affords an incomplete absorption of the state law background
to setoffs in bankruptcy. A bank account in which the debtor at the time of filing
enjoyed the right of withdrawal is per se property of the estate under the old
law because the debtor had the right to withdraw and transfer the funds. That
right rested on the rule which used the test of transferability as creating
bankruptcy property.

bank is mature."); Teshelle, supra note 2, at 61-62 (stating that "When a creditor serves a
bank with notice of garnishment, the general rule is that the bank may set off the account
against the debtor's matured debts owed to the bank .... In fact, the rule is all but
universal.").
129
1d.
130However, the garnishee bank must effect its setoff or jeopardize its priority over
the gamishor. Teshelle, supra note 2, at 62.
131 Bankruptcy Act, § 70(a)(5)(repealed 1979).
132§ 544(a).
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The bankruptcy property test was and is (though in more general
language) 133 the abstract transferability idea. Thus, seductive as it is, the fact
that a debtor has not depleted a bank account before bankruptcy is immaterial
to the property of the estate issue, as is the question of whether a garnishing
creditor might have successfully wrested the account from the holder of setoff
rights. The seductive image of the account remaining at bankruptcy, along with
a state law priority rule suggesting that a bankruptcy trustee's strong-arm
power cannot defeat the setoff right, obscures the other material fact that we
have assumed: that up to bankruptcy, debtor could draw down the account as
it pleased.
A debtor's ability to use the funds on deposit absent a setoff or setoff-like act
of the bank not only satisfies derivative-title legal tests for including a deposit
account in a bankruptcy estate, but it also clouds the traditional supposition
that setoff rights merit special treatment in bankruptcy. In such circumstances
the holder of a setoff right may claim the state law background to bankruptcy
shows it to have superior rights to the account as against other creditors under
the setoff-favoring garnishment rule. However, the debtor's ability to draw the
account down means that it might pay other creditors from the account as it
wished. Setting the state law background to bankruptcy under one but not
another of these rules identifies the prebankruptcy position of such a holder of
setoff rights incompletely. Had bankruptcy not intervened, a contention that
setoff would have happened before debtor withdrew the funds may be as
unconvincing as an unperfected secured party's contention that it would have
perfected its rights before a levy on its collateral.134
Liberal modern rules protecting security interests even though use and
control of collateral remains in a debtor may not significantly improve the claim
for bankruptcy priority of a holder of a setoff right. The floating lien of an
inventory or accounts financer permits the debtor significant control 135 and
perhaps suggests that banks with setoff rights might fit this financing pattern.
If bankruptcy permits such control 136 in the debtor without jeopardizing a
nonpossessory security interest, then the same permissiveness might support
the setoff right.
But differences outweigh the similarities in this comparison under the
different powers of transfer available in these two situations. The use and
control over the actual goods in inventory financing does not permit a debtor

133§ 541(a)(1) passes to the estate "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property...."
134

Such an unperfected bankruptcy security interest generally falls under the trustee's
strong arm power. § 544(a); U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b).

135U.C.C. § 9-207.
136 Generally, the bankruptcy code does protect the inventory or receivables security
interest by immunizing transfers during the preference period, so long as a secured
party meets certain qualifications, including no improvement of its position during the
preference period. § 547(c)(5).
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to dispose of inventory as it wishes free of the security interest. Most transferees
of inventory would under the U.C.C. take subject to the claim of a perfected
secured party. Only buyers in the ordinary course 137 take free of the security
interest. 13 8 No other creditor may receive the goods in payment free of the
security interest.139 No judgment creditor may seize or sell the goods free of
the lien of the perfected inventory financer. Yet, once they are withdrawn, the
debtor may transfer funds previously subject to setoff to anyone it wishes free
of any further setoff claim of the bank. Likewise, the perfected receivables
financer who receives protection of its interest in bankruptcy is also completely
protected under the commercial code because no transferee of its rights in
accounts may take free of the security interest. Yet the situation with respect to
both the setoff right holder and the secured party may be identical to the extent
that cash proceeds 14 0 of either the security interest or the bank account may be
transferred free of the setoff or secured party's claim.
If the setoff right is not justifiable on the same grounds as an inventory lien
because of the limited power of real transferability of the latter, the setoff is also
dissimilar to its most common lien analogy when the funds are freely available
to the debtor. The pledge or possessory security interest requires the debtor to
pay the debt before it may withdraw possession from the pledgee-secured
party. Debtors under pledge have neither a right nor real opportunity to take
the collateral. Few transferees of a released pledge will take subject to the
141
pledgee's claim.

Comparing setoff rights with other well-positioned creditors shows that
special treatment in a bankruptcy need not follow from traditional setoff rights
outside of bankruptcy. Here, as elsewhere, having some advantage over other
creditors when bankruptcy occurs does not suffice for priority. Like lienors of
every kind, all of whom have some claim to bankruptcy to priority, setoff rights
holders may convincingly claim such treatment when they have specially
positioned themselves as by exercising setoff sufficiently prior to
bankruptcy142 in circumstances such that run-of-the-mill unsecured creditors
have no sound claim to reversal of the setoff holder's priority position. Absent
an exercise of setoff rights before bankruptcy, and outside legal proscriptions
based on other policies, a setoff right is indistinguishable from other creditors
who lead in the collection race but who enjoy no bankruptcy priority. What is
137U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
138U.C.C. § 9-307(1).
139U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-307(1).
140U.C.C. § 9-306(1).
141U.C.C. §9-301(1).
142

1f holders of setoff rights were subject to the same tests as general creditors, the law
of preferences could recapture setoffs taken prior to bankruptcy when all of the elements
of a voidable preference applied. § 547(b). This would differ from the present law under
which § 553(b) recaptures improvements in the setoff rights holder's position during
the 90 days before bankruptcy.
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an exercise of setoff rights must rest on an analysis of what opportunities the
holder of setoff rights foreclosed to the debtor. However labeled (e.g., setoff,
freeze 143 or hold) 144, the legal principle measures the prebankruptcy
termination of a debtor's transfer rights in an account by a creditor's decision
not to pay. Bankers and other account debtors who are also creditors of the
same party may make important distinctions by these and other labels. 145 Some
bankruptcy courts have ruled that a freeze or a hold is not a setoff barred by
the automatic stay.146 Others disagree. 14 7 If parties to such setoff opportunities
also discriminate between various labels, then revealing those understandings
should inform the principle of when appropriate action justifies special
treatment in bankruptcy of a setoff holder.

143 E.g., In re New York City Shoes, Inc., 78 B.R. 426 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)(imposing
"administrative freeze" on debtor's account which constitutes a setoff under state law.
We also fail to see how the "banker's dilemma" is so difficult to resolve.
The Bank can protect itself from the consequences of Marin by placing
something akin to a "do not pay hold" on a debtor's accounts. If withdrawals were cleared with the debtor, the bank could then pay them and
protect itself from liability. As we indicated at pages 427-28, supra, we
see significant distinctions between the "do not pay hold," which the
Debtor could loosen at will, and the deep "administrative freeze" imposed
by the Bank here upon its becoming aware of the Debtor's bankruptcy
filing.
Id. at 431. SeealsoIn re Cusanno, 17 B.R. 879 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982), affd sub non. Cusanno
v. Fidelity Bank, 29 B.R. 810 (E.D. Pa. 1983), vacated, 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984).
14 4
E.g., In re Quality Interiors, Inc., 127 B.R. 391, 393 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1991)("[tjherefore, in this Circuitan administrativehold alone does not constitute a setoff
and is not prohibited by § 362(a)(7)."); In re Learn, 95 B.R. 495 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1989)(treating freeze and hold synonymously).
14 5

Some courts hold that a setoff consists of three elements. Whether banks and other
creditors share the following distinctions is doubtful: (1) a decision to setoff; (2) an overt
act; (3) a record indicating that a setoff has occurred. E.g., Baker v. National City Bank,
511 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1975); In re Flynn, 143 B.R. 798 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992).
14 6
E.g., In re New York City Shoes, Inc, 78 B.R. 426 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (imposing
"administrative freeze" on debtor's account not violation of stay at least until debtor
provided setoff holder adequate protection); Bank of Am. v. Edgins (In re Edgins), 36
B.R. 480 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984); Kenney's Franchise Corp. v. Central Fidelty Bank (In re
Kenney's Franchise Corp.), 22 B.R. 747 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1982).
14 7

E.g., In re Patterson, 967 F.2d 505 (11th Cir. 1992); In re Briggs, 143 B.R. 438 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1992); In re Flynn, 143 B.R. 798 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992) (finding a violation of
§ 362(a)(3) not § 362(a)(7)); Homan v. Kemba Credit Union, 116 B.R. 595 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1990)(finding a violation of § 362(a)(3) not § 362(a)(7)); In re Wildcat Constr. Co.,
57 B.R. 981, 984-85 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986); In re Rio, 55 B.R. 814, 817-18 (Bankr. M.D.Ala.
1985); In re LHG Resources, Inc., 34 B.R. 202, 203-04 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983); In re
Executive Assocs., Inc., 24 B.R. 171, 172-73 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982); and In re Nelson, 6
B.R. 248, 250-51 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
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4. Setoff and Executory Contracts
Though comparisons with liens help to understand various forms of setoff
claims, setoff might fall under bankruptcy's treatment of executory contracts
(as might liens, of course). 14 8 The rights of parties to executory contracts also
seem to change 149 upon bankruptcy regardless in general of how
well-positioned a debtor's promisee had been theretofore. Although the policy
is presently in controversy, traditionally parties to contracts as to which
material performance on the part of the debtor as promisor remained could but
need not be performed after bankruptcy. 150 In general, a cost-savings to the
estate grounds the principle. If debtor had at bankruptcy filing more expensive
promises to perform than had its promisee, the debtor or trustee may withhold
performance or "reject" the contract, leaving a promisee to make an unsecured
claim against the estate in the amount of its contract damages. 151

148

See Lawrence Kalevitch, Old Liens, New Constructive Trusts and Contracts,1994-95

ANN. SURV. BANKX

L. 155.

149

Under the real value analysis submitted previously, like setoff rights, contract
rights do not change in value in bankruptcy. Only by positing a counter-factual solvent
debtor may a promisee of an insolvent debtor in bankruptcy see the value of its rights
change. Thus, the analysis nowadays tendered in discussions of promisees of executory
contracts having their nonbankruptcy face value rights converted into diminished
bankruptcy bucks on the filing of a bankruptcy petition is misleading. The promisee of
an insolvent promisor has only a (low) probability of receiving or collecting the face
value of its rights. Insolvency affects value even before bankruptcy proceedings
commence.
15OAgain, it is not bankruptcy proceedings which disturb the promisee's expectation
but rather insolvency. Insolvency does not create a problem for a debtor's profitable
contracts.
151Correlatively, the debtor or trustee may opt to perform its promise, "assume" the
contract, where its entitlement to a more valuable return promise will enhance the
bankruptcy estate.
The Fourth Circuit's decision of Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.,
756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986), sparked controversy about
whether the power of a debtor or trustee to reject an executory contract entailed also the
recapture of prebankruptcy benefits conferred on the nonbankrupt party. Lubrizol
permitted a debtor to recapture intellectual property rights. Congress amended the code
to protect intellectual property licensees such as Lubrizol Enterprises. § 365(n). This
legislative development, along with previous such specific protections for land
purchasers and lessees (§§ 365 (h)-(j)), has encouraged the view that rejection under
§ 365 does not constitute a right of recapture or avoidance. E.g., Michael Andrew,
Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection," 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 846
(1988); Jay L. Westbrook, A FunctionalAnalysis of Executory Contract, 74 MINN. L. REV.
227 (1989); DAVID G. EPSTEIN, ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 241 (1993).
However sound this view may be, courts may persist in following the principle of
Lubrizol outside the specific protections granted by the code, on the interpretive canon
that specific anti-recapture protections would be legislatively granted only if recapture
of prebankruptcy contract benefits were permissible in general. Until Congress enacts
a legislative expression against recapturing benefits, the matter may not rest.
It is altogether unfortunate that an explanation of why abstract contracts rights are
never recaptured under executory contract rejection could not prevent the recapture or
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Bankruptcy thus recognizes "rejected" prebankruptcy contracts as unsecured
claims against the estate. Although the rejection power recognizes the
prebankruptcy contract rights, those contract rights against the estate will
receive the same two-step valuation which comes to all nonpriority unsecured
claims. Because rejection will typically constitute a breach of the contract, the
promisee's rights start as a claim for damages calculated generally under
applicable contract law.152 This damages figure constitutes the promisee's
claim against the estate. 153 Second, the promisee's pro rata distribution (or
chapter 11 voting) rights will come from these damages.
The pro rata distribution or voting rights for which a contract promisee
involuntarily converts its prebankruptcy contract rights measures the real
value of the promisee's contract claim. Treatment at such a real value figure is
no different than what bankruptcy does to contract rights which have been
fully earned by a creditor before bankruptcy. The accounts receivable that a
creditor earned before bankruptcy follows the same two-step valuation
procedure. The face value of the insolvent debtor's accounts payable cannot be
paid. Bankruptcy thus converts face value contract rights to the real value of
those rights in the particular bankruptcy proceeding.
The same two-step treatment or conversion of the face value of contract
rights against the estate might be accorded setoff or certain rights of setoff. One
might regard executory contract rejection and conversion as though this were
a unique problem of bankruptcy law separate from other contractually
transferred prebankruptcy rights such as setoff rights. Yet, when bankruptcy
converts contract promisees' rights from face value to real value, bankruptcy
may have an apt model for setoffs. What happens to executory contracts might
happen more generally in bankruptcy. Tradition and labels separate executory
contracts from setoffs in bankruptcy, not natural or inherent differentiating
features. Sound policy aims might justify the differentiation. But giving special
avoidance cases from emerging. A proper explanation precludes the suggestion taken
by Lubrizol and other cases. That explanation embodies an analysis which would show
why prebankruptcy contract rights are never avoided or recaptured in any case.
Unfortunately, the view remains that prior to bankruptcy a contract promisee has the
right to full payment or performance and that bankruptcy proceedings disrupt this
right. Under the real value analysis suggested here, as well as the construct of the
well-positioned creditor, contract promisees receive in bankruptcy substantially (i.e.,
discounted by priorities created by bankruptcy) what they would have obtained outside
of bankruptcy-the real value of a promise given by an insolvent. Under this view, any
abstract claims held by a contract promisee are honored in bankruptcy (not avoided),
substantially dollar for dollar of real value. When applicable, § 365 merely permits
rejection of the contract so that a debtor or trustee may choose to create a damages claim
rather than perform a prebankruptcy promise to make a property transfer.
So long as one thinks of the prebankruptcy contract promise as having a face value
rather than a real value, the choice to create a damages claim rather than to perform
after bankruptcy will inevitably appear as an avoidance or recapture. But mere claims
against insolvent estates which cannot pay face value have only real values.
152§ 3 6 5 (g).
153§ 502.
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treatment in bankruptcy to setoffs, even setoff rights for which no
prebankruptcy action took place, would suggest similar protection of contract
promisees. Instead, the real and not the face value of the executory contract
promisee receives bankruptcy protection. The policy of granting an inchoate
setoff holder better bankruptcy protection than executory contract promisees
cannot stand on analysis of their respective prebankruptcy positions. That
preferential treatment might stand on some other bankruptcy policy but that
would need separate explanation.
The legal arrangements which give rise to setoff rights typically stem from
contract. Setoff rests on contractual principles and articulates what contractual
analysis would have adduced. 154 The right to setoff arises from the express or
implied agreement of the mutual debtors. When at bankruptcy a debtor has a
general bank account on which no setoff has yet been exercised, the parties'
contractual relationship permits the bank to setoff, which is no more perhaps
than a right to demand performance of any executory promise. The debtor had
promised the bank that it might take the funds in the account and apply them
to its debt to the bank. If no setoff had occurred before bankruptcy, the debtor's
promise remains unperformed. The automatic stay prevents the bank from
helping itself to the funds in accordance with the prebankruptcy promise, just
as a promisee loses any prebankruptcy right to enforce a prebankruptcy
promises in the manner that an agreement or legal processes provides.
Some promisees may have control over property transferred by a debtor
pursuant to an uncompleted prebankruptcy contract. Such promisees may
retain such property against the bankruptcy estate by the wide repudiation of
the idea that executory contract doctrine bestows a recapture or avoidance
power.155 Comparable setoffs would receive sustenance from this view of
executory contracts: Those setoffs under which the holder did actually have
control over the property subject to setoff. Other setoff holders may not so
qualify when before bankruptcy the debtor had control over the property
subject to setoff as where a bank account had no withdrawal restrictions.
These comparisons show that a holder of a setoff right who permits a debtor
free access to funds supporting the setoff right is positioned no better than
ordinary contract promisees and is significantly worse than careful lien
creditors. Treating such holders of setoff rights specially in bankruptcy may be
understood as traditional, but it is nevertheless unjustifiable except on some
independent policy basis. The next section discusses the apparent policy
favoring setoffs, even unexercised setoff rights.

154

This analysis was the basis for the Court's decision that a statute codifying

commercial understandings, contracts, was not state action for purposes of the
fourteenth amendment. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
155

E.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 151, at 241.
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C. Why Funds Remain in Bank Accounts at the Time of Bankruptcy
Given the illusory nature of mere setoff rights, why substantial funds so often
seem to remain at bankruptcy needs explanation. The presence of such
accounts at bankruptcy may per se support the difference between setoff
holders and other well-positioned prebankruptcy creditors who do not receive
special treatment in bankruptcy. Given the risks to the bank in permitting a
debtor access to funds, it seems odd that funds should remain in any general
account at bankruptcy. That oddity disappears upon the realization that setoff
holding banks are unlikely to permit their insolvent debtor-depositors this free
funds availability.
A setoff holding bank may occupy either of two prebankruptcy positions.
Either it knows of its debtor-depositor's financial distress, or it is surprised by
the bankruptcy. If bank has known for a long period of time of the debtor's
precarious position, exercising setoff will be likely to prompt a bankruptcy
sooner rather than later. Protecting setoff rights in bankruptcy may thus delay
the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. Abank's forbearing setoff may
permit the debtor to have the funds he needs to continue operating. This
benefit, which is perhaps one of the benefits sought by setoff policy, would
come no less from a setoff holder who deliberately refrained from offsetting
than from one who unintentionally or negligently passed up the opportunity
to setoff.
This is an independent justification of protecting setoff rights in bankruptcy.
It may be a well-founded policy justification, though that seems doubtful.
Clearly it is an optimistic policy because it ultimately rests on the economic
premise that debtors will succeed in climbing out of financial distress more
often than not if they are permitted to continue operations. Refraining from
setoff in this situation merits special recognition by according the setoff holder
a secured claim in a bankruptcy. Yet a pessimist can believe that encouraging
delay in exercising setoff will permit a debtor and a holder of setoff rights to
manipulate the debtor's assets so that if bankruptcy becomes necessary, the
setoff holder will occupy a safe position. Whether the encouraging of delayed
setoffs benefits the creditor group by producing a more valuable debtor or
bankruptcy estate is open to question. A laissez-faire economist might propose
that this result will occur because encouraging forbearance by the setoff holder
will lead to voluntary new arrangements among the interested creditor group
which, in turn, will maximize the value of the assets for the creditor group. Yet
that suggestion also argues for purifying the voluntary arrangements to
maximize their value, perhaps by removing any legal protection of the setoff
in bankruptcy. Perhaps protecting a setoff right in the event of bankruptcy
corrupts rather than facilitates any value-adding voluntary bargaining before
bankruptcy. Protecting setoff rights in bankruptcy encourages a bank to
participate in bankruptcy-avoiding efforts. Whether such efforts will be
successful, or whether they will be fair if they are successful, depends on far
more than mere opportunity. Such opportunities may waste or secrete assets
as often as they preserve or produce value.
As a result, accepting face value bankruptcy protection of setoff rights on a
policy of setoff delay and opportunity may be no more plausible than
implausible. Second, that policy should in theory extend to any party with the
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss4/3
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power to shut a debtor down, and thus may go too far. The prebankruptcy
opportunity apparently afforded by that policy would justify extending similar
protection to any creditor so well-positioned that it too might close the debtor's
operations down. A policy of delay and opportunity would also protect a
judgment creditor about to levy on a critical asset who temporarily forbears
that right to provide debtor an opportunity to turn a comer. But, the judgment
creditor does not obtain special treatment in bankruptcy. Such a judgment
creditor may well refrain from levy only if it receives something in exchange,
such as a partial payment or security interest. Yet its right to retain such a
payment will become doubtful under preference analysis if the bankruptcy
should occur within ninety days later. 156 An unperfected or a late perfected
secured party who forbears repossession of a critical asset to provide debtor
such an opportunity to work out its troubles does not get special bankruptcy
treatment as a result of that restraint. Perhaps these creditors should get the
same bankruptcy treatment traditionally accorded setoff holders. If they were
to, the setoff holder's traditional place in bankruptcy would have a firmer basis.
Finally, even if setoff policy rests on encouraging continued operations
which may result in a debtor's assets improving in value, that policy is
anachronistic in a bankruptcy world which has dramatically changed since the
dawn of setoff when bankruptcy meant only liquidation. The rise of
bankruptcy reorganization law largely eliminates the power of setoff holders
and other creditors and interests from unilaterally forcing a debtor's
liquidation. The early days of bankruptcy reorganization saw a struggle over
setoffs which might throttle the effort at reorganization. That struggle clearly
ended with the passage of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides a debtor who
might feasibly reorganize (and perhaps too many others) the opportunity to
use funds subject to setoff. Current reorganization law provides the policy
which precludes the disastrous effect that a prebankruptcy setoff once might
have had. Part LV discusses setoff and reorganization.
IV. SETOFF AND REORGANIZATION

Case law has long suggested that permitting setoff rests in the sound
discretion of the bankruptcy court. 157 Under either the conventional view of
setoff or the true value view tendered above, the setoff provisions of the
bankruptcy code lack any additional discretionary judgment. If the code
recognizes setoff to some extent based on nonbankruptcy law, discretion might
derive from nonbankruptcy law. Were that body of law discretionary,
presumably the law of the state creating the right of setoff in the creditor, the
bankruptcy courts might parcel off setoff rights on whatever discretionary

156The courts have generally ruled that creditor forbearances do not constitute new
value. Thus, forbearing to levy in exchange for a payment would not be a
contemporaneous exchange free of preference challenge. Id. at 318.
157

See infra notes 160-63.
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basis nonbankruptcy law expressed. No such nonbankruptcy approach stirs
the lingering rhetoric about permitting setoff in bankruptcy.
A. Setoff Protection as a Reorganization Policy
The once discretionary basis of setoff did not stem from nonbankruptcy
setoff law. Rather, the vague norm of discretion arose as part of the new
bankruptcy reorganization culture. 158 The leading modern case for the

158Ironically, the modem cracks in the setoff stronghold began with the Supreme
Court's decisions concerning whether the bankruptcy setoff rule of § 68(a) applied in
railroad reorganization under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended.
Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467 (1974); Lowden v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 298 U.S. 160 (1936); Harold Justman, Continents on the Bank's Right of Setoff
under the Proposed BankruptcyAct of 1973,31 Bus. LAw. 1607 (1976). See also CJI Industries,
Inc. v. Reading Co. (In re Reading Co.), 838 F.2d 686 (3d Cir. 1988); cf. Boston & Maine
Corp. v. Chicago Pac. Corp. (In re Chicago Pac. Corp.), 785 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1986).
Technically, the provisions of chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Act, including the rule of
§ 68(a) on setoff, only applied in Section 77 (railroad reorganization) to the extent that
they were consistent with Section 77.
The same reorganization-protecting rationale came to be applied in other business
reorganizations under the idea that the right of setoff was not automatically applicable
in reorganizations. Diversa Graphics, Inc. v. Management & Technical Servs. Co., 561
F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1977) (applying chapter 11); Kagel v. First Commonwealth Co., 534
F.2d 194 (9th Cir. 1976) (applying chapter 10); Susquehanna Chem. Corp. v. Producers
Bank & Trust Co., 174 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1949); Baker v. Southeastern Mich. Shippers
Coop. Ass'n, 376 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. Mich. 1973); In re Alfar Dairy, Inc., 458 F.2d 1258
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. March Warehouse
Corp., 356 F. Supp. 567 (S.D. bid. 1972); cf. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 453 F.2d 520 (3d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub. non. Central Penn Nat'l Bank v. Trustees of Property of Penn
Cent. Transp. Co., 408 U.S. 923 (1972).
Ironically, setoff began to crumble in these cases and later fostered the discretionary
or permissive rhetoric in business reorganization. Under one view of setoff, it is more
appropriate in certain cases than in liquidation bankruptcies. Liquidations surrender to
the immediate circumstances of insolvency, and reorganizations try to convert the
debtor's financial and ownership structure so that it may at some point emerge as a
solvent enterprise. Awarding the setoff holder a stronger voice in the reorganization
might recognize the relatively higher value setoff might hold, assuming successful
reorganization and solvency. However, the reorganization culture focused on the
immediate issue of working capital to which setoff may be so devastating; and it
understandably lost sight of the alternatiVe manner by which setoff might receive fair
compensation uder a plan.
Courts have appreciated the difference between, on the one hand, permitting setoff
by way of counterclaim to an action by a reorganizing debtor when the setoff poses no
imminent threat to the reorganization, and on the other hand, the alternative of
postponement of the setoff. E.g., IRS v. Norton, 717 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1983); Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp. v. Utica Floor Maintenance, Inc.(In re Utica Floor Maintenance,
Inc.), 41 B.R. 941 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1984); Western Land Planning Co. v. Midland Nat'l
Bank, 434 F. Supp 616 (E.D. Wis. 1977); In re Williams, 422 F. Supp. 342 (N.D. Ga.
1976)(postponing setoff in chapter 13); Preferred Surfacing, Inc. v. Gwinnett Bank &
Trust Co., 400 F. Supp. 280 (N.D. Ga. 1975)(postponing setoff in chapter 11).
Even under the code, the more controversial setoff issues are the analogous
motions by banks and debtors to get the funds that are in the account subject to setoff.
See supranotes 148-52. The other setoff-like "priority" claims needn't be paid early in a
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discretionary or permissive view of setoff in bankruptcy is Borden Company v.
Bohack (In re Bohack).159 Ironically, the case granted a creditor the opportunity
to setoff its claim, which was the right to assert a counterclaim to the debtor's
complaint for antitrust violations. 16° The theory behind the court's discretion
of
dictum concerns the difference between ordinary bankruptcy, or liquidation
161
"An
the nonexempt assets of a debtor, and a reorganization proceeding.

bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, asking any reorganization court to deny setoff because
the debtor needs the funds to maintain operations may be treated distinctly from
whether a setoff holder has a greater voice in the reorganization through voting power
or through a plan provision. Discretion to deny a setoff was originally meant to deny
the exercise of setoff when that would seriously imperil the incipient reorganization.
However, many thought that this denial thus doomed the setoff entirely, particularly if
reorganization failed and left too meager assets. The concept of adequate protection has
the purpose of offsetting the likelihood of the latter possibility. § 361. See also §§ 362(d),
363(c)(2).
159599 F.2d 1160 (2d Cir. 1979).
160
The court first expressed the conventional view of the history and function of setoff
in and out of bankruptcy:
The doctrine of setoff has long occupied a favored position in our
history of jurisprudence. It originated in the antiquity of Roman law and
was later adopted into the English legal system. See Loyd, The Development
of Setoff, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1916). It was incorporated into the English
bankruptcy scheme in 1705 and became a recognized doctrine of American bankruptcy law with the passage of the Act of 1800. 4 COLLIER ON

BANKRUPTCY 68.01 (14th Ed. 1975). Today, the doctrine of setoff is perserved in § 68 of the Act which provides as follows: 'Inall cases of mutual
debts or mutual credits between the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor
the account shall be stated and one debt shall be set off against the other,
and the balance only shall be allowed or paid."
Although proceedings in bankruptcy are equitable in nature, the
dominant impulse of § 68 is inequality among creditors." In re Applied
Logic Corp., 576 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1978). A setoff has the effect of paying
one creditor more than another. Despite the preferential advantages
bestowed upon certain creditors by virtue of § 68, setoffs are accepted
and approved because they are based upon long-recognized rights of
mutual debtors. Although § 68 is permissive rather than mandatory, the
Supreme Court has held that when the statutory provision is relied
upon by a creditor, it should be enforced by the court. Cumberland
Glass Manufacturing Company v. DeWitt and Company, 237 U.S. 447,
455 (1915).
599 F.2d at 1164-65.
16 1

Allowance or disallowance of a setoff is a decision which ultimately rests
in the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court. This circuit, however,
has repeatedly favored the allowance of setoffs. In In re Applied Logic Corp.,
a bank was permitted to exercise its right to set off a debt owed it by the
bankrupt against deposits and certificates of deposit held by the bank.
Judge Friendly commented therein that (t)he rule allowing setoff, both
before and after bankruptcy, is not one that courts are free to ignore when
they think application would be 'unjust'. It is a rule that has been embodied
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unqualified right of setoff in a chapter 11 proceeding might conceivably defeat
the purpose of the arrangement. A setoff could deprive the debtor of all or a
large part of its current assets at a time when it needs them most."16 2 The
purpose behind the discretionary view of setoff in reorganization cases prior
to the code came from the sensible concern that setoff could defeat or impede
a reorganization. 163 Under even the conventional view of setoff under the code,
a debtor or trustee in chapter 11 may have to recognize a setoff, but that
recognition does not entail immediate satisfaction of setoff rights. Even if a
bank account is subject to setoff, a debtor may use the account under the code,
though the prevailing view 164 requires that the debtor provide adequate
protection 165 to the setoff holder.
The mechanics of the code authorizing a debtor's use of an account which
is subject to setoff settles the precode doubts about whether setoffs may
generally impede reorganization. These mechanics permit alternative
treatments for holders of setoff rights. To whatever extent courts putatively had

in every bankruptcy act the nation has had, and creditors ... have long acted
in reliance upon it.
576 F.2d at 957-58.
In an earlier case Judge Friendly described an injunction against a
setoff as "strong medicine." In re Lehigh and Hudson River Ry. Co.,
468 F.2d 430, 434 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Tyler v. Marine Midland Trust

Co. of New York, 128 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1942). The policy of the Bankruptcy Act is to allow setoffs and counterclaims. Western Land Planning
Co. v. Midland Nat'l Bank, 434 F. Supp. 616 (E.D.Wis.1977). This court
is reluctant to disturb this policy unless compelling circumstances
require it. A decision disallowing a setoff must not be made cavalierly.
The statutory remedy of set off should be enforced unless the court finds
after due reflection that allowance would not be consistent with the
provisions and purposes of the Bankruptcy Act as a whole... [Wiere this
ordinary bankruptcy, no question of the propriety of the setoff would arise.
599 F.2d at 1165-66.
162
1d. at 1165. The debtor's argument in Bohack arose from two Supreme Court
precedents in railroad reorganization cases in which the Bohack court noticed that the
setoff provision of the Bankruptcy Act did not expressly control, as it contrarily ruled
in chapter 11 cases like Boliack. Lowden v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 298
U.S. 160 (1936) and Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467 (1974). The court in
Bohack said:
Section 302 of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 702, explicitly provides that specified
portions of the Act, including § 68, are applicable in Chapter XI proceedings
insofar as they are not inconsistent with or in conflict with the provisions
of the chapter. To the contrary, no express approval of setoffs under § 68
appears in the statute governing § 77 reorganizations.
599 F.2d at 1166 (citation omitted).
16 3

Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467 (1974).

16 4

See infra notes 178-82; cf. EPSTEIN supra note 151.

165§ 361. See infra note 179.
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broad discretion to deny a right of setoff to facilitate reorganization, 166 the code
supplants that general notion with a particular process which accounts for that
concern as well as others, including protection for the setoff holder from the
risks of a debtor's use of an account subject to setoff.

166
The Bohack court held that the Bankruptcy Act absorbed the statutory rules of
ordinary bankruptcy into chapter 11, "insofar as they are not inconsistent with or in
conflict with the provisions of this chapter." 599 F.2d 1160, 1166 (2d Cir. 1979).
Bankruptcy Act, § 302 (repealed). This guided the application of the setoff rule.
Bankruptcy Act § 68(a) (repealed). Unlike the present code, in which the rules of chapter
5 (bearing the setoff provisions, §§ 506,553) are said to apply to all chapters without any
qualifying principle (§ 103(a)), the Act may be seen as creating discretion to permit setoff
under the former § 302 consistency principle. It is unclear whether this means that
deciding under the consistency principle leaves room for differences of opinion, or
whether this truly grants discretion to decide whether to permit setoff. The court in
Bohack propounded that the review standard was an abuse of discretion, which may
suggest the latter and broader view rather than a legal error standard as under the
former.
Some courts to continue to propound a discretionary standard. E.g., DuVoisin v.
Foster (In re Southern Indus. Banking Corp.), 809 F.2d 329, 332 (6th Cir. 1987)("[tlhe
application of setoff, however, is permissive and lies within the equitable discretion of
the trial court."). See also IRS v. Norton, 717 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1983); In re Davies, 27 B.R.
898 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); Tradex, Inc. v. United States (In re IML Freight, Inc.), 65 B.R.
788, 793 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986). Even in chapter 11, this is erroneous under the
Bankruptcy Code, given the plain statutory mandate to apply chapter 5 (including § 553)
to every operative chapter of the code. § 103(a).
For railroad reorganizations, the courts had carved under the Bankruptcy Act a
true discretion rule for setoff. See supra note 162. Under § 1161 of current railroad
reorganization law, several code provisions are stated to be inapplicable in a case
concerning a railroad. Whether the exclusion from this list is meant to reverse the
discretionary setoff rule of previous bankruptcy practice is unclear. That rule may
continue under § 1171(b), by which the railroad reorganization court has broad
discretion to determine whether any unsecured claim is entitled to priority treatment.
However, the discretionary view of setoff spread from former section 77 railroad
reorganization into nonrailroad business reorganization inasmuch as the latter cases
routinely cite to the Supreme Court's railroad cases.
The Bohack case rested on a different statutory direction which left room for
deciding whether setoff was consistentwith chapter 11. No such judgment may be made
under the code. Nevertheless, the absence of true discretion to permit setoff in
reorganization does not mean that setoff is, in any sense, automatic in reorganization.
Aside from the mandated valuation issue under § 506(a), as previously discussed, the
purpose and timing of setoff remains an important, critical concern in a reorganization.
The purpose behind the discretionary view of setoff in reorganization cases prior to the
code came from the sensible concern that setoff could defeat or impede a reorganization.
Even under the conventional view of setoff under the code, a debtor or trustee in chapter
11 may have to recognize a setoff; but that recognition does not force immediate
satisfaction of setoff rights. Even if a bank account is subject to setoff, a debtor may use
the account under the code, and the prevailing view requires that the debtor provide
adequate protection to the setoff holder.
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Under the code a setoff holder has lost the power to defeat a reorganization
effort which might be successful. 167 Whether setoff is taken before or sought
after a chapter 11 filing, a debtor may obtain the use of the funds in an account.
In this reorganization context the previously noted pro-setoff policy has
become an anachronism. The driving force of that policy was the inducement
of banks and other major setoff holders to forbear setoff. For banks had the
power to obstruct a reorganization by exercising their setoff rights. Bankruptcy
held out the carrot and stick of asking few questions about the legitimacy of a
right of setoff in the bankruptcy proceeding even though generations had
acknowledged that setoff was at best a legal preference. Continuing to
recognize setoffs in bankruptcy with few questions asked, and never looking
beyond the face value of setoff rights, no doubt affected the hold-out power of
setoff holders.
Nevertheless, the bankruptcy code substantially eliminated that hold-out
power by providing that chapter 11 debtors might obtain the use of funds
subject to setoff. The legal preference came to setoff holders to induce their
willing forbearance so that reorganization might proceed. The reorganizing
creditors no longer need to overcompensate a setoff holder in order to obtain
the use of funds. Protecting all setoff holders in the face value of their setoff
rights may once have had the salutary effect sought, but continuing that
practice under the code lacks any purpose and will only stir controversy about
why other similarly situated creditors do not merit similar bankruptcy
treatment.

167

A recent treatise takes a different view:

The issue of the bank's right to setoff the debtor's account might arise
another way that also implicates section 553. Suppose that the bank did
not have time to effect the setoff before the debtor filed bankruptcy. The
automatic stay now prevents the bank from acting unilaterally to offset
the debtor's account. Thus, the bank seeks relief from automatic stay to
effect the setoff, and the trustee responds by resisting the relief and
seeking a turnover of the funds in the debtor's account pursuant to
section 542(b), which requires an entity owing a debt that is property of
the estate to pay such debt to the trustee.
The bank will prevail against the trustee. It will be permitted to make
the postpetition setoff if its right of setoff is protected by section 553. The
obligation under section 542 to pay the account to the estate does not
apply to the bank to the extent that the account may be offset under
section 553.
EPSTEIN, supra note 151, at 361 (footnotes omitted). Surely this account assumes that the
trustee or debtor has failed to offer or satisfactorily provide adequate protection. Section
553 expressly subordinates the setoff to the debtor's use of property subject to setoff
under § 363. See COLLIER, infra notes 175-79.
To the extent that an account exceeds the real value of the bank's claim against the
debtor, turnover lies in favor of trustee. As suggested in Part H and III, the code implants
a further valuation test on setoff under § 506(a) to which § 553(a)(1) directs. To reject
turnover under § 542(b) a court must find the whole of a debtor's account subject to
setoff. Fundamentally no difference arises on the right of turnover where the bank has
no setoff right or a setoff right amounting to 50% of the account.
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B. Use of Setoff Funds

The mechanics provided by the code for the use of funds or accounts subject
to setoff begin with a debtor or trustee's right to seek turnover of the funds
pursuant to § 542 (b). In exchange, so to speak, a setoff holder may move for
adequate protection of the setoff right which should ordinarily follow any
request for turnover by a debtor of the property, including funds or bank
accounts, within the possession or control of the creditor or for a court order
permitting relief from stay to effect a setoff. 168 As well, the recognition of a setoff
right may come before a bankruptcy court in the context of a plan confirmation
hearing in which a creditor or other interested parties might object to the
treatment of the creditor, and its setoff claim, under a plan.
One might hold a valid setoff right which nevertheless does not entitle the
creditor to adequate and protection and, depending on the case, does not entitle
the creditor to relief from stay to setoff, nor provides any proper ground for
objecting to confirmation of a plan properly providing for the setoff right. On
these matters it is imprecise if not improper to ascribe as discretion what are
broad legal standards; it is wrong to suppose that some nonstatutory and
precedential idea, such as Bohack's, permits a reorganization court to say that a
creditor has a legal right of setoff but refuses to recognize that right in a
reorganization. Some code cases appear to take that position but, nevertheless,
rest on the context or timing issues. 169

168§ 362(d).
1 69

For example, in Massachusetts v. Dartmouth House Nursing Home, Inc. (In re
Dartmouth House Nursing Home, Inc.), 24 B.R. 256 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982), the court
properly avoided a postpetition setoff because it violated the automatic stay of
§ 362(a)(7). Yet, it needlessly recited the litany of Bohack:
Moreover, because an application of the setoff provisions is permissive, rather than mandatory, the Bankruptcy Court has the discretion to
invalidate the privilege of setoff where setoff would frustrate a Chapter
11 debtor's ability to reorganize. Bohack v. Borden, Inc., 599 F.2d 1160
(2d Cir. 1979); In re Princess Baking Corp., 5 B.R. 587,6 B.C.D. 842 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1980). In enacting Section 553, Congress recognized that:
'Treatment of setoff in a reorganization case is very different than in a
liquidation case. In order to accomplish a successful reorganization it is
important that business proceed as usual for the debtor. Setoff is an interruption in the conduct of the business and may have detrimental effects
on the attempted reorganization.' House Report at 183.
In the present case, it is undisputed that Welfare's setoffs of the retropayments have impaired the debtors' cash flow as debtors have been
unable to satisfy monthly mortgage debt. Moreover, the element of the
public interest is present in this case because patients' health and lives
may be jeopardized by precarious cash flow.
Accordingly, despite the substantive merits of Welfare's entitlement to
setoff the retropayments, it is my opinion that the debtor's substantial
need for the funds, coupled with the public interest factor, and in view
of Welfare's blatant violation of the stay in setting off post-petition
requires a ruling that setoff of the retropayments on February 5, 1982 was
void and of no effect.
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Yet the writ of § 553 leaves a number of possible setoffs unaddressed. 170 As
to these, the code provides no express guidance, and some residue of judgment
or discretion may there remain. As usual such matters may come to a boil in
chapter 11.
C. PreconfirmationUse of Setoff Encumbered Funds
A debtor typically requires "hostage" setoff funds to effect its reorganization.
The conventional manner by which collateral is regained by the estate is
through a turnover proceeding. 171 That section requires "an entity to deliver to
the trustee property in its possession which the trustee may use, sell or lease
under section 363."172 By acquiring possession of the property through
turnover, the debtor may thereafter use the property subject to retention of the
lien and payment on the secured claim under a plan. A debtor with its key
property restored may succeed in reorganizing. Similarly, a cash-starved
debtor with money in a bank may want the use of those funds subject to
adequate protection or the indubitable equivalent of the bank's control of the
funds.
But § 542(b) states that debtors of the estate must pay the debt to the trustee
"except to the extent that such debt may be offset under section 553 of this title
against a claim of the debtor."173 Assuming the offset is in the face amount of
the claim against a debtor, § 542(b) seems literally to leave a court little
discretion in permitting turnover even to a cash-starved debtor whose
reorganization will fail, where it might have a reasonable prospect were the
debtor permitted immediate use of the cash and deferred payment on the
bank's secured claim. Given the fragility of cash as collateral, which the code
specially treats, 174 this special protection for the setoff holder is understandable
but perhaps even more preferential than the rights of similarly situated secured
175
claimants who hold cash collateral liens during a bankruptcy case.

24 B.R. at 265. The debtor was also told by the court to provide adequate protection for
the setoff right. Id.
170These also include setoff rights obtained after the bankruptcy casehas commenced,
whether in favor of prebankruptcy claims or debts, and whether held in favor of the
debtor in bankruptcy or another entity. See infra Part VI.
171§ 542(a).
172§ 542(a).
173§ 542(b).
174Debtors in chapter 11 may not use cash collateral without a court order on notice
and hearing. The provision is designed to permit the lienor on cash to obtain any
necessary adequate protection of its secured claim before the debtor may use the cash
collateral. § 363(b).
175Whiting Pools ordered the I.R.S. to turnover debtor's property seized before the
debtor filed a chapter 11 petition. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
The text asks why a debtor may retrieve property under § 542(a) and not setoff funds
under § 542(b). The policy explanation for the recapture in Whiting Pools given by the
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A setoff holder is immune from turnover under the exception clause of
§ 542(b) 176 which may be inapplicable to other secured claimants. COLLIER
takes the position that § 542(b) does not prevent turnover of property177 in
which the estate has an interest, such as a deposit account subject to setoff.178
COLLIER asserts that "turnover must be made under section 542(b) only if
adequate protection is provided."'179 The logic of this conclusion derives from
a trustee's right to use, sell or lease property of the estate in the ordinary course
of business. 180 Further, the use of deposit accounts including any that are
subject to setoff is an express exception to the right of setoff recognized in
§ 553.181 Thus, a trustee (and so a debtor in possession under chapter 11)182

Supreme Court shows that there is no policy distinction between the two settings in
which reorganization is likely to be facilitated by turnover. Some authorities claim that
the procedural protections given cash collateral under § 363(c)(2) explain the express
exception for setoff under § 542(b). In this view the exception assures a pre-turnover
hearing in which the setoff holder may receive adequate protection of its interest. 4
COLLIERON BANKRUPTCY 1 542.03, at 542-16 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1991).
That the code contemplates use, sale or lease of setoff funds, albeit with limitations,
follows from the introductory text of § 553(a): "Except as otherwise provided in this
section and in sections 362 and 363 of this title .. "
176"... except to the extent that such debt may be offset tnder section 553 of this title
against a claim against the debtor."
177

See supra note 175.

178

1d. Courts have rejected turnover of funds against which an offsetting claim is
properly held under § 542(b). Typically, in these cases, the debtor offers no adequate
protection and inadequately relies on the automatic stay (§§ 362(a)(7); (a)(3)) as entitling
turnover. The fifth circuit has held that a setoff claim valid under § 553 barred a trustee's
turnover action under § 542(b) but no adequate protection was offered. Stephenson v.
DukeSalisbury (In re Corland Corp.), 967 F.2d 1069,1976 (5th Cir. 1992); cf. B.F. Goodrich
Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Patterson (In re Patterson), 967 F.2d 505, 509 (11th Cir.
1992)(granting automatic stay to debtor who dropped turnover request and sought
automatic stay and antidiscrimination enforcement).
179

See supranote 175. Case law supports the COLLIER view that the exception of setoff
from § 542(b) turnover yields when adequate protection of the setoff is provided. E.g.,
In re Quality Interiors, 127 B.R. 391, 395 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991); In re New York City
Shoes, Inc., 78 B.R. 426 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); Elsinore Shore Assoc. v. First Fidelity Bank
(In re Elsinore Shore Assoc.), 67 B.R. 926, 946 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1986); Hoffman v. Portland
Bank (In re Hoffman), 51 B.R. 42 (Bankr. D. Ark. 1985); see also Williams v. American
Bank (In re Williams), 61 B.R. 567 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986); cf. United States v. Perry (In
re Perry), 26 B.R. 599 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983)(stating that setoff is adequately protected
under chapter 13 plan because tax claim holds priority and must be paid in full under
plan).
180§ 363(c)(1). Note also that the limitation to such use of cash collateral requires notice
and hearing, unlike other estate property to be used in the ordinary course of business.
181"Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections 362 and 363 ......
§ 553(a).
182§ 1107(a).
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may use cash collateral. Cash collateral includes deposit accounts.1 8 3 Thus, a
trustee may use its deposit accounts.
Notice that permitting a debtor to use its deposit accounts is the general rule
of § 363(c)(1). Deposit accounts may be free of either lien or setoff rights. When
deposit accounts are subject to a lien, they expressly fall within the expression
"cash collateral." Whether the same is true when a deposit account is subject
to
a right of setoff is facially unclear under § 363, but the exception in § 553 for
§ 363 could have no more likely referent. 184 The COLLIER rendition of the
meaning of § 542(b) thus assumes that deposit accounts with setoff
right-holding creditors are identical with a liened bank account. Yet code
provisions which directly address setoff185 do not associate the term collateral
with setoff. Because deposit accounts may be subject to either setoff or lien
rights, which the code descriptively contrasts with setoff in § 506(a), another
reading of deposit accounts as cash collateral under § 363 may be that they are
no more than accounts subject to a lien, as typically proceeds 186 from the sale
of original collateral. That reading of § 363(a) and (c) would also harmonize the
latter's right to use deposit accounts and § 542(b)'s turnover exception for
holders of setoff rights. Under COLLIER's reading the latter exception is limited
to cases in which adequate protection is not provided to the setoff holder.
My point is not to commend turnover treatment of setoff rights which is
different from liens on a deposit account. 187 Rather, textually 188 the code may
permit one kind of secured claim (lien) to be subject to turnover (albeit with
likely need for adequate protection) 18 9 and another (setoff) to be immune from
turnover. If there is anything profoundly objectionable to setoff under § 553 as
a preference or fraudulent transfer (if "legal"), § 542(b) facially compounds the
disparity by elevating the setoff holder to a position even above the rights and
beyond the risks normal secured claimants and lienors must bear when a court
permits turnover and an adequate protection which may nevertheless fail in
its purpose. 190 Yet this disparity would be less true to the extent a setoff right

183§ 363(a).
184
See supra note 181. See also Williams v. American Bank (In re Williams), 61 B.R. 567
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986); In re Archer, 34 B.R. 28 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983).
185§%542(b), 506(a), 553.
186U.C.C.

§ 9-306(1).

187

See EPSTEIN supra,note 151.

188

See supra note 178.

18 9

The secured claim may be sufficiently secured without the deposit account so that
no adequate protection order need be entered.
190Providing any party with adequate protection under § 361 should not fail but, of
course, it may. In the event that adequate protection does fail to provide the indubitable
equivalent of a party's interest, § 507(b) provides the party a super priority
administrative expense.
Another disparity between apparent lien treatment and setoff treatment relates to
the turnover issue. Dean Lacy takes a distinctly negative view of § 553(b). See supra note
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were properly valued, as previously discussed. Indeed, face value treatment of
setoffs may force debtors to pay dearly for cash needed to reorganize under the
COLLIER view requiring adequate protection in the face amount of the bank's
claim before a court may permit use of the bank account. No reorganizing
debtor should have to provide adequate protection to the setoff holder in the
face amount of the prebankruptcy setoff claim unless a § 506(a) valuation
concludes that that is the value of the setoff in the bankruptcy.
Under the reading of setoff under § 506(a) submitted here, 191 no apparent
reason supports requiring a debtor to provide adequate protection of setoff for
the excess over the real value of the setoff claim as determined under § 506(a)
valuation. Nor, of course, upon a valuation of the setoff right below the face
value, would the exception of turnover from setoff apply to the amount
exceeding the value of the setoff. Nor should it matter for this purpose whether
a setoff right was exercised before bankruptcy or is sought by relief from stay
after bankruptcy.
D. Setoff and the Reorganization Plan
To confirm a plan under chapter 11,192 debtor must provide a secured claim
with one of three alternatives: (1) surrender of the collateral to the secured
claimant; (2) sale of the collateral with the secured claimant's lien continuing
on the collateral or the proceeds of the collateral; (3) retention of the collateral
by the postconfirmation debtor subject to a secured claimant's lien and
payments to the secured party of the value of the collateral under the plan.
If one regards the holder of a right of setoff as the holder of a secured claim
for these confirmation rules, as § 506(a) apparently does, it is interesting to try
to fit a setoff holder into this scheme. First, what is the analogue to the debtor's
surrender of collateral to a lien creditor? The analogue to the setoff right is the

90. On the premise that § 553(b) has the purpose of discouraging prebankruptcy
exercises of setoff rights to facilitate reorganization, he suggests that even
prebankruptcy exercises of setoff should be subject to turnover on provision of adequate
protection. "Under existing law achieving this result is problematic because the exercise
of a setoff effectively terminates the debtor's rights in the account prior to the
commencement of the case." Lacy, supra note 2, at 976; see also suipra note 90. If this
statement is true, it appears to be inconsistent with the turnover of collateral, which has
been the subject of a transfer that has cut off the debtor's interest. See United States v.
Whiting Pool, 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983)("[a]lthough these statutes could be read to limit,
the estate to those 'interests of the debtor in property' at the time of the filing of the
petition, we view them as a definition of what is included in the estate, rather than as a
limitation.").
Setoff, turnover and § 506(a) valuation should come into every setoff taken while
the debtor was insolvent, not simply to facilitate reorganization, but more importantly
to prevent the setoff holder's overcompensation.
19 1

See supra Part II.

192§ 1129(b)(2)(A). The same rule holds in chapters 12 and 13 although the power of
sale in the latter chapters is not expressly provided in the confirmation standard.
§§ 1225(a)(5), 1325(a)(5).
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possessory lien creditor, say a pawn shop. A reorganizing debtor might tell the
pawnshop to keep the collateral, or, if previous turnover 193 has been obtained,
the debtor might return the rolex to the pawn shop. Like the pawn shop, the
bank "holding" a debtor's money might be told by the debtor, or its plan, keep
the money. Yet, again, this runs the risk of overcompensating a setoff holder.
Similarly, if one were to recognize a bank's claim to the money it "holds" in
a debtor's account under setoff rules, one could sell that account under the plan
just as one might sell off a debtor's liened accounts receivable. Because setoff
rights are typically of such liquidated amounts, however, sale most commonly
is the same as surrendering any claim to the funds. However, again, the real
value of the debtor's rights in the account will turn on the valuation of the setoff
claim encumbering the account.
Yet the risk of overcompensation may not arise in the plan stage of
reorganization. Unless there is some agreement otherwise, a debtor may have
to provide the setoff holder under the plan the full face value of the setoff right.
The cramdown amount required for secured claims may be the face amount of
the setoff claim. Just as a setoff right in a chapter 7 liquidation of an insolvent
needs to be discounted to its real value, a setoff right which has not been
invalidated or otherwise concluded prior to the proposal of a plan may at that
stage have a real value amounting to its face value. No less should a setoff claim
enjoy the going concern value presumably held by a successfully reorganized
entity. Just as there may be a difference between the value of a lien in liquidation
of a business as compared to its value in an ongoing business, the value of a
setoff right may likewise vary.194
V. THE AMOUNT SUBJECT TO SETOFF

How a bankruptcy court might determine the real value of a setoff claim
against an insolvent bankruptcy estate begins with the liquidation value of the
setoff right at the time of a bankruptcy filing. The contrasting orthodox analysis
begins (and ends) with the face amount of the creditor's claim. Assuming that
the debts are in an identical face amount, the conventional treatment values the
claim against the estate as exactly what the value of the estate's claim is. For a
creditor of the estate who was also liable to the bankruptcy estate would never
sell such a claim for less than its face amount because that would expose it to
liability to the estate in the larger amount. But this begs the question, for it
assumes that the value of the setoff right in bankruptcy is its face amount.
Indeed, fixing the price by some artificial standard (here that bankruptcy will
fully value the setoff right) ignores the debtor's insolvency and establishes a
bogus hypothetical market. 195

193§

542(a).

194§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(1I).
195
No one would pay face value for a claim against a debtor who was insolvent. Even
a debtor of the debtor in bankruptcy would merely break even by obtaining a setoff
through payment of face value. Given the risk that a claim brought for setoff purposes
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Alternately, one may ask, as above, for valuation of the claim against the
estate alone. The value of that claim is the value that willing buyers would pay
at any particular moment. Claims have a value in such markets substantially
equal to the face amount discounted for the date payable, any interest
permitted, the relevant cost of money and the costs or delay in collection. Using
this sort of market-formulation yields low returns for sales of claims against
insolvents. Indeed, the code establishes a zero value for setoff claims acquired
19 6
within the 90 days before bankruptcy from an entity other than the debtor
or for the purpose of obtaining a setoff right against the debtor.197 Whether
these absolute rules are sound may be doubted, 198 but they suggest that a setoff
right's real value is far below its face amount.
Several objective factors permit the reasonable certainty which courts use in
various valuation contexts. 19 9 Dean Lacy, for example, suggests that a key
factor in approving setoffs, and differentiating setoffs on the principle of
2° °
creditor equality, is the setoff obtained while the debtor was solvent.
Presumably a setoff obtained while a debtor was insolvent is distinguishable.
That seems to be an idea behind the broad rules of §§ 553(a)(2) & (3). The setoff
obtained while the debtor was insolvent has no value through the code if it is
obtained within 90 days of bankruptcy. However, that does not compel the
conclusion that the value of the setoff is the face amount if it had been obtained
more than 90 days before bankruptcy, especially'were the debtor then
insolvent.
A useful initial guide for valuation of setoffs would be the face amount of
any setoff right if the right was obtained when the debtor was solvent so long
as the creditor did not setoff prior to the 90 day period before bankruptcy.
Creditors who do offset prior to the 90 day period should receive attention
under other bankruptcy avoidance law. 201 If such creditors or those who never

may be invalid in bankruptcy, (which seems to depend on the timing of such an
acquisition e.g., § 553), buyers would want to pay somewhere between the estimated
liquidation value of the debtor and the risk-discounted setoff value. This may be the
same figure depending upon the estimation and setoff risks.
196§ 553(a)(2).

197§ 553(a)(3).
198
These rules may rest on a policy of deterrence, or they may reston a policy goal
equality among creditors, a goal which is also accomplished by the true value thesis of
setoff.
199
E.g., U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (advocating that contract damages must be reasonably
certain).
200
See Lacy, supra note 2, at 954-56.
201

For example, under either § 548 or § 544(b), the setoff may be a transfer intended
to defraud creditors or a transfer which has the effect of doing so. Under present law,
the body of § 553(a) has been read to bar avoidance of a setoff not avoidable under § 553.
This conventional reading assumes that the critical language, "this title does not affect
any right to offset...," refers to cases in which no setoff has been taken before bankruptcy,
and also to cases in which setoff has been taken, either prior to the 90 days before
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exercised setoff rights prior to bankruptcy could show some
contemporaneousness which immunizes preferences, 202 the later extension of
unsecured credit 20 3 or other familiar factors which overcome the preference
rules, then a court might finally value the setoff right closer to the face amount
of the holder's claim against the estate. Likewise, setoffs obtained or exercised
when debtors were insolvent should receive valuation scrutiny under a refined
20 4
fraudulent transfer analysis.
VI. SETOFF AFTER BANKRUPTCY
The period after bankruptcy raises several setoff questions. The first issue is
whether a claim arising after bankruptcy may offset a claim arising prior to
bankruptcy. Cases routinely deny such an offset. 205 The second
postbankruptcy issue concerns the effect of the confirmation of a
reorganization plan on preconfirmation setoff rights. Debtors have had the
perhaps greedy vision that the confirmation of a reorganization plan
discharges the claim of a setoff right holder but preserves the claims of debtors.
None of the judicial responses to this sort of contention has shown special
insight into the structure of the bankruptcy law.
A. The Timing Rule of§ 553
Section 553 (a) addresses only the setoff of "mutual debt.., that arose before
the commencement of the case under this title." The latter phrase modifies both
the debt owed by the setoff claimant and the debt owed by the debtor in
bankruptcy. From this plain language comes the proposition that any setoff
rights derived after the filing of a bankruptcy may not be recognized. In two
leading appellate decisions the courts rejected setoff claims on what appear to
be questionable grounds despite the plain language recited.
1. When the Claim Arose
In Cooper-Jarret,Inc. v. Central Transport, Inc.(In re Cooper Jarret, Inc.), 206 the
court held that a disputed prepetition claim of the debtor which had been

bankruptcy or within the 90 days, but not subject to avoidance under §§ 553(a)(2) or (3).
That is a broad reading and may be justifiable by the broad language, "this title does not
affect ....
"If this language were intended to immunize both exercised and unexercised
setoff rights, one might have the doubts McCoid expressed under the principle of
creditor equality. McCoid, supra note 2. Under one aspect of that principle, one might
sensibly favor those setoff rights-holders who acquired their setoffs while the debtor
was solvent and refrained from setoff until bankruptcy.
202 E.g., § 547(c)(1).
203
204

E.g., § 547(c)(4).
See supra note 201; see also supra note 40.

205Boston & Maine Corp. v. Chicago Pac. Corp. (In re Chicago Pac. Corp.), 785 F.2d
562 (7th Cir. 1986); Cooper-Jarret Inc. v. Central Transp., Inc. (In re Cooper Jarret, Inc.),
726 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1984).
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been settled during litigation after the bankruptcy case had commenced was
not a debt of the setoff claimant "that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title." Although the code defines the term "debt" as "liability on
a claim '20 7 and defines "claim"' 208 in the broadest possible terms,209 in this case
the Third Circuit rested its decision on the nonbankruptcy proposition that a
litigation settlement agreement creates a new legal obligation which supplants
any previous liability. Thus, the debtor's debt did not qualify for setoff use
under §553 because this new obligation had arisen after bankruptcy. This same
court decided the notorious Frenville case, during the same term which
consistently held that a claim was not stayed by §362 of the code because under
state law the right to payment did not accrue until after the bankruptcy case
was filed. 210 As other cases and commentary reject Frenville,211 so too may one
reject Cooper-Jarret.
2. Debtor's Use of Setoff
A more interesting though marred case 212 is the railroad reorganization
opinion of Judge Easterbrook which decided a battle of two bankrupt roads,
Boston & Maine Corp. v. Chicago Pac. Corp.2 13 Boston & Maine filed its bank-

206726 F.2d 93, 96-97 (3d Cir. 1984).
207§ 101(12).
208§ 101(5)(A).
2 9

0 Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 558 (1990).

21 0 Avellino & Barnes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332, 335-36
(3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
211E.g., Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 201-02 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed sub
nom. Joynes v. A.H. Robins Co., 487 U.S. 1260 (1988); EPSTEIN, supra note 151, at 176,
describes the Robins view as "dominant".
21 2 The court denied the bankruptcy estate a setoff. Neither the bankruptcy statute nor
policy supports such a novel proposition. Section 553 limits the setoff rights of the
creditor. Though the case discussed arose under the Bankruptcy Act, the accepted view
of the broad language of § 68(a), see supra note 3, had it apply to validate creditor setoff
rights. The concept that bankruptcy trustees may exercise setoff in the rare
circumstances in which the estate may benefit from it comes from the trustee's
succession to the rights of the debtor or its own postpetition activities giving rise to
setoff. If the trustee's setoff right should be viewed tinder a rough reciprocity norm as
no greater than those of creditors, as previously noted there was by the time of this
decision ample precedent suggesting setoff by creditors might be impermissible in
railroad reorganization, but that precedent seemed directed at the early stage of
reorganizations when a setoff might deprive a railroad an opportunity to reorganize.
See supra note 162. The Rock Island dispute concerned the terminal stages of the
reorganization of the two roads.
213785 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1986).
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ruptcy in 1970 in Boston, and in 1979 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
ruled that debts of the Boston & Maine for "interline balances" 2 14 enjoyed no
priority in its bankruptcy.215 The Rock Island railroad 2 16 filed bankruptcy in
1975 but the Seventh Circuit in 1976 ordered that it provide priority for
prebankruptcy interline balances (as well as subsequent balances). 21 7 The
upshot of the conflicting circuit court decisions left the Rock Island and Boston
& Maine debtors in decidedly different positions, even though each was a
creditor in the other's bankruptcy. This resulted because the former had
sufficient funds in the end to pay all creditors but the latter would only be able
to pay 10 cents on a dollar. Thus, as Judge Easterbrook pointed out, the Boston
& Maine would pay $18,000 on a 15-year old debt of $180,000 while the Rock
Island would pay the Boston & Maine more than $100,000 on a more recent
debt of $100,000.218 In these circumstances the Rock Island contended it had
the right to setoff its $180,000 claim against Boston & Maine's $100,000 claim.
Judge Easterbrook's setoff analysis of these facts presumes without
discussion the materiality of the prebankruptcy and postbankruptcy sources
of the debts. 219 Though § 553 requires that each debt arise before bankruptcy,
the scope of § 553 need not extend at all to postbankruptcy setoff rights. As
noted earlier,220 § 553 acknowledges or validates in bankruptcy some
prebankruptcy setoff rights by providing that "this title does not affect any right
of a creditor to offset ... "221 Then, the setoff section qualifies the kind of setoff
rights it acknowledges by excluding setoff rights deriving from certain
circumstances. 222 Interestingly, the literal effect of the rule of §§ 553(a)(1)-(3)
turns out to be no more than excepting those three kinds of setoff rights from
the main clause of the rule, the setoff acknowledgement. Thus, prebankruptcy
setoff rights of the sort covered in the exception clause fall into something of a
limbo: title 11 may affect such setoff rights although § 553 does not say what
or how this will occur. This contrasts with § 553(b), which permits a trustee to

2 14

"Interline balances are the net amount due from one railroad to another for mutual
transactions." Id. at 563.
2 15
d. at 567.
2 16

This was the predecessor to the reorganized Chicago Pacific Corporation.

7

21 Gibbons v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. (In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pac.
R.R.), 537 F.2d 906 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1092 (1977).
218785 F.2d at 564.
219 The Rock Island and the Boston &Maine bankruptcies arose before the Bankruptcy
Code and were governed by the Bankruptcy Act. But the court cited the code as well as
§ 68 of the Act for the requirement that each debt arise before bankruptcy.
220
See supra text accompanying note 66.
221§ 553(a).
222

Setoffs falling within §§ 553(a)(1)-(3) are invalid.
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recover certain setoffs, 22 3 and contrasts with the normal avoidance provisions
of the code which likewise permit a trustee to avoid or recover prebankruptcy
transfers. 22 4 Setoff rights which were not exercised prior to bankruptcy are not
voidable transfers by virtue of the application of §§553(a)(1)-(3). Nevertheless,
225
such setoff rights may be affected by bankruptcy.

22 3

Somewhat consistently, the general recovery provision of the code, § 550, includes
reference to § 553(b) but not § 553(a). The tiny difference seems to arise from liability for
an "avoided transfer" under § 550, applicable only to setoffs exercised prior to bankruptcy. Setoffs which fall under § 553(a)(1)-(3) were never valid setoffs in bankruptcy
and are subject to turnover under § 542(b). Cf. infra note 224.
224§§ 544, 545, 547, 548.
22 5

Note 223, supra, suggests these § 553(a)(1)-(3) setoff rights are invalid in
bankruptcy, and thus § 542(b) turnover lies as opposed to an action under § 550.
Alternatively, the right of setoff is generally viewed by bankruptcy commentators as a
preferential treatment of the holder of a setoff right when it is exercised prior to
bankruptcy and during the preference period of § 547. Commentators describe § 553 as
an exception to the preference law of § 547. E.g., GEORGE TREISTER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS
OF BANKRUPTCY LAw 169 (1987). Further, it is generally agreed that § 553(a) immunizes
setoffs there recognized from preference attack.
Thus, one consequence of § 553(a)(1)-(3) may be simply to expose such
nonbankruptcy setoff rights to a preference challenge under §§ 547 and 550. Setoff rights
obtained during the preference period, normally 90 days (§ 547(b)(4)(A)), would, under
this view, be preferences. Yet it is not easy to see how this may be so. For example,
consider a setoff under § 553(a)(2) acquired from an entity other than the debtor during
the preference period and while the debtor was insolvent. That is, suppose C buys a
claim against D from Cl so that it might offset its own debt in a similar amount. There
is no doubt at all that commentators, as well as Congress, are correct in understanding
the recognition of this setoff right to result in preferential treatment for C in D's
bankruptcy. However, commentators wrongly suppose that preference law is on point
here.
If C's setoff right was recognized as valid in D's bankruptcy, C would not receive
preferential treatment in D's bankruptcy under § 547. This is part of Dean Lacy's
analysis. See Lacy supra note 2. If such a setoff right was tested under § 547, the trustee
would recover nothing. Preference law requires a transfer of property of the debtor prior
to bankruptcy. If C does not setoff prior to bankruptcy, but properly seeks relief from
stay to setoff after bankruptcy (most likely in response to a trustee's action on the debt
C owes D), C's exercise of its right of setoff cannot be a preference because of its timing.
If C does exercise its right of setoff prior to bankruptcy and during thepreference period,
the issue becomes whether there was a "transfer of an interest in property of the debtor"
under § 547(b). In the case of bank setoff it may be that imagination and hypostatization
suffice for the conclusion that the debtor's interest in the general funds of the depository
bank has been "transferred" by a bank's setoff. A transfer may also occur when C offsets
D's claim with the claim it bought from C1. (C's purchase of Cl's claim against D cannot
qualify as a transfer of debtor's property.)
When D or its trustee claims C has received a preference by offsetting prior to
bankruptcy, the final element of a preference action requires a showing that the
challenged "transfer ... enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if- (A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; (B) the transfer had not
been made; and (C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided
by the provisions of this title." In one view the estate would have to pay nothing to C if
the transfer, the setoff, had not been made. The estate might setoff C's claim by its own
claim against C. In that event, C's prepetition setoff would not enable C to receive more
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As to setoff rights acquired postbankruptcy by a prebankruptcy creditor or
a debtor of a bankrupt, § 553 says no more than the pregnant negative, that
such setoff rights, as with the setoff rights borne by §§ 553(a)(1)-(3), may be
affected by bankruptcy. One might suppose that if §553 does not acknowledge
or validate a setoff right, such as one acquired after bankruptcy, title 11 does
affect that right by invalidating the setoff right. This in turn depends on an
assumption about the style of the bankruptcy law that bankruptcy law does
not recognize any claim unless it receives definite expression in the code. As
applied in general this is no doubt an erroneous premise.
But as to claims of priority against the bankruptcy estate, one may expect
express code statements of such priority rights such as provided in §§ 507 and
506.226 Section 506(a) defines setoff by expressly referring to § 553. But, as
shown, the latter merely permits bankruptcy to affect setoff rights without
indicating what that effect may be.
The fact that setoff grants a priority to a creditor may unravel the mystery
about setoffs that lay beyond the reach of § 553. Judge Easterbrook supposed
that any setoff creates an unfair priority to the holder. If, however, one takes
setoff as less than a priority claim, or less than an unfair priority, then one would
expect its express recognition in the code to be no more necessary than a
separate listing under the definition of claim for contract, tort or statutory
liabilities. If there are setoffs which do not create an unfair or any priority
between the holder and other creditors, then such setoffs might be acceptable
in bankruptcy even without any specific statutory mandate. Most obviously,
in the case of a solvent debtor, only futility would ask the setoff holder and the
trustee to exchange checks. More importantly, if it is properly valued, a setoff
cannot create any unfair priority.
What other cases and setoffs might not be affected by bankruptcy derives
from this understanding of what §553 does address: those priority setoff rights
and actual prebankruptcy setoffs which do provide the setoff holder with an

than C would have received in a chapter 7 case filed by D. On the other hand, if the
estate did not setoff against C but rather calculated a hypothetical dividend for C, then
receipt of that dividend, plus C's setoff receipt, would result in C's having received more
than it would have received had there been no setoff transfer.
A final issue may arise which implicates the timing point once more. Perhaps a
setoff right which is sought to be exercised only after the commencement of the
bankruptcy case would bean invalid postpetition transferof property of the estate under
§ 549. Under the previous reasoning, the estate will have had its claim against C
transferred (e.g., discharged) should the setoff be taken. This postpetition transfer may
be invalid. § 549. Accordingly, the postpetition taking of an invalid § 553(a) setoff would
also violate postpetition transfer law and be actionable under § 550. See Tyler v. Marine
Midland Trust Co., 128 F.2d 927, 928 (2d Cir. 1942).
22 6
The Supreme Court suggested as much in United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood
ForestAssoc., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,372 (1988). There the code's express grant ofpostpetition
interest in § 506(b) to oversecured creditors, those whose collateral has a value exceeding
the debt secured, supported the holding that undersecured creditors have no right to
postpetition compensation during the interim period after bankruptcy and prior to
confirmation of a chapter 11 plan.
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unfair priority over other creditors. This fits the Easterbrook conception: the
code must expressly provide for prebankruptcy setoff rights or actual
prebankruptcy setoffs because these have the inevitable effect of giving such
holders priority treatment in the bankruptcy. Postbankruptcy setoff rights
receive no express attention in the code for the opposite reason. These setoff
rights do not necessarily lead to any unfairness in the distribution of rights, as,
for example, among the Rock Island's prebankruptcy creditors. The railroad
22 7
battle exemplifies this. The fight between these railroads had finally nothing
whatever to do with setoff under either old § 68 or its successor § 553.
The issues these bankruptcy provisions address, however fragmentarily, are
a
the setoff rights of a party against whom the bankruptcy estate also has
2 28 The Rock Island brouhaha concerned the setoff rights of a bankruptcy
claim.
debtor. Permitting the bankruptcy estate to setoff, whether its claim derived
before or after bankruptcy, does not create priority for the affected creditor over
other unsecured creditors of the Rock Island, the position which Judge
the code's express limitations on
Easterbrook took as the policy behind
22 9 The problem in such cases 230 by a setoff by an estate implicate priority
setoff.
The creditors were only trivially affected by the discrepant opinions of the circuit
case and
courts. The creditors would receive 100% of their claims in the Rock Island
Island could
stood to gain only additional interest on these claims if the debtor Rock
creditors of
setoff its claim against that of the Boston & Maine. Oa the other hand, the
claims.
their
of
value
face
the latter railroad were to receive a mere 10% of the
22 7

Section 553(a): IT)his title does not affect" any right of a creditor to offset a mutual
to te debtor ....
debt owing by such creditor
2 29
Judge Easterbrook's confusion about setoff, so common in the literature because
passage:
the whole notion of setoff is so dearly abstract, may be seen in the following
should
firm
pre-bankruptcy
the
of
creditors
some
why
reason
no
There is
have their rights diminished by post-bankruptcy transactions of the firm
that might create setoffs-yet that would be the result of allowing preand post-bankruptcy debts to cancel each other out, because a setoff would
reduce the cash intake of the firm, and therefore usually reduce the funds
available to satisfy competing claims.
could have
785 F.2d at 565. The case before the court did not involve a setoff which
debtor in
the
by
sought
setoff
The
creditors.
the
to
available
reduced the funds
the
reducing
by
creditors
its
to
bankruptcy could only increase the funds available
creditor.
one
to
distribution
or events
Further, the view taken of the benefits to be gained by transactions
if doing
Even
narrow.
extremely
is
creditor
pre-bankruptcy
a
postbankruptcy with
bankruptcy
in
valid
setoff
a
create
business with such a pre-bankruptcy creditor might
by Judge
for such a creditor, bankruptcy law does not need a legal rule as imagined
the only
behavior,
firm
from
Easterbrook. Unless self-interest has entirely disappeared
might
who
creditor,
pre-bankruptcy
a
with
deal
should
bankruptcy
in
firm
reason why a
If
elsewhere.
unavailable
benefit
net
a
thereby gain a setoff right, would be to obtain
such a
approve
to
have
would
creditors
pre-bankruptcy
other
the
so,
that were
the creditor,
transaction as a net benefit to them also. If the debtor was colluding with
a legal rule,
by
deny,
to
Thus,
§
510.
setoff.
the
against
summoned
be
may
rules
other
will only
setoff of any postbankruptcy debt against a creditor's prebankruptcy claim
creditors. The
throttle those postbankruptcy dealings which would benefit the other
open issue of
equitable discretion Judge Easterbrook is so intent to deny on the wide
only as
setoffs beyond the scope of § 553, leads him to a rule which appears necessary
22 8
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or preferential treatment concerns between the creditors of one bankruptcy
estate and the creditors of another bankruptcy estate. Because there were two
bankruptcy estates waging this battle of the estates, the effect of permitting one
debtor in bankruptcy to setoff could produce an unfair priority for one creditor
group over another creditor group. Using the real rather than face amounts of
the claims of each estate would produce -fairness to each creditor group. 23 1
Denying setoff or permitting setoff based on face value would have the effect
of favoring one group of creditors over another when the mutual debtors are
both in bankruptcy whenever the real value setoff values differ. Judge
Easterbrook mistook the bankruptcy setoff provisions to present an inflexible
rule against setoff when one debt arose postbankruptcy and the other
prebankruptcy. Second, he took that rule to apply to a setoff claim by a debtor
in bankruptcy. Even so, as shown using real values of setoff rights, 232 the
decision left the parties close to the right analysis.
ReadingCompany233 presents a second battle of bankruptcy estates and setoff.
Central Jersey's creditors, including Reading, had received in Central Jersey's
railroad reorganization nonrecourse 23 4 notes collateralized by a claim that
Central Jersey held against the United States. The claim was of uncertain value.
Thus, the face amount of the notes did not reflect their value. Reading sought
to setoff the note in its face amount against Central Jersey's claim in the Reading
bankruptcy. Because Reading was likely to be solvent, 235 the effect of
permitting it to setoff the note of indeterminate value against Central Jersey's
claim would create a priority in favor of the other Reading creditors in the estate
of the Central Jersey railroad. For by setoff these creditors would replace their
rights in Central Jersey's doubtful note with extinction of Central Jersey's claim

a crusade against discretion and wise only if the rule he creates does more good than
harm.
2 30
CJI Industries, Inc. v. Reading Co. (In re Reading Co.), 838 F.2d 686 (3d Cir. 1988).
23
1Boston & Maine would pay $18,000 on a 15-year old debt of $180,000 while the
Rock Island would pay the Boston & Maine more than $100,000 on a more recent debt
of $100,000. Because Rock Island was solvent, the real value of the Boston &Maine setoff
rightwas its face value. The 10% dividend awaiting the Rock Island in Boston &Maine's
bankruptcy meant the latter was insolvent and using liquidation values. This gave Rock
Island's setoff right a 10% real value on its face setoff claim of $100,000 or $10,000. The
effect of the court's opinion is to require Rock Island to pay $100,000 and receive $18,000
for a net distribution of $82,000. On these real value figures, Rock Island should pay
Boston & Maine $90,000 after deducting the value of its setoff right and receive the same
$18,000 for a net distribution of $72,000. When the First Circuit permitted the Boston &
Maine to affect setoff against Rock Island in the face amount of its claim, the eventual
solvency of Rock Island justified that figure as the real value of the Boston & Maine
setoff.
232
See supranote 231.
233838 F.2d 686 (3d Cir. 1988).
234

1d. at 687.

235

Id.
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against Reading. 23 6 Permitting setoff in the real value of the note would have
respected the rights of the creditors of the two bankruptcy estates.
B. Setoff Surviving Discharge or Confirmation
The supposed special nature of setoff rights has led courts to rule that setoff

23 7
Although this is perhaps a
rights survive a debtor's discharge of debts.
238
§ 553
doubtful proposition under other provisions of the bankruptcy code,
setoffs:
qualifying
for
seems to support the proposition in its broad immunity
"[T]his title does not affect any right of a creditor to offset..."239 Whether or not
the matter is so simple as the cited courts have announced, yet another
relationship of setoffs with liens is apparent in this proposition.
241
persists under the code: liens may
The principle 240 of Long v. Bullard
242
Section 522(c) recognizes the rule for exempt property,
survive bankruptcy.
243
Likewise, the
and the legislative history identifies that case as its source.
a troubled
with
a
subsection
506(d),
§
to
same language appears with reference

recent history. In Dewsnup v. Timm, the Court tentatively held that the latter
subsection does not authorize lien avoidance in the form of lien-stripping in a
245
is the postbankruptcy survival of
chapter 7.244 The theme this suggests
prebankruptcy setoff rights which, like liens, are secured claims. If bankruptcy
today treats setoffs and liens as secured claims, whatever is the continuing
legacy of Long v. Bullard may include the setoff as well as the lien.

236
The court's denial of setoff presumably permits the real value of the setoff right to
emerge by the eventual determination of the value of the note given the Reading
Company. When that value is determinable at the time a debtor in bankruptcy seeks
setoff, setoff might be granted in that amount.
237

Davidovich v. Welton (In re Davidovich), 901 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1990); In re
Morgan, 77 B.R. 81 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1987); Ford v. Darracott (In re Ford), 35 B.R. 277
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983); Slaw Constr. Corp. v. Hughes Foulkrod Constr. Co. (In re Slaw
Constr. Corp.), 17 B.R. 744 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
238

E.g., § 524(a)(2).

239§ 553(a).
24

0Although often described as the "rule" of Long v. Bullard, the vagueness of what
this assertion means cannot justify that description. The fact that liens survive
bankruptcy in view of the numerous putative effects bankruptcy may impose on liens
states a general principle of law and not a rule.
241117 U.S. 617 (1886).
242

Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).

243S. R. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, at 76 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
78; H.R. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 361 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6114.
244112 S.Ct. at 776-77.
24 5

A forthcoming broader paper on liens and bankruptcy will provide a more
thorough investigation of the issues raised.
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Yet substantial doubt about how liens survive bankruptcy under Long v.
Bullardis very real and sensible. Much of substantive bankruptcy law purports
to affect 246 liens in one manner or another, including bifurcating liens under
§506(a); avoiding liens (or subordinating in the true sense) 24 7 in one or another
or avoiding power such as the strong arm power 248 or preference 249 law; or
redemption; 250 or cramdown. 2 51 If liens may be affected under so many code
sections, it may be that liens as perhaps setoffs, survive a bankruptcy
proceeding merely to the extent that they are specifically unaffected by
bankruptcy. Or, there may be even more to liens as perhaps setoffs and less to
bankruptcy than meets the eye.
One might soundly suppose, nevertheless, that liens or setoffs survive
bankruptcy unless they are satisfied or avoided in bankruptcy. Liens or setoffs
may survive bankruptcy only if bankruptcy does not terminate them.
This latter idea permits a broad view of what may be forever accomplished
in a bankruptcy proceeding with respect to liens: Long v. Bullard would not
threaten due arrangements made in bankruptcy. But, whatever bankruptcy
may do to liens may be a feature solely of what bankruptcy is doing.
Bankruptcy cases end and are closed; reorganization and rehabilitation plans
are confirmed and at least some are fully performed. Other cases are converted
to chapter 7. The impact of bankruptcy on debts is one model for liens or setoffs.
Bankruptcy has for many years said that not only is debt generally
unenforceable while the debtor is in bankruptcy, bankruptcy may well
252
discharge the debt and forever.

2461 deliberately use the softer term affecting liens or setoffs, rather than what often
appears in bankruptcy discussions-"avoidance." Avoidance connotes a stronger
meaning than effect, that a lien or a setoff no longer exists. Arguably, this may be true;
but it is not logically a necessary meaning of avoidance which may have, as Carlson,
supra note 6, suggests, a lesser meaning. For example, avoidance may mean temporally
that C has no right against D, in terms of a present right to enforce that right; or,
relationally, C may have its right avoided in the sense of present enforcement against
D, but the right may be presently enforceable against Dl. Many of variations on this
theme may be played. The automatic stay (§ 362(a)) affects (but does not avoid in the
strongest sense) the rights that the examples suggest.
247
Conpare Carlson, supra note 6, at 855-62 (arguing that avoidance in the bankruptcy
avoiding powers actually means subordination, although the effect may generally be
the same when a debtor is insolvent) with EPSTEIN, supra note 151, at 422 (emphasizing
that "avoid" is "meaningful in itself").

248§ 544(a).
249§ 547(b).
250§ 722.
251§§ 1129(b)(2)(B), 1225(a)(5), 1325(a)(5).
252

See, e.g., §§ 524(a), 727(a), 1141(c), 1228(a)-(c), 1328(a)-(c).
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Debt discharge orders apply after bankruptcy.253 They provide a parallel to
liens in bankruptcy which likewise may not be enforced during a proceeding
without relief from stay,254 by leave of the bankruptcy court.255 Liens or setoffs
may be enforced once the stay terminates under § 362(c). There is no clear lien
or setoff parallel in the code to the provision that permanently enjoins actions
to collect discharged debts. Further, the provisions of § 524 barring the
collection of discharged debt speak only to in personam actions against the
relieved debtor. Again, it bears emphasis that avoided or disallowed liens or
256
setoffs in bankruptcy, under an expansive avoidance or disallowance notion,
receive no complementary provision forever barring their enforcement after a
bankruptcy case ends. Such a provision might be superfluous because
enforcement of an avoided lien would be thought absurd; yet the same might
also have been said about the effect of discharge.
All that may be clearly said is that the avoidance or disallowance of a lien or
setoff in a bankruptcy proceeding has whatever effect bankruptcy had in mind
in avoidance or disallowance. 257 What happens, however, when the
bankruptcy purposes apparently abort liquidation or a failure to confirm a
proposed plan or a default with the dismissal of a chapter 7 under a plan is far
from clear. For example, suppose a chapter 11 plan crammed a lien down to
50% of the debt secured and shortly thereafter the debtor defaulted on its
payments to the secured claimant under the plan. Thereafter, the secured party
258
repossessed the collateral and sold it for a price which amounted to the full
amount of the debt owed. (Assume also the debtor had paid none of the

253§ 524(a).
254§ 362(a).
255§ 362(d). But see § 362(b).
2 56

In the strongest sense available, a lien or setoff avoided in bankruptcy would be
extinguished for all purposes.
2 57
A recent chapter 13 case held that a plan eliminating the lien on the debtor's
residential property and retaining the lien on the debtor's business property was
binding on the mortgagee upon confirmation hearing, regardless of its notification of
the confirmation. Because the mortgagee knew that the debtor had filed a bankruptcy
petition, the mortgagee had to pay attention to the proceedings to determine what it
might want to challenge. Pacesetter Bank of Montpelier v. Pence (In re of Pence), 905
F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1990). The major undercurrent on the postconfirmation effects on
liens or other claims in recent cases is the issue of whether the creditor bears the risk of
protecting its interest, as under Pacesetter,or whether the debtor must come forward to
alert the creditor of the effect of a proposed plan. See infra notes 294-313.
25 8
1f such a heady price is too much to believe, assume that the collateral sold for more
than the bankruptcy-determined value of the secured claim. Also assume that the
secured claimant did not make the § 1111(b)(2) election. With respect to said election,
the literature assumes that a creditor making the election guarantees its right to any
surplus. Professor Carlson argues a contrary version of the text of § 1111(b), under which
the electing creditor is entitled to no more than its secured claim under § 506. Carlson,
supra note 74. It follows from Carlson's proposition that the electing creditor presents
the same issue regarding any right to the surplus in the example.
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unsecured claims under the plan.) Outside of bankruptcy and had there been
no bankruptcy, the secured creditor usually has the right to these foreclosure
sale proceeds. The question is whether the lien cramdown of the confirmed but
defaulted chapter 11 plan has altered this nonbankruptcy right. If it has, this
comports with a revised view of Long v. Bullard; otherwise, the wider and
perhaps older view of Long, that liens survive bankruptcy, might yet control.
The postbankruptcy effectiveness or survival of prebankruptcy rights is a
complicated issue. Here the focus is on, as in the preceding text, the lien or
setoff. Yet, the abstractions of most of the code text mean that one has to regard
other claims and interests, and other rights, in order to understand the
postbankruptcy effect of these creatures.
First, the types of bankruptcy proceedings which postbankruptcy questions
about prebankruptcy rights might address are numerous. A simple or a
complex bankruptcy may have occurred. Even in a simple bankruptcy
proceeding there may have been discharge as well as avoidance of claims or
interests unaffected by debt discharge. Even in a complex bankruptcy
proceeding there may have been no discharge but there may have been
successful avoidance of particular claims or interests. So the first difficulty is
the code's abstractions which leave its readers to determine what falls within
these generalities; the second difficulty is the lack of a singular bankruptcy
25 9
proceeding on which to guage postbankruptcy effects.
25 9

The range of bankruptcy proceedings will startle the uninitiated. The traditional
dichotomy of bankruptcy proceedings separated bankruptcy into liquidations, the
surrender of assets to creditors in exchange for debt discharge or dissolution of
unnatural debtors, and reorganizations, the court approved and sometimes supervised
workout of debt problems of a surviving debtor. No less than three (sometimes
overlapping) reorganiza tion chapters exist in present law. Several different liquidations
are available under chapter 7, including stockbrokers (§§ 741-752), commodity brokers
(§§ 761-766) and everyone else who is eligible (at least seventeen different entities are
ineligible) for chapter 7 (§ 109(b)).
As if this does not fill the bankruptcy plate, the occasional business enterprise
which was so dismal as to require repeated bankruptcy proceedings has been turned
upside down in the new age of exploration and exploitation in which creditors may: 1)
breakfast with a debtor in chapter 7; 2) suffer lunch in chapter 13; and 3) find themselves
at dinner in chapter 11 or 13, or any combination thereof or others. Bankruptcy hearings
are more common in the morning and so these multiple proceedings pass in the trade
as serial bankruptcy. One may proceed, other than by conversion, from chapter to
chapter by paying a new filing fee. Numerologists may take inspiration in the newly
created chapters that imaginative debtors have created, chapter 18, chapter 20, chapter
22, chapter 26, etc. One yet unaddressed legal issue in serial bankruptcies, which may
concern the security interest in bankruptcy, is whether § 506, central to both liens and
setoffs in bankruptcy, applies in these new chapters. The code states that chapter 5
applies in chapters 7, 11, 12 or 13 (§ 103), as though serial cases were uninvited guests
at the bankruptcy version of the predators' ball! The Court in Johnson v. Home State
Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991), hid from the serial maiming outside and settled
jurisprudential brooding about whether a claim is a claim. However, before trying to
take strategic advantage of § 103(a)'s lapse, bear in mind that the same may be said for
chapters 1 and 3. Thus, a holder of a secured claim in any chapter higher than 13 may
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Second, a bankruptcy proceeding may concern prebankruptcy rights of
260
debtor, creditors, shareholders and even third parties. So the tendency to
assume that a bankruptcy will treat all prebankruptcy rights the same may
prove incorrect even though an a priori fairness principle supports that
expectation. Whose rights are involved may become an interesting qualification
on any answers the code may give to postbankruptcy effectiveness of
prebankruptcy rights.
The prebankruptcy rights of debtors may provide analogies or homologies
to the postbankruptcy rights of other parties, but may on the other hand be
quite immaterial to any question of the survival of others' rights. The debtor in
some bankruptcy proceedings may lose prebankruptcy rights; in others the
debtor may have prebankruptcy rights which survive. The debtor in chapter
11 presents the most curious "who" issue. First, bankruptcy lore holds that for
some purposes the prebankruptcy debtor is different from the
postbankruptcy 26 1 debtor. 262 Second, the postbankruptcy debtor is ambiguous

and may mean either the preconfirmation or postconfirmation debtor. The
preconfirmation debtor may have rights different from a postconfirmation
debtor under the view that it is a different entity, a successor to the
preconfirmation debtor with new rights and duties. When true, the
preconfirmation debtor may retain prebankruptcy rights (and perhaps duties)
to which the postconfirmation debtor does not succeed.

claim that, without the applicability of § 109, the debtor has no authority to be in chapter
13+. Perhaps regrettably, the high court took that authority for granted in Johnson.
260
A third-party may be simply be a co-owner of property with the debtor. The code
permits sale of the mutually owned property. § 363. As with secured parties who seem
to be treated by the code as creditors rather than co-owners, the rights of a co-owner
may be affected in bankruptcy, but only less drastically than the prebankruptcy rights
of others, such as unsecured creditors whose prebankruptcy rights seem quite likely to
be terminated forever in many proceedings.
26
1Cf. Commodity Futures Trading Corp. v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985)
(concluding that a trustee, as new management of debtor, may waive attorney-client
privilege).
262
This metaphysic is accomplished by the automatic stay of action in § 362 which
effectively avoids rights and duties to the extent they cannot be used once the
bankruptcy case commences. Thus, the stay alters the existing effective rights others
hold at bankruptcy. Arguably, one might better describe the effect of the stay and other
rights as mere suspension and not avoidance-or perhaps as avoidance (or suspension)
of the powers nonbankruptcy law presents others against the estate or debtor. In fine
legal analysis, these Hohfeldian niceties may help; but in general discourse, a distinction
between a power and a right is likely to miss the point. Bankruptcy immediately affects
the debtor-creditor and other relationships.
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1. Setoff and Discharge of Debts in Liquidation
Though discharge may be irrelevant in the liquidation of a corporation, 263
any balance remaining after setoff of the setoff holder's claim will practically
disappear after the setoff right is exercised. The liquidation of the corporate
debtor will leave any unused excess over the amount setoff and the amount
distributed seemingly worthless.. Theoretically, though, a claim remains
against the liquidating corporate debtor.
That claim may be lost 2 64 against a natural debtor if there were a discharge
of debts in the case. Section 524(a)(2) expressly enjoins offset through a debt
discharged under any chapter of the code "as a personal liability of the debtor."
A setoff right may not squarely fit the idea of a debtor's personal liability.265
As a § 506(a) "secured claim," it reflects an aspect of a property right as with
liens.
Almost every claim of a debtor passes at bankruptcy to the bankruptcy
estate. 266 Thereafter, an individual debtor may exempt her own claims from
the estate to the extent provided by applicable exemptions law.267 Nonexempt
claims remain as property of the estate. The effect of a bankruptcy discharge
on a setoff holder's right may depend on whether the debtor's claim is exempt
or not. If it is exempt, when the debtor makes such claim on a creditor with a
right of setoff, absent a bankruptcy the creditor may have offset its claim against
the debtor if the law creating the exemption and the setoff permitted. 268 But,
2 63

A corporation is ineligible for a discharge in chapter 7. § 727(a)(1). A reorganizing
debtor corporation receives a discharge on confirmation. § 1141(d)(1). A liquidating
debtor, including a corporation, does not receive a discharge on confirmation.
§ 1141(d)(3). Cf. Turner v. United States (In re Omni Corp.), 835 F.2d 1317 (10th Cir.
1987)(standing for the proposition that until discharge is ordered, a creditor need not
file proof of claim as a prerequisite to asserting § 553 setoff right).
264§ 524(a)(2) appears to say that Title 11 does not affect setoff. However, several cases
appear to state the contrary proposition.
26 5
Cf. Murray, supra note 30, at 462.
266§§ 541(a)(1), 541(c)(2).
26 7

These may be state exemptions or § 522(d) bankruptcy exemptions, depending on
whether the debtor's domicile state has opted out of both the § 522(d) exemption under
§ 522(b)(2(A), as well as the nonbankruptcy federal exemptions. Id.
26 8
A setoff may be asserted against exempt property only if the exemption law so
permits. Some states shield some or all of the exemptions they create from setoff. E.g.,
In re Laues, 90 B.R. 158 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1988)(holding that the applicable North
Carolina exemption law precluded setoff by credit union against account).
As one court said:
Since a creditor's right of setoff in bankruptcy cases is no different
than in non-bankruptcy cases, sta te court decisions should provide
guidance. An overwhelming majority of non-bankruptcy cases prohibit
a creditor from offsetting obligations owed against statutorily exempt
property. E.g., Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 521 P.2d 441, 451 (1974); see
generally 106 A.L.R. 1071 (1937). The courts' rationale in these cases
underscores the purpose of exemption statutes, that of shielding certain
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss4/3

72

19931

SETOFF AND BANKRUPTCY

even if the exemption law permitted a setoff, if the debt creating setoff was
dischargeable and if the debtor's estate were insufficient to pay the creditor's
claim, then the debtor may assert its exempt claim and contend that the
otherwise offsetting claim of its creditor had disappeared because of the
bankruptcy discharge. Section 524(a)(2) enjoins the collection or offset of any
discharged creditor claims "as a personal liability" of the debtor. No doubt this
injunction serves a debtor-protective purpose in barring a postbankruptcy
assertion of the prebankruptcy setoff against the debtor. Undoubtedly this
injunction bars the use of a prebankruptcy and discharged claim of a creditor
from offsetting a claim by the debtor which arose after the commencement of
the debtor's bankruptcy case.
However, when the (perhaps rare) debtor's prebankruptcy claim is exempt,
§ 524(a)(2) may also bar using the discharged claim as an offset against the
debtor's exempt claim. The fresh start policy of discharge might support
freeing a debtor's exempt claim from her creditor's setoff.26 9 Yet, some would
property from the coercive process of law. Bankruptcy courts have
generally followed this direction and have not allowed setoff against
property otherwise unreachable by creditors under the Code. In re
Haffner, 12 B.R. at 372, In re Davies, 27 B.R. at 901; In re Hinson, 65 B.R.
at 678; In re Terry, 7 B.R. 880, 883 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); see also In re
Monteith, 23 B.R. 149 601, 604, (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982), In re Internal
Revenue Service Liabilities and Refunds In Chapter 13 Proceedings, 30
B.R. 811,814 (M.D. Tenn. 1983). Where setoff has been allowed, the courts
have recognized a more compelling policy consideration than that of
debtor's rehabilitation. For example, the state was allowed to setoff
exempt tax refund monies on behalf of past due child support payments
in In re Small, 18 B.R. 318, 319 (Bankr.D.Minn.1982). See also InI re Haley,
41 B.R. 44, 46 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984) (exemption is inferior to debts
arising out of criminal matters).
In re Wilde, 85 B.R. 147, 148 (Bankr. D. N. M. 1988).
Debtors in a bankruptcy proceeding may choose the federal bankruptcy
exemptions in thesmall minority of states which have not opted out of these exemptions.
When the debtor chooses the federal bankruptcy exemptions, either bankruptcy law,
state law, or both, may govern a claim of setoff against such exempt property. Several
bankruptcy provisions might protect the exemption: (1) § 524(a)(2) could apply to bar
such a setoff; (2) § 522(c) could apply to exempt such property from liability for setoff;
(3) § 522(f)(1) could free the exempt property from the setoff right as it directly does for
judicial liens if the mutual denomination of setoff and lien as secured claims provided
a sufficient analogy. On the other hand, if the state exemption law would not shield the
property from setoff, although the state exemption law would otherwise also exempt
such property from creditors, a court might construe the cited bankruptcy provisions
as inapplicable and permit the setoff. The interaction of the bankruptcy code and state
law on what is exemptible and the effect of exemptions has produced great controversy,
including two recent generally unhelpful Supreme Court adventures. Farrey v.
Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991); Owen v. Owen, 111 S. Ct. 1833 (1991). See generally
Kalevitch, supra note 40; Morris, supra note 40.
269

For support of the wider interpretation of § 524(a)(2), one might also look to
§ 522(f), which avoids certain fresh start impairing liens on exempt property. One might
reason that if certain exempt tangible property would be freed from prebankruptcy
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agree with the contention that freeing a debtor's prebankruptcy claim from a
valid setoff claim would provide a debtor with more than a fresh start, the
2 70
so-called head start.

liens, then § 524(a)(2) simply extends that policy to exempt claims by freeing the latter
from setoff.
27 0
0ne court has taken this thought to permit setoff against an exempt claim.
California has protected exemptions provided to insure an income
stream during times of need, such as unemployment or disability. However, it does not necessarily follow that California would be so solicitous
of an exempt asset constituting an unliquidated contract claim, which
could not be relied on to.provide a source of income at any time in the
foreseeable future. Therefore, we hold that California would recognize
the right of setoff against this cause of action under the usual equitable
considerations. In reaching this decision we note that in each of the California cases where setoff was not allowed against exempt property there
were mutual debts but they did not arise out of the same transaction. It
is obvious that the equitable balance is tipped in favor of the creditor's
right to setoff when the debts involved arise out of the same contractual
dispute.
Pieri v. Lysenko (In re Pieri), 86 B.R. 208, 212 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988).
Some courts have addressed the issue as one of "recoupment". This tends to mute
the effect of § 524(a)(2), which enjoins postbankruptcy setoff but perhaps does not enjoin
recoupment. Recoupment permits the setoff of claims from the same transaction, unlike
setoff, which requires only mutual claims however derived.
The justification for the recoupment doctrine is that where the creditor's
claim against the debtor arises from the same transaction as the debtor's
claim, it is essentially a defense to the debtor's claim against the creditor
rather than a mutual obligation, and application of the limitations on
setoff in bankruptcy would be inequitable.
Lee v. Schweiker (In re Lillie Lee), 739 F.2d 870,875 (3d Cir. 1984). Secalso In reSherman,
627 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1980); Waldschmidt v. CBS, 14 B.R. 309 (M.D. Tenn. 1981); In re
Monongahela Rye Liquors, Inc., 141 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1944).
In Lee v. Schweiker, the court barred the Social Security Administration from
offsetting a chapter 13 debtor's liability for prepetition social security payments against
debtor's exempt postpetition claim for social security payments. The recoupment
doctrine could not justify the offset the Social Security Administration sought because
the postpetition claim of the debtor arose from a statutory entitlement instead of a
contract or transaction. 739 F.2d at 875. See, e.g., In re Nevear, 674 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir.
1982); In re Hawley, 23 B.R. 236 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982); Contra In re Maine, 32 B.R. 452
(Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1983) (permitting state to recoup from postpetition unemployment
benefits). Recoupment has been permitted, however, where the prebankruptcy
overpayments arose out of the same health-care contract entitling debtors to
postbankruptcy benefits. See In re Yonkers Hamilton Sanitarium, Inc., 22 B.R. 427(Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd 34 B.R. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Monsour Medical Center, 11 B.R.
1014 (W.D. Pa. 1981); In re Berger, 16 B.R. 236 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
A prepetition tax claim may offset a debtor's exemptible tax refund claim where
the debtor became entitled to the tax refund before bankruptcy. CompareRunnels v. IRS
(In re Runnels), 134 B.R. 562 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991)(recognizing that an exemptible tax
refund is subject to setoff by prebankrutcy dischargeable tax claim) with In re Miel, 134
B.R. 229 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1991) (concluding that § 522(c) protects exemptible property
from a dischargeable tax claim, including use as a setoff, because § 522(c)(1) exposes
exempt property to a nondischargeable tax claim). See generallyCommerce Union Bank
v. Haffner (In re Haffner), 12 B.R. 371 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981).
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Several cases have held that setoff rights against the debtor's prebankruptcy
claim survive discharge. 271 These cases rationalize the survival of the setoff
right on a putative conflict between the general statement of § 553 that the
bankruptcy code does not affect any valid setoff and the injunction against
setoff of § 524(a)(2). 272 ,Another and perhaps stronger (presenting no conflict)
justification is available: § 524(a)(2) only bars setoff through discharged
prebankruptcy claims against a discharged debtor's claims which arise
subsequent to the commencement of the debtor's bankruptcy case.
The suggested resolution renders § 524(a)(2) inapplicable to the setoff of a
debtor's exempt prebankruptcy claim by a creditor's prebankruptcy claim
regardless of whether the creditor's claim was discharged. This also accords
with the general setoff valuation theory suggested above.273 The rationale for
limiting a setoff in bankruptcy to its real value results from the appreciation of
a setoff as a claim against the debtor and thereby according the nonbankruptcy
setoff right no greater value in bankruptcy than outside bankruptcy. The
concern that prompts such an analysis of setoff in bankruptcy is
overcompensation of the setoff right. But, as against the debtor's exempt claim
and the creditor holding a setoff right, the real value of the setoff right was, and
therefore should remain even after bankruptcy, its face value.
Although this resolution surely provides a debtor with less of a
postbankruptcy start than a wider reading of § 524(a)(2), so also does the
survival after bankruptcy of many liens on exempt property.274 But the reason
why the Court held that liens on exempt property survive bankruptcy also
applies to setoff rights. At first blush this ancient bankruptcy proposition 275
sounds nonsensical. For, if property is exempt it seems to mean that creditors
may not subject the property to a lien.
An exemption may render all liens on exemptible property invalid but such
a wide-ranging blanket exemption is extremely rare. The common meaning of
the exemption of property consists in the inability of judgment creditors to
attach or levy on such property. Yet, a debtor may often subject property
voluntarily to a lien. Thus, homesteads are often exempt from judgment
creditors but are not exempt from purchase money mortgagees or mechanics
lienors.

27

1Davidovich v. Welton (In re Davidovich), 901 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1990); In re
Morgan, 77 B.R. 81 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1987); Ford v. Darracott (In re Ford), 35 B.R. 277
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983); Slaw Constr. Corp. v. Hughes Foulkrod Constr. Co. (In re Slaw
Constr. Corp.), 17 B.R. 744 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
272
A leading chapter 11 case used the same rationale to uphold the survival of a setoff
right after plan confirmation. In re DeLaurentiis Entertainment Group, Inc., 963 F.2d
1269 (9th Cir. ), cert.denied sub noni. Carolco Television, Inc. v. NBC, 113 S. Ct. 330 (1992).
See supra text accompanying note 209.
273

See supra Parts II& 111.

274

Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886).
Section 522(c) codifies this ancient proposition.

275
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It would only be proper, therefore, to bar setoff against a prebankruptcy
exempt claim when the exemption law barred the setoff.276 That would mean,

of course, that when state law provides the exemption law in bankruptcy,
which is usually the case, there never had been any right to setoff against the
debtor's exempt claim even before the bankruptcy. Broadly interpreting
§524(a)(2) to bar what would have been a valid setoff despite the exempt status
of a debtor's claim enlarges the debtor's exemption.
When the debtor chooses the federal bankruptcy exemptions 277 in the states
where that option remains, one might read § 524(a)(2) as part and parcel of the
§ 522(d) exempt claim and understand the meaning of the exemption as free
from any setoff rights. This would produce the rare blanket exemption
mentioned above. In this view, whatever the law had been prior to bankruptcy,
§ 522(d) would create a blanket exemption extinguishing any pre-existing liens
on the exempted property as well as any pre-existing setoff rights against an
exempt claim. If this were true, § 522(f) would become even odder than it
seemed to be in recent troublesome cases thereunder.2 78 If § 522(d) exemptions
were so broad, the limited right a debtor would receive to avoid certain liens
on such property would be superfluous.
Instead, these federal bankruptcy exemptions have been understood as the
typically limited form of exemption. By exempting property within § 522(d)
from the bankruptcy estate, the property is freed from the claims of a debtor's
unsecured creditors, just as under such normal exemption law the property
would have been so free prior to bankruptcy had such exemptions then been
in effect. Thus, judgment liens obtained by the debtor's creditors prior to
bankruptcy may be avoided under § 522(f)(1).
Yet, as to consensual liens, which setoffs resemble, only nonpossessory,
nonpurchase money liens on certain goods may be avoided under § 522(f)(2).
When congress so restricts that list, the message of § 524(a)(2) goes no further
than to state that it protects a debtor's claims arising postbankruptcy from a
setoff based on a prebankruptcy discharged claim.
2. The Imaginary Conflict between § 553 and Chapter 11 Plan Confirmation
Rules
Survival of preconfirmation rights may depend on these rights having
become property of the estate. 279 Additionally, survival of prebankruptcy
276A number

of cases have so held on the basis of state exemption law barring a setoff.

ContraDaugherty v. Central Trust Co., 504 N.E.2d 1100 (Ohio 1986).
277§ 552(d).
278

The interaction of the bankruptcy code and state law on what is exemptible and

the effect of exemptions has produced great controversy, including recent Supreme
Court misadventures. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991); Owen v. Owen, 111
S. Ct. 1833 (1991). See generally Kalevitch, supra note 40; Morris, supra note 40.
2 79
The bankruptcy estate succeeds to all the legal and equitable rights that the
prebankruptcy debtor held.-In corporate reorganizations, the postbankruptcy debtor
takes all the prebankruptcy debtor's rights because the successorship is simply
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rights may depend on their not having been terminated during the
preconfirmation period. For example, the ownership interest of a
preconfirmation debtor in an asset of the estate may have been used to provide
needed cash to keep the enterprise functioning. A sale or securing of a loan may
have terminated the prebankruptcy or preconfirmation rights the debtor
had. 280 Third, the plan confirmation may terminate all or some prebankruptcy
rights the debtor had. For chapter 11, the rules on plan confirmation 281 and its
282
effect appear to be the most likely code source of law on the general issue.

derivative with regard to assets. The individual (or oxygen-breather) in bankruptcy
presents a more complicated successorship issue due to exemptions or immunities that
maybe enjoyed pursuant to bankruptcy or nonbankruptcy law. § 522. Individuals are,
of course, eligible to file a case under chapter 11. Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197 (1991).
Although exemptions become part of the bankruptcy estate, as may immunities (see
Lawrence Kalevitch, Some Thoughts on Entireties in Bankruptcy, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 141
(1986)), they are set aside from the rights of the estate by § 522. In chapter 11, an
individual debtor retains these exemptions even if a trustee is appointed because the
exemption rights do not come under the rights of the trustee. §§ 103(a), 522, 541, 1106.
Seealso In re Fitzsimmons, 725 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1984)(applying the earnings exception
of § 541(a)(6) to an individual chapter 11 case).
280§§ 363, 364.
281§ 1129.
282

Under the code, confirmation of a plan binds the debtor. § 1141(a). Section 1141 (a)
provides as follows:
Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this section,
the provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor, any entity
issuing securities under the plan, any entity acquiring property
under the plan, and any creditor, equity security holder, or general
partner in the debtor, whether or not the claim or interest of such
creditor, equity security holder, or general partner is impaired under
the plan and whether or not such creditor, equity security holder, or
general partner has accepted the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (1988).
Interestingly, the preconfirmation rights of creditors are addressed in § 1141, but only
§ 1141(a) could affect a debtor's preconfirmation rights. The remaining subsections
address the survival of debtor's duties, the issue of debt discharge or the loss of
prebankruptcy rights.
If the postconfirmation debtor is a party so bound, (perhaps more precisely, the
postconfirmation debtor owes its existence to confirmation of the plan) whether the
prebankruptcy or the preconfirmation debtor is also bound to the plan is obscure in the
text. The same is true of the prebankruptcy debtor. Assuming that these three labels
(prebankruptcy debtor, preconfirmation debtor, and postconfirmation debtor) reflect
meaningfully on three different entities, they may affect the question of who owns
whatever prebankruptcy rights surviving commencement of the case or confirmation
of a plan, as well as dismissal or conversion of a case before or after confirmation.
Because this study concerns the debtor's surviving rights only as an analogy to the
primary question of survival of secured or setoff creditor's rights, this article does not
address the above questions. Instead, for the instant purposes, it is important to note
how, if at all, debtor's prebankruptcy rights which do pass to the preconfirma tion debtor
survive confirmation. For simplification, the text assumes that § 1141(a) speaks to the
postconfirma tion debtor.
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Since no other code text seems to speak to the effect of confirmation on a
debtor's preconfirmation rights, what the code intends to say emerges in
§ 1141(a). And § 1141(a) merely "binds" the debtor to "the provisions of a
confirmed plan". Thus, the confirmed plan determines whether and which
preconfirmation rights the debtor retains. A recent recurring issue is whether
a rule of law governs survival of preconfirmation debtor rights, as though this
were a distinctly rule-governed issue, or, whether this is simply a matter of
interpretation of the plan on which a court 2 83 may exercise its interpretive
discretion and any rule is simply an interpretive aid. The decisions reveal
differing views but one has very direct implication to the survival of
prebankruptcy rights held by a setoff holder.
DeLaurentiis held that a preconfirmation setoff right offset a
confirmation-surviving claim of the postconfirmation debtor against the
285
creditor. 284 The court took the view that the code setoff section conflicted
with § 1141. It thought that § 1141 permitted the plan to retain the pre-bankruptcy right of the debtor "free and clear" of any prepetition debt.28 6 Further,
it thought that the code lacked a priority rule as between the latter and a

28 3

The question of what court may interpret the code or plan is itself complicated.
Bankruptcy courts may have jurisdiction but this proposition is not clear. State courts
frequently determine these issues.
2841n re DeLaurentiis Entertainment Group, Inc., 963 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Carolco Television, Inc. v. NBC, 113 S. Ct. 330 (1992).
2 85

1d. at 1274.

2 86

d. The court may have misconstrued the legal effect of the most difficult passage
in the text of § 1141(c), which is a monument to either meta-precise drafting or obscurity.
§ 1141(c) provides, in pertinent part:
Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this section and
except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order confirming the
plan, after confirmation of a plan, the property dealt with by the plan is
free and clear of all claims and interests of creditors, equity security
holders, and of general partners in the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (1988).
The court cited § 1141(c) and it is only that subsection that uses the expression "free
and clear." 963 F.2d at 1274. But, what is free and clear is "the property dealt with by the
plan ..."Id. What is property for this purpose is hopelessly vague as is what is dealt
with by the plan. The court reasonably supposed that because the claim against the
offset-claiming creditor was included in the plan (the case does not reveal whether the
claim was specifically identified or included by boilerplate), it was "property dealt with
by the plan." Id. The claim is property in the abstract, as are all rights in this context. But,
is the claim property with which the plan dealt deserving of passing free and clear to
the postconfirmation debtor simply because it was "dealt with?" Surely, a plan may deal
with property by fairly disclosing that confirmation will terminate another's interest as,
for example, where a plan expressly subordinates the interest of another in particular
property. But the plan in question seems merely to have granted the debtor the right to
continue to prosecute its claim against the creditor claiming offset, litigation which was
pending prior to confirmation. Id. As a result, the creditor made no objection to
confirmation, arguably under the erroneous view that this plan or any plan could not
moot its offset claim. Id. A majority of courts have held that a debtor loses any claim the
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creditor's setoff right under § 553.287 Given the conflict it supposed, the court
ruled in favor of the setoff section, relying on seemingly persuasive 2 88 precode
reorganization case law 289 favoring holders of setoff rights in conflict with the
previous provisions of the Bankruptcy Act concerning confirmation.
The code does not present the conflict the court imagined. The code
straightforwardly resolves the issue as one of confirmability of the
reorganization plan under § 1129. The court unfortunately created a needless
rule of law, that setoff rights under § 553 survive confirmation under the rules
of § 1141.290 Section 1141(c) speaks to whether "property dealt with by the plan"

plan does not preserve and a few cases have applied this rule against creditors. Id. at
1276.
The rule is cruel when applied against creditors who are unlikely to know or to
find counsel who know how unconscionable this rule would be when applied against
creditors. Creditors may not be presumed to enjoy counsel or the opportunity to enjoy
counsel who do appreciate these chapter 11 exotica. Attomeys familiar enough with this
argument about the effect of confirmation are rare and, if they do represent creditors at
all, theyare likely to have conflicts barring representation. Indeed, bankruptcy literature
lacks discussion of such finery. The reorganization bar propounds the gross view,
properly rejected in DeLaurentiis, that everything is free and clear from the debtor's
viewpoint.
287/d.
288E.g., Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494
(1986)(preferring interpretation in light of precode practice).
289

The court cited two postcode cases for this precode proposition and one precode
decision of the Court of Claims. Record Club of Am. v. United Artists Records, Inc., 80
B.R. 271 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Reading Co., 72 B.R. 293 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987);
Marley v. United States, 381 F.2d 738 (Ct. Cl. 1967). DeLaurentiisacknowledged that a
precode Supreme Court decision in a railroad reorganization denied setoff, but
dismissed that ruling as limited to extraordinary bankruptcy proceedings. In short, the
precode law or practice is, as on all issues, almost certainly as cloudy as the code text.
This cloudiness was a reason for the bankruptcy reform which has been notably
unsuccessful. Leaving the proper resolution of an obscure text behind the obscure
resolution of an even more obscure and repealed text is an interesting heuristic.
Hopefully, what courts seek to accomplish by studying history is the same goal sought
by historians to understand the present. Why the code should be taken to prefer the
postconfirmation claim over another claim requires an understanding of the principles
backing each claim. Old law helps understand the strength of the principles as they are,
and if they are, absorbed into the present law and procedure.
29

0Arguably, there is some good sense in the proposition that security interests
survive bankruptcy. Thus, it should be noted that this rule would strongly support such
a proposition inasmuch as setoffs under the code are treated as secured claims. § 506(a).
But whether security interests or setoffs qua secured claims survive bankruptcy is a
deceptive question. The bankruptcy debtor or trustee must often deal with the
intra-code conceptualized secured claim. The purpose of § 506(a) is to rule on what the
secured claim is, and is merely a definitional rule which is narrower than what may be
considered a security interest, a setoff right or any lien outside of bankruptcy. The
purpose of § 506(a) valuation is to set a figure for either adequate protection or
bankruptcy payment of the secured claim. The secured claim may be protected or paid
in bankruptcy in the lesser of the amount of the debt secured and the value of the
collateral. E.g., §§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I1), 1225(a)(5)(ii), 1325(a)(5)(ii); Cf. Dewsnup v. Timm,
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is affected by preconfirmation claims and interests. That mysterious expression
may be inapplicable when the plan provides otherwise. 291 The plan may only
give postconfirmation rights to others under the exception to § 1141(c); it may
not terminate the rights or interests of others in plan property within the
grammar of § 1141(c). 292 The code uses the confirmation standards 29 3 to resolve

112 S. Ct. 773 (1992) (rejecting cram- or strip-down in chapter 7 because no issues of
adequate protection or payment were presented-debtor simply sought to reduce the
lien obligation after bankruptcy).
But, from the fact that bankruptcy merely requires such a payment, it need not,
and logically does not mean that payment of the bankruptcy figure determined by
§ 506(a) forever precludes the lien. Perhaps more importantly, the bankruptcy failure
to pay that figure raises the question of whether such a default, most clearly seen in a
bankruptcy plan default, leaves the prebankruptcy lien rights (including those of a
security interest or setoff) unaffected by bankruptcy. The same may be true of chapter
7 unless Dewsnup stems the tide there.
Suppose the trustee determines, and the court permits, a buy-out of the secured
creditor's interest in property in which the estate has an interest. Unless agreed upon
by the creditor and trustee, the court must value the property under § 506(a) to
determine the cash-out figure. Assume a low figure is judicially determined, but
fortunately for the secured creditor, the trustee is unable to effect the purchase because
of a dry market or, for other reasons, the liquidation case is dismissed. If the secured
creditor is granted relief from stay to foreclose, or forecloses upon dismissal, and the
foreclosure sale exceeds the bankruptcy valuation, who receives the surplus, assuming
that the debt exceeds the proceeds? To say that the debtor or unsecured creditors take
the excess rather than the secured creditor is odd, but required, if one believes the
intra-bankruptcy determination of the senior creditor's secured claim per § 506(a) is "res
judicata" after bankruptcy. See infra text accompanying note 306. Were one to believe
otherwise, then one begins to see some wisdom in the idea that liens may survive
bankruptcy, just as more clearly "secured claims" only exist in bankruptcy and thus do
not survive.
291§ 1141(c).
292

No doubt a plan may terminate some preconfirmation or prebankruptcy rights by
application of other provisions of § 1141, but not § 1141(c). The latter takes away the
preconfirma tion rights in "property dealt with by the plan" from creditors, partners and
equity holders. To be an exception to this effect of confirmation, a right in property dealt
with by the plan must be acknowledged or created by the plan. Thus, § 1141(c) cannot
be read to provide the debtor with any power to terminate a right in property dealt with
by the plan. It gives a debtor (or any plan proponent) only the power to continue any
preexisting right in property of the debtor.
As the following text explains, the question of the survival of a creditor's setoff
right should have been determined in the confirmation process, prior to confirmation.
For the question put as a § 1141 issue is pure parody whether setoff claims concededly
discharged under § 1141(d)(1) at confirmation, may, nevertheless survive, for the
purpose of setoff of a postconfirma tion claim of the debtor. No creditor could seriously
contest the absoluteness of a discharge of its setoff right if the plan offered it fair
treatment; nor would confirmation be barred if the plan provided what, by the
confirmation standards (§ 1129), is appropriate for such a creditor. The debtor in
DeLauren tiis did neither. Unfortunately, the recent reports are full of debtors so behaving
after confirmation.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss4/3

80

19931

SETOFF AND BANKRUPTCY

the question: When a debtor proposes in its plan to retain the rights against a
creditor holding a setoff right, without also retaining the setoff right, does the
plan merit confirmation? Asking the question after confirmation creates an
issue the confirmation "effect" section ought not answer, as it ought already to
have been answered at the confirmation hearing.
Whether a plan proposes to affect a setoff right is the threshold issue.
Confirmation of a plan discharges preconfirmation claims294 of creditors not
created or recognized 295 in a plan 296 other than plans of individuals 297 and
certain liquidating plans.2 98 A plan may lack clarity about whether
preconfirmation claims such as setoffs continue. More commonly in light of
reported disputes, plans have not clearly provided for the preservation of
debtors' preconfirmation claims. The courts have sensibly ruled that after
confirmation a debtor has no surviving claim unless their creditors qua debtors
should have reasonably known from the disclosure statement, 299 the plan or
otherwise that the plan did not resolve both the creditor's and the debtor's
claims. 300 The same rationale applies in DeLaurentiis3 01 which sketches a
perhaps common 302 and mischievous scheme. The debtor was vigorously
contesting 30 3 the prebankruptcy 304 validity of the creditor's claim creating the

293§ 1129. The question would have been whether the plan treated NBC's setoff claim,
and if so, whether in terminating that claim, as the debtor later claimed, the creditor had
been treated properly under § 1129.
2941 mean this in the strongest sense. The code here says "any debt" and relates debt,
as other sections do, to claims. §§ 101(5), 101(12), 1141(d)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
295

Under the view that the postconfirmation debtor is a new legal entity, it may be
more proper to view all obligations of that entity as created by the plan.
296
This is put very technically because the debtor does not have the exclusive right to
propose a plan under chapter 11. Any party in interest (§ 1121(c)) may propose a plan
(Id.) after the first 120 days (§ 1121(b)), after the order for relief, unless the court increases
or reduces the period. § 1121(d). The confirmation of a plan discharges creditors' claims
regardless of who proposed the plan (§ 1141(d)), unless the debtor is an individual
(§ 1141(d)(2)) or the plan liquidates, inter alia. § 1141(d)(3).
29 7

Exceptions to discharge stated in § 523 survive an individual debtor's (§ 101(43))
confirmation in chapter 11. § 1141 (d)(2).
298§ 1141(d)(3).
299§ 1125.
300

See infra note 309.

301 Supra note 284.
302

See infra note 308.

303

An adversary proceeding was entertaining the debtor's objection to the creditor's
setoff claim at the time of confirmation. DeLaurentiis,963 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1992).
30 4
The claim asserted by the creditor, NBC, involved a debt owed to NBC for
advertising, which had arisen from the debtor's advertising agency's contract with NBC.
The debtor preferred NBC's collecting the debt from the agency, which would
presumably receive a bankruptcy minibuck distribution on the claim, rather than NBC's
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setoff issue. The debtor contemporaneously proposed a plan it evidently
supposed would terminate the setoff right.3 05 The creditor, the National
Broadcasting Company, perhaps no easy victim, might have sought
clarification prior to confirmation about the survival of its setoff rights under
the plan. But, it is also the duty to disclose what creditors like NBC need to
know to make an informed decision about the plan.306 If the plan is ambiguous
or vague, and this and many plans may be strategically quiet about what they
take away from others, creditors may fail to raise the survival issue. In light of
the code's burdening a plan proponent with disclosure, NBC should receive
protection from this perhaps duplicitous debtor who engaged in litigating the
validity of the creditor's claim while contemporaneously proposing a plan
which it construed to terminate the setoff right even if it were valid. Had the
plan stated the setoff's termination, the debtor would have properly borne its
duty to disclose, and if NBC had not objected to confirmation, then no later
misunderstandings would merit respect.
3. The Imaginary Need for Res Judicata under the Code Text
Another rationale of the cases uses the principle of res judicata to determine
whether a debtor's claim survives confirmation where the claim arose,307 if at

effectively collecting 100% on the claim by offsetting the claim against a claim debtor
held against NBC. The adversary proceeding arose out of the debtor's objection to NBC's
advertising charge on the grounds that the debtor was neither liable for the agency-NBC
contract nor, as NBC sensibly claimed, in quantum meruit. The court that ruled that the
debtor was liable only in quantum meruit as though the law of principal and agent were
inapplicable to the contract issue. That ruling came after confirmation. The sequence of
determining confirmation, and then the validity of claims or interests, creates the
mistaken idea that § 1141 is controlling. Arguably, § 1141(a) should have a bold
exclusion of confirmation effect on all disputed claims or interests on which the court
has not yet ruled. But, properly understood, that section already says that, since the plan
or the order of confirmation operates to exclude pending disputes.
305§ 1141(d)(1).
306§ 1125(a)-(b).
307 Howe v. Vaughan (In re Howe), 913 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1990). These cases do not
explore the wonders of the phrase found by Judge Merighe and others on the issue of
whether a claim exists under the code even though there is no nonbankruptcy cause of
action yet in existence. E.g., Grady v. Robins (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 63 B.R. 986 (E.D.
Va. 1986). Although the Supreme Court has ruled that claims under the code have the
broadest possible meaning, it is not easy to understand how future claims fit the code
definition. Pennsylvania Dep't of Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990). In Robins
and other-products liability reorganizations, the plans purported to deal with claims of
future manifested victims. Whether the rights of these parties have been adjudicated by
the confirmation of plans is a separate question from whether in order to make a
successful reorganization these anticipated claims may be dealt with. A future claim in
a reorganization may be dealtwith by providing for a future claim regardless of whether
that claim is dischargeable. To suppose that the effect of confirmation on a future claim
is discharge follows only from a willful misreading § 1141. Debts and claims only are
discharged in § 1141(d)(1). Future victims lack either debts owed by the debtor or claims
themselves. That is why the phrase future claim comes so easily. If future claims are
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all, prior to bankruptcy. For the most part the cases take the view that, unless
carefully retained in the plan, which would provide fair notice as suggested
above, the confirmation of the plan terminates the claim. The sensible theory
is that these postconfirmation defendants reasonably understood that the
confirmation of the plan resolved the parties' prebankruptcy obligations to the
debtor. However, the confirmation effect section, § 1141, says drearily little on
this subject which may explain why the courts avoid resting the decisions there.
What may prove worse, however, would be the courts' deciding that the res
judicata principle discharges the debtor's claim upon confirmation, as though
the obscurity of § 1141 signals a need for the judge-made principle of res
judicata.
Notwithstanding the very difference between the prebankruptcy debtor and
the postconfirmation debtor which bankruptcy accomplishes, the courts are
saying these are the same parties, same issues etc., and they fall within the res
judicata principle. Clearly, reorganization aims to settle the past and go on free
from whatever past may be overthrown. So, the res judicata principle may befit
these cases about whipsawing debtors who don't disclose an intent to chase a
putative prebankruptcy obligor. Surely, res judicata may catch the point of
§ 1141(a), whatever that is. Yet either res judicata or § 1141(a) may have the
unfortunate effect of adjudicating claims of either debtor or creditors to which
a plan does not expressly speak. At least, however, § 1141(a) offers the
opportunity to ask whether the "provisions" of a chapter 11 plan affect
prebankruptcy rights. If either the plan or the confirmation order of the court
per se was res judicata of all the parties intersese rights, § 1141(a) may have no
reason to address the narrower subject of "provisions of a plan." Nor would it
be necessary for a limited settling of past relationships for a plan to list every
claim deriving from the preconfirmation setting as to which a plan proposes
no change. But that would be necessary under loose versions of res judicata in
which judges unfamiliar with bankruptcy might suppose an end to everything
outside of a confirmed plan, which no doubt appeals to debtors and creditors
30 8
satisfied by a plan.

discharged by the cited section, it would follow that any future debt or claim, with any
link to preconfirmation behavior of the debtor, would be discharged under (d)(1).
On the other hand, the lack of discharge of such future claims is no more a bar to
creating a successful reorganization in chapter 11 than it is outside of bankruptcy.
Reserves must somehow be plotted to pay for future claims. As §_1123 illustrates, a
chapter 11 plan may contain almost whatever is wanted. The confirmation standards
are also not divorced from recognition of future claims. These standards invariably
provide tests for whether a class is deemed to accept a plan and for whether impaired
but non-accepting classes may involumtarily be bound to the plan. But neither the fair
and equitable standard (§1129(b)) for cramdown, nor the liquidation value for the best
interests standard (§1129(a)(7)(ii)), needs to be read as though the value of the enterprise
must be determined without regard to future claims.
308 CompareIn re Jartran, 886 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Benjamin Coal Co., 978 F.2d
823 (3d Cir. 1992)(denying administrative priority status in converted chapter 7 case to
former chapter 11 administrative claim where postconfirmation conversion under
§ 1141(d)(1)) with In re White Farm Equip. Co., 943 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
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The correct analysis of whether a debtor's claim from the prebankruptcy past
survives confirmation comes from the more limited source of the bankruptcy
text in § 1141(a) under which the obscurity of both "provisions" and "binds"
must be faced. Yet the emergent res judicata analysis might affect a claim of
setoff like that in DeLaurentiis.In the leading case, 3 09 Judge Kaufman correctly
denied the confirmed debtor the opportunity to pursue a lending liability claim
resting wholly on prebankruptcy facts. As the judge pointed out, "the timely
bringing of such a claim may have affected the parameters of a bankruptcy
repayment schedule." 310 That this reasoning supports the suggested debtor's
burden of going forward on such matters prior to confirmation, however,
results in suggesting, again on res judicata principles, that creditors with
interests in property of the debtor might also qua claimant have to go forward.
In the latter view, the setoff holder may not safely ride outside the
reorganization proceeding.
Nevertheless, the core of good sense in the proposition that liens survive
bankruptcy should apply as well to the setoff right. At least the lien or setoff
right should survive a bankruptcy in a manner narrower than the possible res
judicata constructions. Where a setoff right is not addressed or addressed
impermissibly,3 11 no debtor should have any greater claim against a setoff
112 S. Ct. 1292 (1992)(IRS priority trust fund tax claim in second chapter 11); compare
Bank of Louisiana v. Pavlovich (In re Pavlovich), 952 F.2d 114(5th Cir. 1992)(concluding
that preconfirmation grounds for debt nondischargeability are discharged by chapter
11 confirmation and inapplicable in converted chapter 7) withi Spring Valley Farms, Inc.
v. Crow (In re Spring Valley Farms, Inc.), 863 F.2d 832 (11th Cir. 1989)(standing for the
proposition that § 1141 does not discharge a claim of creditor lacking knowledge of
claim's bar date, although creditor had general knowledge of bankruptcy proceedings).
Cf. § 348(d).
30 9 Sure-Snap Corp. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co. (In re Sure-Snap Corp.), 948 F.2d
869 (2d Cir. 1991). See also Bank of Lafayette v. Baudoin (In re Baudoin), 1993 WL 1871
(5th Cir. 1993); Eubanks v. FDIC, 970 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1992); In re Brady Municipal
Gas Corp., 936 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 657 (1991); In re Howe, 913 F.2d
1138 (5th Cir. 1990); Hendrick v. Avent, 891 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 64
(1990); Southmark Properties v. Charles House Corp., 742 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1984); Cf.
Latham v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 896 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Colley, 814 F.2d
1008,1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898 (1987)(stating that "[olld bankruptcy cases,
like old soldiers, never die").
310

Sure-Snap Corp., 948 F.2d at 870.
A plan or an order confirming a plan might provide general language terminating
all interests in property of the estate not provided for in the plan. Such language cannot
affect parties beyond the limits of due process or bankruptcy procedure. Bankruptcy
court jurisdiction permits the bankruptcy court to disallow claims or invalidate liens.
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (K). However, if terminative language in a plan or order has the
effect of terminating setoff or lien rights, then the established procedures providing
normal litigational notice and an opportunity to be heard under the Bankruptcy Rules
(e.g., 7001) will not have been provided such parties.
The fifth circuit recently purported to untangle its own conflicting res judicata
analyses of postconfirmation issues by rejecting res judicata when chapter 13 debtors
did not object to a secured claim. Sun Finance Co. v. Howard (In re Howard), 972 F.2d
639 (5th Cir. 1992). The debtors listed the secured claim as disputed because they claimed
311
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holder than it had prior to confirmation. In such a case no provision of a plan
should bind a setoff holder to a legal relation different than had previously
existed. 312 Nor should such a plan have "dealt with property" subject to a setoff
right or lien such that it might be "free and clear" of preconfirmation claims. 313
Surely much remains to be discovered about the effects of confirmation of
chapter 11 and the analogous stages of other bankruptcy proceedings. The
remarkable tale of lien survival after bankruptcy lacks a conclusion. We are also
ignorant of whether or how setoffs will fare in this or their own tale.
Nevertheless, setoff holders must defend their rights and beware chapter 11
plans which ignore setoffs. Courts should not follow the imaginary conflict
DeLaurentiis supposed in order to protect setoff claims. Nor should courts
indulge creditors with setoff claims who reasonably should have known a
chapter 11 plan proposed to cancel such claims. Nevertheless, debtors should
not expect more from what their plans propose than what they say. The
provisions of a chapter 11 plan bind debtor and creditors and not any silence
which might stir frivolous pleas of res judicata.
VII. CONCLUSION
The right question about setoff under the code is what priority and not why
priority for the setoff. Setoffs are eligible for priority so long as the setoff right
has a value greater than zero. When a debtor is insolvent the value of a setoff
right may be closer to zero than the face amount. Courts do not merely have
the discretion to value the setoff. The code mandates valuation of the setoff in
bankruptcy. Though here as elsewhere valuation is difficult and problematical,
that is required. Though here the effect of that valuation is difficult and
problematical, such questions bear on the setoff in bankruptcy.

an action against secured claimant for unfair and deceptive trade practices as an asset.
Their plan provided for compromise of the parties' mutual claims by payment on the
secured claim of less than 10%. The court granted that § 1327(a) "[g]ives a Chapter 13
reorganization plan sweeping binding effect on all creditors ... whether or not the claim
[sic] of such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan." 972 F.2d at

640. Yet that section of the code "[clannot be read in isolation." Id. Because the debtors
had never objected to the proof of claim the secured claimant had filed, the plan could
not reduce the claim. So the Howard court interpreted In re Simmons, 765 F.2d 547 (5th

Cir. 1985).
The circuit had also decided that although the bankruptcy court lacked the
authority to release a guaranty of a third party to creditors, confirmation of a chapter
13 plan so providing was res judicata. Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046 (5th
Cir. 1987). Squaring Simmons and Shioaf, the Howard panel held that "[Sihoaf stands for

the proposition that a confirmed chapter 13 plan is res judicata as to all parties who
participate in the confirmation process." 972 F.2d at 641. Cf. In re Szostek, 886 F.2d 1405
(3d Cir. 1989). Parties who receive no objection to their claim, nor participate in the

confirmation process, fall outside the res judicata effect of confirmation under Simmons.
312§ 1141(a).
313§ 1141(c).
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Valuing setoffs in bankruptcy fits the general treatment of liens in
bankruptcy as well as other well-positioned prebankruptcy creditors. As well,
valuing setoffs in bankruptcy leaves the setoffs proscribed completely by
§ 553(a) and (b) intact. Valuing setoffs in bankruptcy corrects the conventional
perpetuation of face valuation of setoff as a policy in favor of reorganization
which is sufficiently accomplished by present bankruptcy law.
Finally, the treatment of setoff in and after bankruptcy has created
controversy including imaginary rules precluding debtors in bankruptcy from
asserting setoff; conflicts between the setoff provision and the plan
confirmation or the confirmation effect provisions; and conflict between the
latter and the rule of res judicata. To these controversies, and others, a better
theory of setoff in bankruptcy based on valuation of setoffs may bring needed
relief.
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